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ABSTRACT
 Capital structure can have important consequences for firm value. High leverage 
increases firms’ probability of bankruptcy, and is shown to be the primary cause of 
financial distress. As suggested by a strand of literature on capital structure and product 
market interactions, high leverage is costly because financial weakness could induce 
unfavorable actions by product market participants such as customers and competitors. 
While the costs of high leverage are well documented in the extant literature, little is known 
on the factors that influence the costs of high leverage. This dissertation addresses this gap 
in the literature by examining how the costs of high leverage, measured by the sensitivity 
of firm sales growth to high leverage, are influenced by corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), creditor rights, and national culture. 
The first essay examines the relation between CSR and the costs of high leverage. 
We find that CSR reduces losses in market share when firms are highly leveraged. Our 
main evidence persists when we use regression of discontinuity design (RDD) and 
difference-in-difference (DID) to address endogeneity. We also examine whether CSR 
separately mitigates the high leverage costs driven by customers and competitors. We find 
that CSR helps high-leveraged firms retain customers and guard against rival predation. 
Our results support the stakeholder value maximization view of CSR.  
vii 
The second essay examines the impact of creditor rights on the costs of high 
leverage. We find that strong creditor rights increase the costs of high leverage. This result 
lends support to the dark-side effects of strong creditor rights when a firm is highly 
leveraged. The negative impact of creditor rights on high leverage costs is more 
pronounced for the types of creditor protection that drive creditors’ hold-up incentives as 
well as for firms located in countries with developed banking system (rather than bond 
market system), and firms with higher liquidation costs. When we explore the dark-side 
effects of creditor rights on specific players, we find that strong creditor rights intensify 
the adverse responses of customers and competitors. In an additional analysis, we find that 
creditor rights intensify the adverse responses of employees. Overall, our findings 
contribute to the debate on the role of creditor rights and shed light on the channels 
underlying the dark-side effects of creditor rights. 
The third essay examines how national culture (specifically collectivism) 
influences the costs of high leverage. We find that these costs are mitigated in collectivist 
countries through two potential channels of influence: tight group structures and mental 
conditioning. This relation is stronger where high leverage costs are more pronounced and 
where legal systems are less developed. We extend our analysis to include employee and 
supplier stakeholder groups and find that collectivism helps highly leveraged firms retain 
employees and obtain trade credit from suppliers. Collectively, our findings suggest that 
national culture affects corporate financial outcomes by simultaneously influencing key 
stakeholders in the firm and its environment. 
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CHAPTER 1 
DOES CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY REDUCE THE COSTS 
OF HIGH LEVERAGE? EVIDENCE FROM CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
AND PRODUCT MARKETS INTERACTIONS 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
Research on capital structure and product markets interactions documents 
significantly negative effects of high leverage on product market performances (e.g., Opler 
and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006). However, very little attention is paid to the 
mechanisms that may mitigate high leverage costs. In this paper, we fill this gap in the 
literature. We argue that corporate social responsibility (CSR) can mitigate the negative 
impact of high leverage on product market performances. Our study offers insights into the 
potentially important role of CSR in reducing the costs of high leverage due to a firm’s 
conflicts with its stakeholders such as customers and competitors. 
Stakeholders can impose significant costs on highly leveraged firms. For instance, 
high leverage leads to substantial losses in market share due to unfavorable actions by 
customers and competitors. Customers are reluctant to purchase from highly leveraged 
firms because these firms may renege on implicit contracts with customers by 
discontinuing product support or reducing product quality (Titman, 1984; Maksimovic and 
Titman, 1991; Matsa, 2011; Kini et al., 2016). Competitors may undertake predatory 
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attacks such as capital-intensive promotion activities (e.g., negative advertising campaigns, 
deep price discounts) against highly leveraged firms. As highly leveraged firms have 
difficulty accessing capital and face high cost of capital, they have less ability to withstand 
predatory attacks from competitors and can be forced to surrender substantial market share 
(Telser, 1966; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Chevalier, 1995).1  
We hypothesize that CSR plays a risk management role by protecting firms from 
stakeholders’ unfavorable reactions in response to high leverage and thereby reduces the 
costs of high leverage. There are at least two reasons for this. First, CSR is associated with 
a halo effect (Hong and Liskovich, 2015; Lins et al., 2017) that increases trust between a 
firm and stakeholder groups such as customers. The halo effect of CSR provides a highly 
leveraged firm with insurance-like protection that tempers negative actions from customers 
and reduces competitors’ incentives to exploit a highly leveraged firm’s weak financial 
position. Second, high-CSR firms are perceived to have lower levels of risk (e.g., lower 
litigation risk) and have a wider investor base (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Hong and 
Kacperczyk, 2009; El Ghoul et al., 2011; Chava, 2014).2 These firms thus have better 
                                                          
1 In this paper, we follow Freeman (1984) and define stakeholders as “any group or individual who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 40). 
Accordingly, we classify both customers and competitors as stakeholders. 
2 Waddock and Graves (1997) argue that firms attempting to shift costs to external stakeholders through 
socially irresponsible actions face a higher likelihood of future explicit claims. Hong and Kacperczyk (2009) 
document that “sin” firms (i.e., tobacco, alcohol, and gaming firms) face a higher risk of litigation. Hong and 
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access to financing and lower cost of capital (Merton, 1987; Heinkel et al., 2001), which 
mitigates the costs imposed on the firm by predatory attacks from competitors.  
To examine the role of CSR for highly leveraged firms, we obtain firms’ CSR 
scores from MSCI ESG STATS, which is the most extensive database on firms’ CSR 
practices and has been widely used in recent finance studies on CSR (e.g., Bae et al., 2011; 
El Ghoul et al., 2011; Deng et al., 2013; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Di Giuli and 
Kostovetsky, 2014; Krüger, 2015; Hong and Liskovich, 2015; Lins et al., 2017; Jung et al., 
2016). Following Campello (2006), we use the sensitivity of industry-adjusted sales growth 
to high leverage as a measure of high leverage cost, in which a more negative coefficient 
represents a higher cost. Industry-adjusted sales growth measures “the ﬁrm’s sales growth 
relative to that of its industry rivals in a given year; this roughly gauges a ﬁrm’s market 
share growth” (Campello, 2006, p. 148).  
Using a sample of 2,739 U.S. firms over the 1996 to 2012 period, we find that CSR 
mitigates the costs of high leverage. Specifically, a one-standard-deviation increase in a 
firm’s relative-to-rival CSR score reduces highly leveraged firms’ losses in industry-
adjusted sales growth by 1.1%, which is equivalent to recouping 70% of the costs of high 
                                                          
Kacperczyk (2009) argue that norm-constrained institutional investors tend to avoid “sin” stocks in their 
portfolios.  
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leverage (1.6%). Our main evidence is robust to using alternative proxies for CSR and 
leverage.  
Identifying the causal effects of CSR on high leverage costs is challenging, as both 
CSR and high leverage costs are subject to endogeneity.3 Both CSR and high leverage costs 
could be driven by unobserved firm-specific factors. For instance, firms with deep pockets 
or low cost of capital tend to invest more in CSR and these firms can withstand competition 
in distress, rather than CSR causally enhancing firms’ competitiveness. Endogeneity could 
also come from reverse causality: a reduction in sales can force a firm to incur debt to cover 
expenses, while high-CSR firms somehow borrow less. We use two identification 
strategies to establish the causal effect of CSR on high leverage costs.4 First, we use 
regression of discontinuity design (RDD), which allows us to create “locally” exogenous 
variation in CSR by making use of shareholder-sponsored CSR proposals that pass or fail 
by a small margin (Cuñat et al., 2012; Flammer, 2015a). Such close-call CSR proposals 
                                                          
3  Previous studies (e.g., Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2006) address endogeneity in the relation 
between leverage and sales growth. In addition to addressing the endogeneity of the high-leverage variable, 
we tackle endogeneity arising from the CSR variable. 
4 In our main analyses, we also mitigate endogeneity concerns by using the relative measurement method 
(Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006). Because peer firms’ performance is beyond a focal 
firm’s control, relative-to-peer measures are less likely to be endogenous. We also follow Campello (2006) 
and measure high leverage costs using long-term debt, which is less sensitive to short-term performance, 
and we use two-year lags between our high leverage and CSR measures and sales growth. 
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should be akin to random assignment of CSR to companies and allow for clean inference 
on the effect of CSR on high leverage costs. Second, we introduce a set of shocks that 
influence the costs of high leverage but are exogenous with respect to firms’ CSR. 
Evidence of a more pronounced relationship between CSR and high leverage costs under 
those exogenous shocks should suggest that endogeneity biases do not drive our main 
results. We employ two sets of exogenous shocks: the reduction in import tariffs (Frésard, 
2010; Valta, 2012) and exogenous economic and political conditions (Campello, 2003; 
Baker et al., 2015). The endogeneity test results consistently show that CSR causes a 
decrease in high leverage costs. 
We next examine whether CSR reduces the costs of high leverage through the 
customer channel, the competitor channel, or both. We call the costs of high leverage due 
to unfavorable actions by customers and competitors customer-driven costs and 
competitor-driven costs, respectively. If the customer channel holds, we should find a 
stronger effect of CSR when customer-driven costs are higher—for example, when product 
specialization or customer switching costs are higher. Similarly, if the competitor channel 
holds, the effect of CSR should be more pronounced when competitor-driven costs are 
higher—for example, when competitors are financially robust (Campello, 2003; Campello 
and Fluck, 2006) or when highly leveraged firms are small and relatively easy to drive out 
of the market. Our results are consistent with these predictions, suggesting that the 
mitigating effects of CSR on the costs of high leverage operate through both the customer 
and competitor channels. 
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Our study makes contributions to at least two literatures. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, our study is the first to investigate the role of CSR in the unique setting of 
capital structure and product market interactions. While prior studies on capital structure 
and product market performances focus on the negative consequences of high leverage 
policies,5 ours provides a mechanism to mitigate such negative effect of high leverage. 
Furthermore, our study allows us to identify specific channels through which CSR affects 
firm value. In related work, Deng et al. (2013) examine the effect of CSR on firm value in 
the setting of mergers, as the merger approval and integration processes are also influenced 
by various stakeholder groups. Our study builds on and extends their work by identifying 
how CSR influences two specific stakeholder groups, namely customers and competitors. 
We show that CSR reduces the adverse behavior of customers and competitors when firms 
are highly leveraged. This evidence on the risk management role of CSR improves our 
understanding of the mechanisms through which CSR influences firm value. 
Second, our study contributes to the debate on whether CSR is value-enhancing or 
value-destroying. The value-enhancing view holds that CSR increases shareholder welfare 
by improving firm–stakeholder relationships. Research that substantiates this view finds 
                                                          
5 For example, Chevalier (1995) finds that prices fall following leveraged buyouts (LBO) in local markets 
where competitors have low leverage, suggesting that low leverage rivals prey on LBO firms. Matsa (2011) 
finds that highly leveraged supermarket firms tend to degrade their products’ quality. Kini et al. (2016) show 
that firms with higher financial leverage experience a greater probability of a product recall, as well as more 
frequent and severe recalls. 
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that firms with high customer awareness, high employee satisfaction, and fewer agency 
problems command higher valuations (Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Edmans, 2011; Ferrell 
et al., 2016). CSR improves investors’ perception of a firm’s trustworthiness and thus 
mitigates market underreaction to earnings news (Jung et al., 2016). The adoption of close-
call CSR proposals increases firm value by increasing labor productivity and sales growth 
(Flammer, 2015a). High-CSR firms undertake value-enhancing mergers and acquisitions 
(Deng et al., 2013), and they perform better during the 2008–2009 financial crisis (Lins et 
al., 2017). By contrast, the value-decreasing view holds that CSR activities are 
manifestations of agency problems. Studies supporting this view find that CSR activities 
reduce shareholder wealth by increasing opportunistic managers’ ability to misuse 
corporate resources for their private gain (Friedman, 1970; Pagano and Volpin, 2005; 
Cronqvist et al., 2009; Masulis and Reza, 2015). Using the setting of capital structure and 
product market interactions, our study contributes to the debate by supporting the 
stakeholder value maximization view of CSR. 
Our study proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 describes our sample, the main 
variables, and our empirical design. Section 1.3 presents the results. Section 1.4 concludes.  
1.2. SAMPLE, MAIN VARIABLES, AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
1.2.1. Sample Construction 
The sample selection process begins with all U.S. firms in Compustat over the 1988 
to 2012 period. We omit observations that have negative total assets and sales, missing 
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equity, or a long-term debt-to-asset ratio less than 0 or greater than 1. We next eliminate 
firm-years with asset or sales growth greater than 200% to control for outliers. We further 
exclude observations with a missing Fama–French (1997) 48-industry classification and 
observations from financial institutions, utilities, and industries that are not clearly defined 
(i.e., industries coded “almost nothing”). Based on the resulting sample, we compute both 
the absolute value and the industry-year mean of our main financial variables. To ensure 
that the industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we require that each industry-
year contain at least four firms. These filters yield 123,667 firm-year observations 
representing 13,919 firms.  
Next, we merge the Compustat sample with data from MSCI ESG STATS 
(formerly known as KLD STATS), which tracks firms’ CSR ratings since 1991. Based on 
the MSCI ESG STATS data, we calculate the adjusted CSR scores and their industry-year 
means. We require a minimum of four CSR observations for each industry-year. Firm-
years with missing values for variables in our main regression are excluded. We further 
merge our sample with data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to 
obtain annual risk-adjusted stock returns and data from I/B/E/S to obtain analyst forecast 
information used to compute firms’ implied cost of equity.6 The final sample comprises an 
                                                          
6 In this step, we use a “left join” approach whereby we retain all observations in the Compustat-MSCI sample 
and add data from CRSP and I/B/E/S because, otherwise, the intersection of the four data sets would yield a 
limited number of observations. Note that while we drop observations with missing values in regressions in 
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unbalanced panel of 16,390 U.S. firm-year observations representing 2,739 firms over the 
1996 to 2012 period.7 
Table 1.1 presents the sample distribution by industry (using the Fama–French 48-
industry classification) and year. Firms belonging to the Business Services (12.31%), 
Retail (8.93%), and Electronic Equipment (7.95%) categories dominate the sample. 
Turning to the distribution by year, the number of sample firms is steady at slightly over 
300 per year over the 1996 to 2002 period before increasing to 622 in 2004 and 1,600 in 
2005. The number of firms per year is then fairly stable at around 1,600 over the 2005 to 
2012 period. Changes in the distribution by year are due to increased CSR coverage.  
1.2.2. Main Variables 
1.2.2.1. Corporate Social Responsibility 
To measure a firm’s CSR activities, we rely on MSCI ESG STATS. Information 
used to construct firms’ CSR ratings comes from government agencies, non-governmental 
                                                          
which the outcome variable is sales growth, we allow missing values in regressions using other outcome 
variables, as again we would otherwise face a limited number of observations. Thus, the number of 
observations for other outcome variables is fewer than 16,390, as shown in Table 1.2, Panel A (e.g., COEt 
has 12,996 observations). 
7 For each firm-year observation, the number of CSR strength components in the human rights area is zero 
from 1991 to 1993 and, thus, CSR scores defined as described in Section 2.2 are missing during this period. 
Because the CSR data for our purposes start in 1994 and we lag these data two years in the baseline regression, 
our final sample starts in 1996. 
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organizations, global media publications, annual reports, regulatory filings, proxy 
statements, and company disclosures. MSCI ESG STATS coverage has expanded over 
time. Over the 1991 to 2000 period, it covered the S&P 500 and Domini Social Index. 
Since 2000, additional indexes have been included in its coverage, with the Russell 1000 
Index added in 2001, the Large Cap Social Index added in 2002, and both the Russell 2000 
Index and the Broad Market Social Index added in 2003.  
MSCI ESG STATS tracks seven CSR areas: community, diversity, employee 
relations, environment, human rights, product characteristics, and corporate governance. 
Within each of these areas, a number of strength and concern factors are assigned a value 
of 0 or 1 (see Appendix A). For each firm-year, we calculate the scores for each CSR area 
by subtracting the number of concerns from the number of strengths. We then obtain the 
firm’s raw CSR score, CSR_NET, by summing the scores across all areas except corporate 
governance.8 This simple summation approach is widely used in the literature (El Ghoul et 
al., 2011; Jiao, 2010; Bae et al., 2011). However, Deng et al. (2013) note that comparing 
raw CSR scores can be problematic because the number of strengths and concerns in an 
area varies considerably over time. For example, in the employee relations area, the 
“Health and safety” factor is not available until 2003. To address this issue, we follow 
                                                          
8 We exclude the corporate governance component to ensure that our CSR measure is not simply a proxy for 
governance effects. However, our results continue to hold when we include corporate governance, as shown 
in robustness tests.  
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Deng et al. (2013) and construct our main CSR measure, CSR, by dividing the raw strength 
and concern scores of each area by the number of factors in that area-year and then taking 
the difference between the adjusted strength and concern scores for that area. Appendix B 
provides detailed variable definitions. 
1.2.2.2. The Costs of High Leverage 
In a study revisiting Opler and Titman’s (1994) finding that high leverage has a 
detrimental effect on relative-to-rival product market performance, Campello (2006) shows 
that in equilibrium, the negative product market effect of leverage arises only when 
leverage is sufficiently high. He finds that excessive indebtedness leads to unfavorable 
actions by customers and competitors, whereas moderate indebtedness is associated with 
improved relative-to-rival sales performance. We follow Campello (2006) and capture the 
costs of high leverage using the sensitivity of sales to high leverage. Specifically, we run 
the following model: 
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑎 + 𝜆1𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 +  𝜆2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + ∑  
2
𝑘=1  𝜆3𝑘𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +
∑  2𝑘=1 𝜆4𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∑  
2
𝑘=1 𝜆5𝑘𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,       (1) 
where i indexes firms and t indexes years. Sales growth, SALES_G, is assumed to 
reflect the actions of customers and competitors. We should observe a decrease in sales 
growth if customers abandon the firm or if the firm faces predation by competitors. HLEV 
is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the firm’s long-term debt ratio is in the top 
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three deciles of the overall sample in a given year. We use long-term debt in constructing 
our high leverage measure to mitigate concerns about reverse causality from sales growth 
to leverage because long-term debt is less likely to be adjusted in response to short-term 
performance (Campello, 2006). We further attempt to mitigate endogeneity by using a two-
year lag between the high leverage measure and sales growth (Campello, 2006). The 
coefficient on HLEV, 𝜆1, captures the costs of high leverage, with a more negative value 
indicating higher costs.  
The above model controls for several variables that are correlated with both sales 
growth and leverage, as their omission would lead to biased coefficients on HLEV. Our 
first control is firm size, SIZE, which is equal to the natural logarithm of total assets. Large 
firms tend to have higher debt capacity. At the same time, large firms tend to be mature 
firms, which grow at a slower pace. The second control variable is profitability, PROFIT, 
computed as operating earnings plus depreciation over total assets. High leverage may 
indicate that a firm cannot generate sufficient revenue to cover expenses. However, high 
leverage may discipline management (Jensen, 1986) and increase profitability, which can 
affect future sales growth through the firm’s ability to retain earnings. Our third control 
variable is capital investment, INV, which is equal to capital expenditures over total assets. 
While a firm’s capital investment depends on its debt burden, it contributes to future sales 
growth. The final control variable is the ratio of advertising and selling expenses to total 
sales, SELLEXP. Higher selling expenses should be positively related to future sales but 
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are also correlated with leverage (Chevalier and Scharfstein, 1996). All control variables 
are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. The reported 
t-statistics are based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for 
clustering at the firm level. Appendix B provides detailed variable definitions. 
1.2.3. Empirical Design 
To examine the effect of CSR on the costs of high leverage, we augment the costs 
of high leverage model in Equation (1) by adding two terms: the interaction between HLEV 
and our proxy for CSR and the standalone CSR measure. The regression is as follows: 
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑏 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2×𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 +  𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 
∑  
2
𝑘=1
 𝛽5𝑘𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∑  
2
𝑘=1
𝛽6𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∑  
2
𝑘=1
𝛽7𝑘𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
+ 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 .       (2) 
In (2), 𝛽1 measures the effect of CSR on the costs of high leverage. A positive 
(negative) value indicates that CSR activities reduce (increase) the costs of high leverage. 
One main concern with the model described by Equations (1) and (2) is endogeneity 
bias. First, both CSR and high leverage could reflect unobserved firm characteristics such 
as corporate culture. Second, deteriorating sales performance could induce a firm to 
increase debt to cover expenses. To mitigate such concerns, in our main analyses, we adopt 
the relative measurement method (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), 
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whereby regression variables are determined in part by other firms’ performance. Given 
that other firms’ performance is outside a focal firm’s control, relative-to-peers variables 
are less likely to be endogenous. Specifically, we measure SALES_G, CSR, and the control 
variables relative to their industry-year means, and we construct HLEV such that a firm is 
considered highly leveraged if, in a given year, its relative-to-mean leverage ratio is in the 
top three deciles. Moreover, as with HLEV, we use a two-year lag between CSR and sales 
growth. In additional tests, we address potential endogeneity by using RDD and difference-
in-difference approaches. 
Table 1.2, Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the key variables (before 
industry-year adjustments) used in Equations (1) and (2), and Panel B reports the pairwise 
correlations between these variables. The pairwise correlation coefficients among the 
control variables are low, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a primary concern. 
1.3. RESULTS 
In Section 1.3.1., we provide evidence first on the costs of high leverage and then 
on the role of CSR in mitigating the costs of high leverage. In Section 1.3.2., we address 
endogeneity concerns. In Section 1.3.3., we examine the extent to which the effect of CSR 
on the costs of high leverage is driven by the customer and competitor channels. Finally, 
in Section 1.3.4., we check the robustness of our results to alternative measures of high 
leverage and CSR. 
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1.3.1. CSR and the Costs of High Leverage 
In this section, we first establish that the effect of high leverage on product market 
performance as measured by sales growth is negative. We then examine whether CSR 
mitigates this negative effect. Model 1 of Table 1.3 reports the results of regressing 
Equation (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS). The coefficient on the high-leverage 
dummy is significantly negative, indicating that high leverage is associated with reduced 
sales growth. Specifically, we find that firms with high leverage experience 1.6% lower 
relative-to-rival sales growth than other firms. The magnitude of this estimate is close to 
the -1.9% documented by Campello (2006) for a sample that ends before 2000. Because 
90% of our sample observations correspond to the 2000 to 2012 period, our findings 
indicate that the costs of high leverage documented by Campello (2006) have persisted 
over the last decade. 
Models 2 and 3 of Table 1.3 report the results of regressing Equation (2) using OLS. 
Model 2 regresses sales growth on CSR×HLEV, HLEV, and CSR after including the control 
variables and shows that CSR attenuates the costs of high leverage. Model 3, our baseline 
model, shows that CSR mitigates the costs of high leverage. Specifically, in Model 3, the 
coefficient estimate on CSR×HLEV is significantly positive at 0.025, suggesting that a one-
standard-deviation increase in our industry-adjusted CSR score increases a highly 
leveraged firm’s relative-to-industry sales growth two years ahead by 1.1%. Recall that in 
Model 1, the coefficient estimate on HLEV, the proxy for high leverage costs, is -0.016. 
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The effect of CSR is thus economically substantial, reducing the negative effect of high 
leverage on sales growth by 69% (0.011/0.016). Taken together, the results indicate that 
firms face lower costs of leverage if they adopt CSR, consistent with the risk management 
role of CSR. 
Interestingly, we find that the standalone CSR term loads significantly negatively 
on sales growth. Note that the standalone CSR term captures the effect of CSR when firms 
have lower leverage and are financially healthy. Its negative coefficient suggests that the 
risk management benefit of CSR is limited and indeed outweighed by the costs of CSR 
investment when firms maintain low leverage and are financially healthy. We interpret 
these findings as evidence that CSR investment is like an insurance product. Firms pay 
insurance premiums in the form of CSR investment costs when they are financially healthy, 
and they receive the benefits of CSR insurance when they are in distress.  
There are alternative interpretations of our results. One might argue that the 
negative effect of CSR on sales growth is a manifestation of agency problem with CSR 
investment and the positive interaction effect indicates the disciplining effect of high 
leverage, which curbs the agency problem and attenuates the negative effect of CSR. We 
argue that such interpretation is unlikely for several reasons. First, the discipline hypothesis 
of high leverage is inconsistent with our finding. The hypothesis predicts a positive relation 
between leverage and sales growth. We find the opposite relation, which is consistent with 
the idea that high leverage is costly rather than beneficial. Second, the agency view predicts 
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a negative effect of CSR on sales growth and an attenuated agency problem of CSR for 
highly leveraged firms. Thus, the total effect (main effect plus interaction effect) of CSR 
on sales growth for highly leveraged firms should be non-positive. On the contrary, we 
find that CSR increases sales growth for highly leveraged firms (Model 3 in Table 1.3). 
Third, the negative coefficient on the standalone CSR term is not robust when using the 
RDD and difference-in-difference approaches shown in Sections 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.2, 
respectively. For these reasons, we conclude that our findings are inconsistent with the 
agency view. 
Another interpretation of our findings is that reduced sales growth in the presence 
of high leverage reflects efficient downsizing. Because firms with high leverage have to 
submit to the scrutiny of capital markets (Jensen, 1986), highly leveraged firms tend to shut 
down or otherwise divest themselves of unprofitable product lines. However, even 
unprofitable product lines could be of value to certain customers; for example, a low-price 
brand may be welcomed by low-income individuals. In this case, a high-CSR firm that 
cares about social welfare might choose to continue an unprofitable product line, resulting 
in worse firm performance. In other words, CSR prevents efficient downsizing, resulting 
in less sensitive changes in sales growth in the presence of high leverage. This alternative 
interpretation predicts that by impeding efficient downsizing, CSR negatively affects the 
performance of highly leveraged firms. Contrary to this prediction, in untabulated results 
we find that CSR helps highly leveraged firms increase stock returns and improve operating 
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performance. These results suggest that rather than negatively affecting firm performance 
by impeding efficient downsizing, CSR positively affects firm performance by reducing 
the costs of high leverage. 
1.3.2. Endogeneity 
Our main results show that CSR reduces the costs of high leverage. However, this 
evidence is subject to potential endogeneity problems arising from the HLEV and CSR 
variables. We use two identification strategies to establish the causal effect of CSR on high 
leverage costs in the following subsections.9 
1.3.2.1. Regression of Discontinuity Design (RDD) 
For our model to be free of endogeneity, we would need to randomly assign firms 
to groups with different levels of CSR and then observe the costs of high leverage across 
                                                          
9 While not reported, we implement several additional tests to further mitigate endogeneity concerns. First, 
we employ the 2SLS approach. We use two instruments for CSR: 1) BLUE (following Deng et al., 2013), 
which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is headquartered in a Democratic state and 0 otherwise and 2) 
one-year lagged CSR. These instruments are relevant because “blue companies” are more likely to “go green” 
(Di Giuli and Kostovetsky, 2014) and firms’ CSR policies tend to be sticky. To instrument for HLEV, we use 
two-year lagged values in the spirit of Campello (2003). Second, we use the system GMM approach 
developed by Blundell and Bond (1998). Third, we estimate firm-fixed effect regressions. In our baseline 
model, we do not add firm fixed effects due to the “stickiness” of CSR. As indicated by Wooldridge (2002) 
and Zhou (2001), fixed effects can generate imprecise estimates on the key explanatory variables that do not 
vary much over time. Nevertheless, the 2SLS, system GMM, and firm fixed effects model all consistently 
support our main evidence. 
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the groups. While such randomization is not available to the researcher, the RDD approach 
of Flammer (2015a) and Cuñat et al. (2012) allows us to create “locally” exogenous 
variation in CSR by making use of shareholder-sponsored CSR proposals that pass or fail 
by a small margin. The idea is that a firm that marginally passes a CSR proposal (e.g., 
50.1%) should not be systematically different from a firm that marginally fails a similar 
CSR proposal (e.g., 49.9%) and, thus, such close-call CSR proposals should be akin to 
random assignment of CSR to companies and allow for clean inference on the effect of 
CSR on high leverage costs.  
We gather information on CSR proposals from RiskMetrics and SharkRepellent 
databases. RiskMetrics traces shareholder proposals by S&P 1,500 companies and an 
additional 400–500 widely held companies from 1997 to 2011. SharkRepellent covers 
around 4,000 companies in the Russell 3000 index over the 2005 to 2012 period. To ensure 
that the proposals in our sample are related to CSR, we retain only those proposals 
identified by the type “SRI” (socially responsible initiative) in RiskMetrics or 
“Social/Environmental Issues” in SharkRepellent. Note that while the RDD approach can 
be implemented by restricting the sample to those proposals that pass or fail by a small 
margin, discarding all non-close proposals yields a small number of observations. An 
alternative approach suggested by Flammer (2015a) is to include polynomials that 
approximate a continuous relationship between the outcome variable and the CSR proposal 
vote. This approach makes use of the full sample of CSR proposals, mitigating the concern 
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about inferences from a small sample. Therefore, we conduct our RDD analysis using the 
approach with polynomials.10 
Specifically, we run the following model11: 
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖,𝑡 =  𝜋1𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 ×𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝜋2𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝜋3𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑃𝐴𝑆𝑆𝐸𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2 
+𝑃𝑙(𝜈𝑖,𝑡, 𝛾𝑙) + 𝑃𝑟(𝜈𝑖,𝑡, 𝛾𝑟) + 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,          (3)  
where SALES_G, HLEV, and the control variables contained in Z are defined as 
before; CSRPASSED is a dummy equal to 1 if the CSR proposal is adopted and 0 otherwise; 
𝑃𝑙(𝜈𝑖,𝑡, 𝛾𝑙) is a flexible polynomial function for observations on the left-hand side of the 
majority threshold γ (i.e., 50%); 𝑃𝑟(𝜈𝑖,𝑡, 𝛾𝑟) is a flexible polynomial function for 
observations on the right-hand side of the majority threshold γ; and ν is the percentage of 
votes on the CSR proposal. Similar to our baseline model, we use a two-year lag between 
CSRPASSED and the outcome variable, sales growth. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level to account for within-firm dependence across observations.  
                                                          
10 We also test the first RDD approach. Specifically, we restrict the sample to CSR proposals that pass or fail 
within a bandwidth of +-10%, +-7.5%, +-5%, and +-2.5% around our majority threshold of 50%. The results 
are qualitatively similar to those in Table 1.4, all consistently supporting our main finding that CSR reduces 
the costs of high leverage. 
11 We thank Caroline Flammer for providing code guidance on the RDD with interactions. 
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Table 1.4 reports the results. In Model 1, we follow Flammer (2015a) and use 
polynomials of order three on the left- and right-hand sides of the majority threshold 
without the inclusion of control variables. We find that the interaction term 
CSRPASSED×HLEV loads significantly positively on SALES_G, with a significant 
coefficient estimate of 0.265. This finding suggests that the passage of CSR proposals is 
associated with a significant decrease in high leverage costs. In Model 2, we further add 
the control variables to Model 1. As pointed out by Flammer (2015a, p. 2558), “if the 
outcome of the vote is truly random, including these controls should not affect the 
coefficient on the pass dummy … since all predetermined characteristics should be 
orthogonal to the assignment of pass versus fail.” We find that the coefficient estimate on 
CSRPASSED×HLEV in Model 2 is close to that in Model 1 in both magnitude and significance 
level, supporting that our experiment is randomized. Models 3 and 4 repeat the previous 
analyses using polynomials of order four (Cuñat et al., 2012). Again, we find positive and 
significant estimates on CSRPASSED×HLEV. Taken together, the RDD results show that 
endogeneity does not drive our main results on the mitigating effect of CSR on high 
leverage costs. 
1.3.2.2. Exogenous Shocks 
In this set of endogeneity tests, we introduce a set of exogenous shocks to our 
model. These shocks influence the costs of high leverage but are exogenous with respect 
to firms’ CSR. Evidence of a more pronounced relationship between CSR and high 
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leverage costs under exogenous shocks that magnify the costs of high leverage would 
suggest that endogeneity problems are not driving our main results. We employ a quasi-
natural experiment as follows. A firm establishes its CSR policy two years before a base 
year. In the base year, the firm experiences an exogenous business shock. Because the 
firm’s CSR precedes the exogenous shocks, it is not likely to be affected by these shocks. 
However, the exogenous shocks can influence the costs of high leverage. Building on this 
argument, we predict that the mitigating effect of CSR on the costs of high leverage is 
magnified after the advent of the exogenous shock.  
We focus on two sets of exogenous shocks. First, we use the reduction in import 
tariffs (e.g., Frésard, 2010; Lileeva and Trefler, 2010; Valta, 2012). A tariff cut can increase 
stakeholders’ sensitivity to high leverage, thus increasing the costs of high leverage. 
Bernard et al. (2006) show that lower trade barriers attract intensified competition from 
foreign rivals. Indeed, import tariff reductions are exogenous shocks that shift the 
competitive landscape of industries (Frésard, 2010). With reduced import tariffs, foreign 
rivals face lower costs of entering U.S. product markets, and therefore introduce a variety 
of goods and services to the U.S. markets (Valta, 2012). In this case, customers are more 
sensitive to high leverage, because in a more competitive environment they have more 
choices and do not have to stick with the original products regardless of the financial 
conditions of the firm. Competitors are also more reactive to a highly leveraged firm 
because the expanded pool of rivals increases the probability of predation. 
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Following prior studies, we use the industry-level import tariff data compiled by 
Feenstra (1996), Feenstra et al. (2002), and Schott (2010). These data cover the U.S. 
manufacturing industries (2000–3999 SIC range) over the 1972 to 2005 period. Following 
common practice (Frésard, 2010; Lileeva and Trefler, 2010; Valta, 2012; Flammer, 2015b) 
we define the “shock” when the reductions of tariff rates12 exceed a certain threshold. In 
particular, we consider industry-years with a tariff reduction at least twice the average 
annual change in the same industry.13 To identify the relation between CSR and high 
leverage costs after tariff shocks, we employ a difference-in-difference regression, 14 
similar to Frésard (2010) and Valta (2012): 
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + γ1𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡×𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2×𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 + γ2𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2×𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2
+ γ3𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡×𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 + γ4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡×𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2
+ γ5𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 + γ6𝐶𝑆𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 + γ7𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑗,𝑡 + γ8𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑  
2
𝑘=1
 γ9𝑘𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 
                                                          
12 The ad valorem tariff rate is computed as the duties collected by U.S. Customs divided by the free-on-
board value of imports. 
13 The alternative choices of threshold (2.5, or 3 times) do not qualitatively influence our results, and thus are 
not reported for brevity. 
14 The sample period of the difference-in-difference regression is 1996–2012. The end of sample period is set 
later than the end of tariff data (2005) to allow time for the main effect to emerge. However, the results are 
qualitatively similar if the sample period is changed to end at 2005.  
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+ ∑  
2
𝑘=1
γ10𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∑  
2
𝑘=1
γ11𝑘𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 .       (4) 
where i, j and t denote firm, industry and year. 𝛼𝑖 is a vector of firm fixed effects. 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is a dummy equal to one if the tariff reduction has taken place in industry 
j by time t (Valta, 2012). Again, SALES_G, CSR, HLEV, and the control variables are 
defined as before. Similar to our main model, standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
The difference-in-difference result is reported in Table 1.5. The regression 
automatically treats all firm-years in industries that have not experienced a reduction in 
tariff as a control group. The coefficient of interest is the three-way interaction among 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 , CSR, and HLEV (γ1), which represents the difference in CSR–high 
leverage costs sensitivity between firms that have experienced tariff reduction and those in 
the control group. In the difference-in-difference model, we find the estimate of the three-
way interaction is 0.074, positive and significant at the 5% level. This finding implies that 
after the tariff shock, firms’ CSR policy reduces extra stakeholder-related costs that could 
occur to highly leveraged firms in an exogenously modified competitive environment. This 
difference-in-difference result ensures that our main finding cannot be fully influenced by 
the endogeneity problems. 
The second set of shocks we consider are exogenous economic and political 
conditions. During an economy-wide downturn, the viability of a highly leveraged firm 
becomes more uncertain, increasing unfavorable actions from both customers and 
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competitors. Following Campello (2003), we use changes in the unemployment rate and 
GDP. An increase in the unemployment rate or a decrease in GDP represents a negative 
shock to aggregate demand that adversely affects the product market environment, thus 
magnifying the costs of high leverage. We also use an annual policy uncertainty index from 
Baker et al. (2015). Greater policy uncertainty puts upward pressure on the cost of 
financing (Baker et al., 2015; Pástor and Veronesi, 2013), limiting the ability of highly 
leveraged firms to withstand attacks from competitors. We therefore expect the costs of 
high leverage to be greater under higher policy uncertainty. 
To test the idea that the effect of CSR on the costs of high leverage is conditioned 
by the exogenous economic and political environment, we mainly rely on the two-step 
procedure of Campello (2003), who examines how continuous exogenous condition 
variables affect the main relation (the relation between CSR and high leverage costs in our 
setting). The results, which are untabulated for brevity, show that the effect of CSR on high 
leverage costs is more pronounced under bad exogenous conditions, lending further 
support to our main finding that CSR reduces the costs of high leverage.15 
                                                          
15 We also test this idea using a good/bad exogenous condition dichotomy. Specifically, we re-run Equation 
(2) separately for firm-years partitioned into good and bad economic condition subsamples. We continue to 
find consistent results. 
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1.3.3. Channels through which CSR Reduces the Costs of High Leverage 
The analyses so far present evidence on the combined effect of CSR on the costs of 
high leverage. The literature shows that customers and competitors each contribute to a 
decline in the performance of highly leveraged firms. In this subsection, we test whether 
this finding extends to our setting—that is, whether the effect of CSR on high leverage 
costs operates through both customers and competitors. 
1.3.3.1. Customer Channel 
If CSR reduces high leverage costs driven by customers, the effect of CSR should 
be stronger when customer-driven costs are higher. Research shows that customer-driven 
costs are higher under higher product specificity (Opler and Titman, 1994). When a 
customer purchases a specialized product, a large portion of the price paid is for implicit 
claims such as future servicing. However, because highly leveraged firms are likely to 
break implicit customer contracts, customers have incentives to avoid high-specificity 
products. We use two proxies for the degree of product specificity. First, following Titman 
and Wessels (1988), we use R&D expenditures. We classify a firm as a high-R&D (low-
R&D) intensity firm in a given year if its R&D-to-sales ratio is greater (smaller) than 0.1% 
two years before the base year (Opler and Titman, 1994). High R&D expenditures suggest 
that the firm is likely to produce more specialized products. Second, we use the asset 
turnover ratio, which is measured as the ratio of total sales to total assets. We classify a 
firm as having high (low) asset turnover if its asset turnover ratio is above (below) the 
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sample median two years before the base year. A lower asset turnover ratio suggests that 
the firm has a longer production cycle (Long et al., 1993) and is hence likely to produce 
more specialized products. 
Table 1.6 presents the results. Model 1 provides the baseline model from Table 1.3 
for comparison. Models 2 and 3 show that the coefficient on CSR×HLEV is significantly 
positive at 0.027 for firms with high R&D intensity but insignificantly positive at 0.012 for 
firms with low R&D intensity. Models 4 and 5 show that the coefficient on CSR×HLEV is 
significantly positive at 0.034 for the low asset turnover subsample but is insignificantly 
positive at 0.009 for the high asset turnover subsample. These results imply that CSR 
mitigates customer-driven leverage costs as captured by measures of product specificity. 
Customer-driven costs are also likely to be higher for firms that produce 
differentiated goods than for firms that produce standardized goods because differentiated 
products are associated with high switching costs, whereas standardized products allow 
customers to switch brands easily. 16  To classify goods as standardized versus 
                                                          
16 To see this, consider Nokia cellphones that were offered only on the Symbian platform (i.e., differentiated 
products). In 2013, when Nokia stopped updating Symbian, thus breaking its implicit contracts with 
customers, its customers’ cellphones lost value. Had Nokia instead allowed its cellphones to operate on 
multiple platforms (i.e., standardized products), its customers could have easily switched to the Android or 
Windows platform, reducing their losses. 
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differentiated, we follow Giannetti et al. (2011) and Rauch (1999) and partition the sample 
into industries with standardized goods versus industries with differentiated goods.17  
Models 6 and 7 of Table 1.6 show that the effect of CSR is strong and significant 
for firms in industries producing differentiated goods but not for firms in industries 
producing standardized goods. These results lend further support to our finding that CSR 
reduces customer-driven leverage costs. 
The mitigating effect of CSR on high leverage costs is also likely to be stronger 
when customers are more sensitive to firms’ CSR activities. Lev et al. (2010) argue that 
corporate charitable contributions are more likely to influence sales for firms producing 
consumer rather than industrial goods. While consumer purchases are influenced by social 
forces and psychological factors, industrial purchases are formalized and follow well-
defined procedures (Corey, 1991), and a firm’s image is thus likely to play a more 
important role for consumers than for industrial buyers. Building on this argument, we 
predict that customers of consumer goods are more sensitive to the CSR activities of highly 
leveraged firms. We follow the methodology of Lev et al. (2010) to define high- and low-
customer-sensitivity industries.18  
                                                          
17 According to Giannetti et al. (2011) and Rauch (1999), industries with differentiated goods have SIC2 
codes 25, 27, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39, and industries with standardized goods have SIC2 codes 12, 
14, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31, and 33. 
18 According to Lev et al. (2010), high-customer-sensitivity industries are those with 4-digit SIC ranges 
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Models 8 and 9 of Table 1.6 report the results. We find, consistent with Lev et al. 
(2010), that the influence of CSR is strong and significant for firms in high-customer-
sensitivity industries but not for firms in low-customer-sensitivity industries. These results 
again suggest that CSR reduces customer-driven costs. 
To summarize, the above subsample tests show that CSR reduces high leverage 
costs for firms in which customer-driven costs are likely to be high, particularly for firms 
that produce high-specificity products, differentiated products, and consumer goods. 
1.3.3.2. Competitor Channel 
If CSR reduces the high leverage costs driven by competitors, the effect of CSR 
should be stronger when competitor-driven costs are higher. We expect competitor-driven 
costs to be high when highly leveraged firms face competitors that are financially robust. 
The rationale is that financially healthy competitors can afford to charge lower prices in an 
attempt to drive a highly leveraged firm out of the market (Campello, 2003; Campello and 
Fluck, 2006). Following prior research, we proxy for the financial condition of a firm’s 
competitors using the industry-average level of debt. We classify an industry as a high-
debt (low-debt) industry in a given year if its average long-term debt ratio is above (below) 
                                                          
[0,999], [2000,2399], [2500,2599], [2700,2799], [2830,2869], [3000,3219], [3420,3429], 3523, [3600,3669], 
[3700,3719], 3751, [3850,3879], [3880,3999], 4813, [4830,4899], [5000,5079], [5090,5099], [5130,5159], 
[5220,5999], [6000,6999], [7000,7299], and [7400,9999]. The remaining industries are classified as low-
customer-sensitivity industries. 
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the overall sample median two years before the base year. We also expect competitor-
driven costs to be high for highly leveraged firms that are small. Leveraged firms that are 
small suffer from more severe information asymmetry problems and hence have more 
difficulty accessing capital (Hovakimian et al., 2012). As a result, these firms can be more 
easily forced out of the market (Opler and Titman, 1994). 
Table 1.7 presents the results. Model 1 again presents the baseline model from 
Table 1.3 for comparison. In Models 2 and 3 of Table 1.7, we find that the coefficient on 
CSR×HLEV is significantly positive for the low-debt industry subsample (0.031, t-statistic 
= 2.53) but insignificantly positive for the high-debt industry subsample (0.011, t-statistic 
= 1.11). Models 4 and 5 report the results for the subsamples partitioned by median market 
share two years before the base year, while Models 6 and 7 present the results for the 
subsamples partitioned by median total assets two years before the base year. Consistent 
with our predictions, we find that less competitive and smaller firms observe a more 
pronounced effect of CSR on high leverage costs. Specifically, the coefficient on 
CSR×HLEV is as large as 0.063 with a t-statistic of 3.53 for highly leveraged firms that 
face financially robust competitors, while it is only 0.010 with a t-statistic of 1.23 for firms 
that face competitors with a weaker financial position. Similarly, we find that the 
coefficient on CSR×HLEV is as large as 0.057 with a t-statistic of 3.02 for small firms, 
while it is only 0.014 with a t-statistic of 1.74 for large firms. These results together suggest 
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that the mitigating effect of CSR on high leverage costs also operates through the 
competitor channel. 
1.3.4. Robustness Tests 
In this subsection, we check whether our main results are robust to using alternative 
measures of HLEV and CSR. Recall that following Opler and Titman (1994), our primary 
measure of high leverage is a dummy equal to 1 if a firm’s leverage ratio in a given year is 
in the top three deciles of the sample. To address concerns that the three-decile cutoff is 
arbitrary, we follow Opler and Titman (1994) and assign a value of 1 to top-decile firm-
year observations and 0 to bottom-decile observations. Comparisons based on this 
definition are made between extremely high-leveraged firms and extremely low-leveraged 
firms, and thus the results should be more pronounced. As can be seen in Models 1 and 2 
of Table 1.8, the coefficients on HLEV are two to three times those in the baseline models 
(-0.036 compared to -0.016; 0.068 compared to 0.025). These results suggest that 1) 
industry-adjusted sales growth is 3.6% lower on average for firms with extremely high 
leverage (top leverage decile) than for firms with extremely low leverage (bottom leverage 
decile) and 2) a one-standard-deviation increase in relative-to-industry CSR score increases 
industry-adjusted sales growth by 3% more for extremely high-leveraged firms compared 
to extremely low-leveraged firms.  
Next, recall that we construct our primary high-leverage measure using long-term 
debt because it is less subject to adjustment and hence should be more exogenous than 
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short-term debt (Campello, 2006). However, Opler and Titman (1994) use the total debt 
ratio, which also incorporates short-term debt. Accordingly, we check whether our main 
results hold after replacing the long-term debt ratio with the total debt ratio. The results 
reported in Models 3 and 4 of Table 1.8 show that although the significance level declines, 
CSR continues to reduce the costs of high leverage.  
In Models 5 and 6, we lag CSR and HLEV by three years rather than two to examine 
whether the full effects of high leverage take more time to emerge and, if so, whether the 
benefits of CSR persist long enough to reduce high leverage costs. This test is inspired by 
Campello (2006). The results show that the costs of high leverage are decreasing in horizon 
(-1% at a three-year lag versus -1.6% at a two-year lag), but the benefits of CSR are 
nonetheless similar (2.4% at a three-year lag versus 2.5% at a two-year lag). 
Turning to alternative proxies for CSR, we first adopt different adjustments in 
computing our CSR measure. In Model 7 of Table 1.8, we use CSR_NET (El Ghoul et al., 
2011; Jiao, 2010; Bae et al., 2011), the net strengths and concerns score for the six areas 
we consider. In Model 8, we follow Jo and Harjoto (2012) and adjust CSR_NET by the 
total number of strength and concern factors. Next, given that simple aggregation of the six 
areas does not account for the relative importance of each area, following Goss and Roberts 
(2011) we use principal component analysis to determine the weight of each dimension. 
Model 9 reports results using a measure of CSR based on the first principal components. 
We also address concerns related to whether all six of the areas considered affect firm 
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value. Hillman and Keim (2001) suggest that the CSR areas directly related to primary 
stakeholders—community, diversity, employee relations, environment, and product 
characteristics—have a greater effect on firm value. Accordingly, in Model 10, we 
construct our CSR measure on the basis of these five primary stakeholder-related areas. 
Finally, while we exclude the corporate governance issue area from our primary measure 
of CSR to rule out the possibility that our results are driven by governance effects, in Model 
11 we report results using a CSR measure based on all seven CSR areas to facilitate 
comparison with other studies (e.g., Deng et al., 2013). We find that all of the alternatively 
defined CSR variables generate results in line with CSR reducing high leverage costs. 
In additional tests that are untabulated, we first examine whether our main finding 
is affected by ownership changes of the CSR database. The CSR database was originally 
maintained by KLD before it was acquired by RiskMetrics Group in 2009 and then sold to 
MSCI Inc. in 2010. Because several factors were added or dropped in 2010 following these 
ownership changes, we re-run our analysis for the 1996 to 2009 period and find 
qualitatively similar results. We also re-run our baseline model using different industry 
specifications, including the Fama–French 5-, 10-, 12-, 17-, 30-, and 38-industry 
classifications and 3- and 4-digit SIC code classifications. We find consistent results that 
CSR leads to lower costs of high leverage. 
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1.4. CONCLUSION 
Departing from traditional research on agency conflicts between shareholders and 
bondholders, a growing body of research on the costs of high leverage finds that two 
players—customers and competitors—can exert a significantly negative impact on the 
value of highly leveraged firms. In this paper we examine whether corporate social 
responsibility influences the behavior of these players favorably and thus mitigates the 
costs of high leverage. 
Using a large sample of 16,390 firm-year observations representing 2,739 firms, 
we find that CSR reduces the costs of high leverage as captured by a loss in sales growth. 
CSR appears to provide a risk management benefit. We further find that CSR helps highly 
leveraged firms keep customers and guard against rival predation, which suggests that the 
effect of CSR operates through both customer and competitor channels.  
Our study highlights the role of previously unexplored mechanisms through which 
CSR influences firm value and the strategic importance of CSR as a risk management 
instrument. Our study also contributes to the debate on whether “doing good” can help a 
firm “do well.” Future research could further our understanding of the effect of CSR on 
firm value by extending our analysis to a wider set of stakeholders such as employees, 
suppliers, the community, and the government.  
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Table 1.1. Sample distribution by industry and year 
 
Panel A. Sample distribution by industry 
# Industry N % 
1 Agriculture 51 0.31 
2 Food products 417 2.54 
3 Candy & soda 45 0.27 
4 Beer & liquor 101 0.62 
5 Tobacco products 29 0.18 
6 Recreation 102 0.62 
7 Entertainment 228 1.39 
8 Printing & publishing 204 1.24 
9 Consumer goods 401 2.45 
10 Apparel 344 2.10 
11 Healthcare 200 1.22 
12 Medical equipment 579 3.53 
13 Pharmaceutical products 708 4.32 
14 Chemicals 578 3.53 
15 Rubber & plastic products 111 0.68 
16 Textile 26 0.16 
17 Construction materials 390 2.38 
18 Construction  254 1.55 
19 Steel works 280 1.71 
20 Fabricated products 5 0.03 
21 Machinery 827 5.05 
22 Electrical equipment 288 1.76 
23 Automobiles & truck 365 2.23 
24 Aircraft 155 0.95 
25 Shipbuilding & industrial metal mining 40 0.24 
26 Defense 50 0.31 
27 Precious metals 3 0.02 
28 Non-metallic & industrial metal mining 72 0.44 
29 Coal 59 0.36 
30 Petroleum & natural gas 828 5.05 
32 Communication 599 3.65 
33 Personal services 248 1.51 
34 Business services 2,017 12.31 
35 Computers 757 4.62 
36 Electronic equipment 1,303 7.95 
37 Measuring & control equipment 442 2.70 
38 Business supplies 370 2.26 
39 Shipping containers 75 0.46 
40 Transportation 348 2.12 
41 Wholesale 608 3.71 
42 Retail 1,463 8.93 
43 Restaurants, hotels & motels 359 2.19 
46 Real estate 61 0.37 
 Total 16,390 100.00 
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Panel A. Sample distribution by industry 
# Industry N % 
Panel B. Sample distribution by year 
Year N %         
1996 340 2.07  
1997 340 2.07 
1998 331 2.02 
1999 327 2.00 
2000 322 1.96 
2001 333 2.03 
2002 345 2.10 
2003 589 3.59 
2004 622 3.79 
2005 1,600 9.76 
2006 1,619 9.88 
2007 1,565 9.55 
2008 1,575 9.61 
2009 1,612 9.84 
2010 1,678 10.24 
2011 1,656 10.10 
2012 1,536 9.37 
Total 16,390 100.00 
Notes: This table presents the Fama–French (1997) 48-industry and fiscal year distributions for our sample 
of 16,390 firm-year observations representing 2,739 unique firms. 
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Table 1.2. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean SD Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maximum 
SALES_Gt 16,390 0.08 0.22 -0.98 -0.01 0.07 0.16 1.95 
CSRt-2 16,390 -0.14 0.48 -3.00 -0.40 -0.17 0.09 3.83 
HLEVt-2 16,390 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
SIZEt 16,390 7.30 1.58 1.07 6.15 7.22 8.33 12.72 
PROFITt-1 16,390 0.08 0.14 -2.66 0.05 0.09 0.13 0.38 
PROFITt-2 16,390 0.08 0.14 -3.57 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.38 
INVESTMENTt-1 16,390 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.40 
INVESTMENTt-2 16,390 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.40 
SELLEXPt-1 16,390 0.31 0.45 0.02 0.13 0.24 0.38 10.72 
SELLEXPt-2 16,390 0.31 0.44 0.02 0.13 0.24 0.38    10.72 
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Panel B. Correlation matrix 
 CSRt-2 HLEV t-2 SIZE t PROFIT t-1 PROFIT t-2 
INVEST-
MENTt-1 
INVEST-
MENTt-2 
SELLEXP t-1 SELLEXP t-2 
CSR t-2 1.00         
HLEV t-2 -0.07*** 1.00        
SIZE t 0.10*** 0.17*** 1.00       
PROFIT t-1 0.07*** -0.06*** 0.22*** 1.00      
PROFIT t-2 0.07*** -0.10*** 0.18*** 0.53*** 1.00     
INVESTMENT t-1 -0.02*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 1.00    
INVESTMENT t-2 -0.01 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.82*** 1.00   
SELLEXP t-1 0.05*** -0.10*** -0.25*** -0.41*** -0.33*** -0.11*** -0.10*** 1.00  
SELLEXP t-2 0.05*** -0.10*** -0.25*** -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.11*** -0.11*** 0.91*** 1.00 
SALES_G t 0.00 -0.04*** 0.02** 0.06*** -0.02** 0.04*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 
Notes: Panel A reports the descriptive statistics for the key variables (before industry-year adjustments) used in Equation (1). Panel B provides the pairwise 
correlations between these variables. Appendix B provides the detailed variable definitions and data sources. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.3. CSR and the costs of high leverage 
  
HLEVt-2 CSRt-2 CSRt-2 
(1) (2) (3) 
CSRt-2 × HLEVt-2  0.023*** 0.025***  
 (3.00) (3.28) 
HLEVt-2 -0.016*** -0.019*** -0.015***  
(-3.86) (-4.61) (-3.85) 
CSRt-2  -0.006 -0.010**  
 (-1.17) (-2.11) 
SIZEt  -0.000  0.000  
(-0.02)  (0.19) 
PROFITt-1  0.064***  0.064***  
(3.11)  (3.13) 
PROFITt-2  -0.006  -0.006  
(-0.29)  (-0.27) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.323***  0.324***  
(3.75)  (3.78) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.111  0.112  
(1.39)  (1.40) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.000  0.000  
(0.00)  (0.01) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.018  0.019  
(1.17)  (1.18) 
CONSTANT -0.009** -0.003 -0.009**  
(-2.37) (-1.44) (-2.44) 
N 16,390 16,390 16,390 
R-squared 0.012 0.002 0.013 
Notes: This table reports the results for the costs of high leverage (Model 1) and the effect of CSR on the 
costs of high leverage (Models 2 and 3) using OLS. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted sales growth 
(SALES_G). The main variables of interest are industry-adjusted CSR (CSR) and a dummy variable equal to 
1 if the firm’s long-term debt-to-assets ratio is in the top three deciles of the overall sample in the given year 
(HLEV). Additional variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. All of the control variables are adjusted 
to their industry-year means and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. 
To ensure that the industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we require that each industry-year contain 
at least four firms. The sample period is 1996 to 2012. The reported t-statistics are based on standard errors 
that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.4. Endogeneity tests: Regression of discontinuity design (RDD) 
 
       All Obs. (order = 3)          All Obs. (order = 4)     
 no controls with controls no controls with controls 
     (1)    (2)    (3)    (4) 
CSRPASSEDt-2 × HLEVt-2 0.265*** 0.223*** 0.268*** 0.232*** 
  (3.29) (2.61) (3.73) (2.89) 
HLEVt-2 -0.275*** -0.220*** -0.277*** -0.229*** 
  (-3.56) (-2.71) (-4.10) (-3.07) 
CSRPASSEDt-2 0.251 0.220 0.318 0.258 
  (1.11) (1.03) (1.20) (1.03) 
N     1,527     1,527     1,527     1,527 
R-squared 0.007 0.029 0.009 0.029 
Notes: This table reports the RDD regression results. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted sales 
growth (SALES_G). CSRPASSED is obtained from RiskMetrics and SharkRepellent and is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if a CSR proposal is adopted and 0 otherwise. HLEV is a dummy variable equal to 1 if, in the given 
year, the firm’s long-term debt-to-assets ratio is in the top three deciles of the overall sample. Additional 
variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. Models 1 and 2 (3 and 4) control for polynomials of order 
3 (4) on the left and right sides of the majority threshold without and with control variables, respectively. All 
of the control variables are adjusted to their industry-year means and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels 
to mitigate the influence of outliers. The sample period is 1999 to 2014. Reported t-statistics are based on 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.5. Endogeneity tests: Exogenous shock of import tariff reduction 
  
Difference-in-difference 
(1) 
Post-reductiont × CSRt-2 × HLEVt-2 0.074**  
(2.13) 
CSRt-2 × HLEVt-2 -0.044  
(-1.42) 
Post-reductiont × HLEVt-2 -0.041  
(-0.83) 
Post-reductiont × CSRt-2  0.067**  
(-2.04) 
HLEVt-2 0.023  
(0.46) 
CSRt-2 0.043  
(1.35) 
Post-reductiont 0.060*  
(1.88) 
SIZEt  0.050***  
(5.12) 
PROFITt-1  -0.109***  
(-2.69) 
PROFITt-2  -0.039  
(-0.96) 
INVESTMENTt-1  -0.295*  
(-1.92) 
INVESTMENTt-2  -0.145  
(-0.93) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.075***  
(3.79) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.047*  
(1.84) 
CONSTANT -0.088**  
(-2.44) 
Firm Fixed Effect       Yes 
N 5,880 
Notes: This table reports the difference-in-difference regression by introducing the exogenous shock of 
import tariff reduction. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). Post_reduction 
is a dummy equal to 1 if the tariff reduction has taken place in industry j by time t (Valta, 2012). The main 
variables of interest are industry-adjusted CSR and HLEV, a dummy variable equal to 1 if, in the given year, 
the firm’s long-term debt-to-assets ratio is in the top three deciles of the overall sample. Additional variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix B. The difference-in-difference model includes firm fixed-effect. All of 
the control variables are adjusted to their industry-year means and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels 
to mitigate the influence of outliers. The sample period is 1996 to 2012. Reported t-statistics are based on 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and 
* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.6. CSR and the costs of high leverage: Customer channel 
 
 Baseline Model Firm R&D Intensity Asset Turnover Product Differentiation Customer Sensitivity  
High Low High Low Differentiated Standardized High Low 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CSRt-2 × HLEVt-2 0.025*** 0.027** 0.012 0.009 0.034*** 0.030** 0.018 0.029*** 0.016  
(3.28) (2.54) (1.12) (0.75) (3.39) (2.15) (1.50) (3.12) (1.31) 
HLEVt-2 -0.015*** -0.012** -0.022*** -0.014** -0.021*** -0.012* -0.023*** -0.014*** -0.017***  
(-3.85) (-2.11) (-3.90) (-2.41) (-4.03) (-1.84) (-3.05) (-2.61) (-2.91) 
CSRt-2 -0.010** -0.016*** 0.005 -0.000 -0.016** -0.017** -0.006 -0.008 -0.01  
(-2.11) (-2.70) (0.76) (-0.07) (-2.43) (-2.26) (-0.64) (-1.27) (-1.50) 
SIZEt  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.006** 0.000 0.000  
(0.19) (0.00) (0.22) (0.77) (-0.78) (1.59) (-2.39) (0.12) (-0.20) 
PROFITt-1  0.064*** 0.071*** 0.050 0.060* 0.066*** 0.023 0.077 0.113*** 0.024  
(3.13) (2.80) (1.43) (1.95) (2.66) (0.63) (1.11) (3.44) (0.89) 
PROFITt-2  -0.006 0.036 -0.077** 0.008 -0.019 -0.015 0.051 0.003 -0.018  
(-0.27) (1.43) (-2.18) (0.31) (-0.70) (-0.43) (0.71) (0.08) (-0.66) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.324*** 0.090 0.432*** 0.135 0.410*** 0.103 -0.057 0.307*** 0.323***  
(3.78) (0.71) (3.85) (1.15) (3.68) (0.59) (-0.34) (2.88) (2.69) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.112 0.018 0.161 0.244* 0.067 -0.034 -0.040 0.131 0.097  
(1.40) (0.17) (1.48) (1.88) (0.67) (-0.24) (-0.27) (1.19) (0.88) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.000 0.030* -0.082** 0.009 0.000 0.020 0.028 0.032 -0.032*  
(0.01) (1.68) (-2.33) (0.34) (0.01) (0.78) (0.99) (1.39) (-1.65) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.019 0.011 0.047 0.008 0.019 0.014 -0.009 0.005 0.028  
(1.18) (0.58) (1.55) (0.33) (1.06) (0.75) (-0.28) (0.21) (1.36) 
CONSTANT -0.009** -0.012** -0.010* -0.024*** 0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.017*** -0.004  
(-2.44) (-2.27) (-1.82) (-5.00) (1.02) (-0.64) (-0.30) (-3.68) (-0.58) 
N 16,390 8,653 7,737 6,692 9,698  5,711  3,267 7,520 8,870 
R-squared 0.013 0.011 0.032 0.012 0.015 0.005 0.016 0.025 0.009 
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Notes: This table reports the results from re-running our analysis on the effects of CSR on high leverage costs using subsamples split by characteristics related to 
customer-driven costs of high leverage. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The main variables of interest are industry-adjusted 
CSR and HLEV, a dummy variable equal to 1 if, in the given year, the firm’s long-term debt-to-assets ratio is in the top three deciles of the overall sample. Additional 
variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. All of the control variables are adjusted to their industry-year means and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels 
to mitigate the influence of outliers. Model 1 repeats the results of the baseline model using the full sample. In Models 2 and 3, we proxy for the degree of product 
specialization using R&D expenditures. A firm is classified as a high-R&D (low-R&D) intensity firm in a given year if its R&D-to-sales ratio is greater (smaller) 
than 0.1% two years before the base year (Opler and Titman, 1994). In Models 4 and 5, we use the asset turnover ratio, which is measured as the ratio of total sales 
to total assets, to proxy for the degree of product specialization. A firm is classified as having high (low) asset turnover if its asset turnover ratio is above (below) 
the sample median two years before the base year. In Models 6 and 7, differentiated (standardized) refers to industries that produce differentiated (standardized) 
products. Following Giannetti et al. (2011) and Rauch (1999), industries with differentiated goods have SIC2 codes 25, 27, 30, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39, while 
industries with standardized goods have SIC2 codes 12, 14, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31, and 33. In Models 8 and 9, high (low) customer sensitivity refers to 
industries in which the predominant customer is a consumer (industrial buyer). Following Lev et al. (2010), high customer sensitivity industries have the SIC4 
ranges [0,999], [2000,2399], [2500,2599], [2700,2799], [2830,2869], [3000,3219], [3420,3429], 3523, [3600,3669], [3700,3719], 3751, [3850,3879], [3880,3999], 
4813, [4830,4899], [5000,5079], [5090,5099], [5130,5159], [5220,5999], [6000,6999], [7000,7299], and [7400,9999]; the remaining industries are defined as low 
customer sensitivity industries. To ensure that the industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we require that each industry-year contain at least four firms. 
The sample period is 1996 to 2012. The reported t-statistics are based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm 
level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.7. CSR and the costs of high leverage: Competitor channel 
 
 Baseline Model Industry Debt Level     Competitive Position          Firm Size        
High    Low Strong Weak Large Small 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CSRt-2 × HLEVt-2 0.025*** 0.011 0.031** 0.010 0.063*** 0.014* 0.057***  
(3.28) (1.11) (2.53) (1.23) (3.53) (1.74) (3.02) 
HLEVt-2 -0.015*** -0.025*** -0.011* -0.021*** -0.016** -0.011** -0.019***  
(-3.85) (-4.80) (-1.72) (-4.48) (-2.31) (-2.17) (-2.79) 
CSRt-2 -0.010** 0.003 -0.020*** -0.006 -0.016* -0.007 -0.006  
(-2.11) (0.42) (-3.49) (-1.19) (-1.71) (-1.33) (-0.68) 
SIZEt  0.000 -0.002 0.002 -0.007*** 0.014*** 0.001 0.025***  
(0.19) (-1.30) (1.30) (-3.87) (4.54) (0.46) (7.76) 
PROFITt-1  0.064*** 0.076** 0.060** 0.048* 0.060** 0.020 0.037  
(3.13) (2.14) (2.39) (1.95) (2.20) (0.85) (1.30) 
PROFITt-2  -0.006 -0.094*** 0.046* 0.033 -0.031 0.025 -0.042  
(-0.27) (-2.60) (1.93) (1.29) (-1.17) (0.98) (-1.51) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.324*** 0.439*** 0.068 -0.152 0.531*** 0.174 0.437***  
(3.78) (3.80) (0.58) (-1.34) (4.78) (1.46) (3.82) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.112 0.134 0.085 0.367*** 0.024 0.094 0.145  
(1.40) (1.23) (0.82) (3.06) (0.23) (0.92) (1.28) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.000 -0.062** 0.020 0.010 -0.004 -0.045** 0.015  
(0.01) (-2.01) (1.08) (0.68) (-0.21) (-2.39) (0.84) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.019 0.019 0.024 -0.002 0.028 0.043*** 0.011  
(1.18) (0.70) (1.22) (-0.12) (1.33) (2.60) (0.55) 
CONSTANT -0.009** -0.003 -0.018*** 0.003 -0.013** -0.029*** -0.004  
(-2.44) (-0.40) (-3.84) (0.47) (-2.54) (-4.66) (-0.72) 
N 16,390 7,567  8,823  8,274  8,116    8,205    8,185 
R-squared 0.013 0.032 0.012 0.013 0.022 0.009 0.026 
4
4
 
 45 
Notes: This table reports the results from re-running our analysis on the effects of CSR on high leverage costs using subsamples split by characteristics related to 
the competitor-driven costs of high leverage. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The main variables of interest are industry-
adjusted CSR and HLEV, a dummy variable equal to 1 if, in the given year, the firm’s long-term debt-to-assets ratio is in the top three deciles of the overall sample. 
Additional variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. All of the control variables are adjusted to their industry-year means and are winsorized at the 1% and 
99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. Model 1 repeats the results of the baseline model using the full sample. In Models 2 and 3, we proxy for the 
financial condition of a firm’s competitors using the industry-average debt level: an industry is classified as a high-debt (low-debt) industry in a given year if its 
average long-term debt ratio is above (below) the median of the overall sample two years before the base year (Campello, 2003; Campello and Fluck, 2006). In 
Models 4 and 5, strong (weak) competitive position refers to a market share ratio (total sales of the firm/total sales of the industry) that is higher (lower) than the 
sample median. In Models 6 and 7, large (small) firm size refers to total assets higher (lower) than the sample median. To ensure that the industry-year mean is not 
biased toward outliers, we require that each industry-year contain at least four firms. The sample period is 1996 to 2012. The reported t-statistics are based on 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
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Table 1.8. Robustness checks 
 
 
                                     HLEVt-2                                 CSRt-2                         
Top Decile Total Debt Lag 3 Years 
CSR_ 
NETt-2 
Adjusted 
CSR 
PCA 
No 
HUM 
Add 
CGO
V 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
CSRt-2 × HLEVt-
2  0.068***  0.016*  0.024** 0.005*** 0.022*** 0.010*** 0.025*** 0.021***  
 (3.13)  (1.93)  (2.53) (2.96) (3.19) (3.38) (3.22) (3.10) 
HLEVt-2 -
0.036*** -0.034*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.010** -0.010** -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.015***  
(-3.42) (-3.20) (-4.80) (-4.77) (-2.30) (-2.26) (-3.87) (-3.13) (-3.80) (-3.87) (-3.78) 
CSRt-2  -0.029**  -0.006  -0.009 -0.002** -0.021*** -0.001 -0.012** -0.007  
 (-2.48)  (-1.30)  (-1.54) (-2.30) (-4.42) (-0.28) (-2.40) (-1.53) 
SIZEt  0.015*** 0.016*** -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000  
(3.98) (4.22) (-0.01) (0.10) (0.18) (0.32) (0.32) (0.66) (0.11) (0.25) (0.07) 
PROFITt-1  0.025 0.025 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.064*** 0.065*** 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.064***  
(0.79) (0.77) (3.14) (3.15) (3.61) (3.61) (3.13) (3.21) (3.09) (3.13) (3.12) 
PROFITt-2  0.008 0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.005 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006  
(0.23) (0.22) (-0.39) (-0.38) (-0.37) (-0.36) (-0.26) (-0.17) (-0.30) (-0.27) (-0.28) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.494*** 0.491*** 0.322*** 0.323*** 0.271*** 0.272*** 0.324*** 0.327*** 0.322*** 0.325*** 0.324***  
(2.98) (2.98) (3.75) (3.77) (2.89) (2.91) (3.78) (3.81) (3.75) (3.78) (3.77) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.035 0.043 0.113 0.115 0.125 0.127 0.113 0.120 0.107 0.113 0.111  
(0.21) (0.25) (1.42) (1.44) (1.45) (1.47) (1.42) (1.50) (1.34) (1.41) (1.38) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.037** -0.037** 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000  
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (-2.47) (-2.45) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.022 0.023 0.018 0.018 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.019 0.019  
(0.64) (0.67) (1.16) (1.17) (3.74) (3.74) (1.19) (1.24) (1.16) (1.19) (1.18) 
CONSTANT -0.005 -0.006 -0.009** -0.009** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.010** -0.013*** -0.009** -0.009** -0.009**  
(-0.58) (-0.70) (-2.35) (-2.39) (-2.96) (-2.98) (-2.50) (-3.37) (-2.40) (-2.47) (-2.39) 
4
6
 
 47 
N 3,980 3,980 16,390 16,390 13,387 13,387 16,390 16,390 16,390 16,390 16,386 
R-squared 0.022 0.025 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 
Notes: This table reports the results for our main analyses on the costs of high leverage and the effect of CSR on the costs of high leverage using alternative 
definitions of HLEV and CSR. The dependent variable is industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The main variables of interest are industry-adjusted CSR and 
HLEV, a dummy variable equal to 1 if, in the given year, the firm’s long-term debt-to-assets ratio is in the top three deciles of the overall sample. Additional 
variable definitions are provided in Appendix B. All of the control variables are adjusted to their industry-year means and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels 
to mitigate the influence of outliers. Models 1 and 2 assign a value of 1 to top-decile firm-year observations and 0 to bottom-decile observations. Models 3 and 4 
replace the long-term debt ratio with the total debt ratio. Models 5 and 6 lag both CSR and HLEV by three years to reflect the alternative definitions shown in 
Campello (2006). In Model 7, we use CSR_NET. In Model 8, we follow Jo and Harjoto (2012) and adjust CSR_NET by the total number of strength and concern 
factors. Model 9 creates a comprehensive measure of CSR by adopting principal component analysis. In Model 10, we exclude the human rights area (Hillman and 
Keim, 2001). In Model 11, CSR is computed based on all seven areas in MSCI ESG STATS to facilitate comparison with other CSR studies (e.g., Deng et al., 
2013). To ensure that the industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we require that each industry-year contain at least four firms. The sample period is 1996 
to 2012. The reported t-statistics are based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THE DARK-SIDE EFFECTS OF CREDITOR RIGHTS: EVIDENCE 
FROM CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND PRODUCT MARKETS 
INTERACTIONS
2.1.INTRODUCTION 
Since the seminal work of La Porta et al. (1998) on the relation between law and 
finance, a rich literature has documented the bright-side effects of the legal protection of 
creditor rights. Studies following this line of research show that strong creditor rights 
induce lenders to provide credit at more favorable terms, which relaxes financial 
constraints and stimulates innovation. 19  However, several recent papers suggest that 
creditor rights may also have dark sides. Strong creditor protection in bankruptcy can allow 
creditors to seize assets at the expense of shareholders and this threat of premature 
liquidation can lead firms to reduce the use of debt (Vig, 2013; Cho et al., 2014; Acharya 
et al., 2011), underinvest in innovative projects (Acharya and Subramanian, 2009), and 
intensify equity risk (Favara et al., 2012, 2017).  
The literature on the dark-side effects of creditor rights is still in its infancy. 
Contributing to this strand of research, this paper explores the dark-side effects of creditors’ 
                                                          
19 See La Porta et al. (1997), Levine (1998, 1999), Djankov et al. (2007), Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2005), 
Houston et al. (2010), Benmelech and Bergman (2011), Kyröläinen et al. (2013), Qian and Strahan (2007), 
and Bae and Goyal (2009). 
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legal rights in a new setting: capital structure and product market interactions. According 
to the literature of capital structure and product market interactions, high leverage is costly 
because it is associated with reduced firm market share due to unfavorable actions by 
customers and competitors (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006).20 We choose 
this context for two reasons. First, we focus on highly leveraged firms because the dark-
side effects of creditor rights are more pronounced for financially weak firms. As Favara 
et al. (2017) point out, the effect of debt enforcement on underinvestment and risk-shifting 
problems intensifies as firms approach financial distress. Second, we focus on firms’ 
product market performance because it provides a wider scope of view on the dark-side 
effects of creditor rights. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate the 
influence of creditor rights on product market participants: customers and competitors, 
besides the traditional studies on managers and shareholders (e.g., Vig, 2013; Cho et al., 
2014; Acharya et al., 2011; Favara et al., 2017).  
We expect that creditor rights amplify the costs of high leverage. For highly 
leveraged firms that are financially weak, creditors may try to maximize the value of their 
own claims by seizing and liquidating firm assets, even if the firm is viable and 
continuation would be preferred by other stakeholders (liquidation bias or hold-up 
problem; see Aghion et al., 1992; Pulvino, 1998; Strömberg, 2000; Ayotte and Morrison, 
                                                          
20 For example, customers are reluctant to purchase from highly leveraged firms because these firms are 
associated with increased costs of future servicing and lower quality of products (Titman, 1984; Maksimovic 
and Titman, 1991; Matsa, 2011; Phillips and Sertsios, 2013; Kini et al., 2016); Competitors are likely to take 
predatory actions to drive the highly leveraged firm out of market (Telser, 1966; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; 
Chevalier, 1995). 
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2009). These so-called hold-up incentives of creditors can lead to adverse responses from 
stakeholders 21  (e.g. customers and competitors). For example, customers may protect 
themselves by not purchasing from these firms, anticipating the potential liquidation 
(Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Titman, 1984), and competitors may be tempted to prey 
on these firms in their further weakened financial condition (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; 
Chevalier, 1995), leading to a decrease in firm sales. In sum, liquidation bias of strong 
creditor rights could intensify the loss of sales for highly leveraged firms. 
To test for the effect of creditor rights on the costs of high leverage, we build on 
the framework of Campello (2006) and Opler and Titman (1994). Specifically, as our main 
dependent variable we use a firm’s country-industry-adjusted sales growth. This variable 
captures the responses of customers and competitors. We regress sales growth on a high 
leverage dummy, and a more negative coefficient on this dummy implies higher costs of 
high leverage. To capture the extent of creditor protection we employ the Djankov et al. 
(2007) index, which is extensively used in prior literature (Brockman and Unlu, 2009; Bae 
and Goyal, 2009; Houston et al., 2010; Benmelech and Bergman, 2011). Based on a large 
sample of 203,920 firm-year observations representing 30,041 firms from 54 countries over 
the 1989–2010 period, we find that, in line with our prediction, creditor rights significantly 
increase the costs of high leverage: on average, an increase in creditor rights (from the 25th 
percentile to the 75th percentile) doubles the magnitude of the costs of high leverage (a 
0.86% decrease in highly leveraged firms’ country- and industry-adjusted sales growth). 
                                                          
21 In this paper we classify both customers and competitors as stakeholders. This classification follows 
Freeman’s (1984) definition of stakeholders as “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984, p. 40). 
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This result implies that strong creditor rights intensify the responses of customers and 
competitors to a firm’s high leverage. 
Creditor rights and high leverage costs may be subject to endogeneity. To address 
the concern, we first introduce an exogenous shock of financial crisis. Financial crisis is 
not likely to change the creditor rights legal system of a country in the short term, but it 
has substantial influence on the hold-up incentives of creditors. Due to a tightened liquidity 
from the crisis, the survival of highly leveraged firms is further challenged. To minimize 
potential losses, creditors tend to hold up other stakeholders by quickly liquidating the firm 
or seizing firm assets regardless of the continuation value of the firm. As expected, we find 
that the dark-side effects of creditor rights are more pronounced during the financial crisis 
period, mitigating our concern for endogeneity. We also employ the 2SLS approach to 
address the endogeneity problem. The result further suggests that endogeneity is not likely 
a major problem in our study. 
In subsample analysis, we find that among the different types of creditor rights 
protection, those that most drive creditors’ hold-up incentives (No Automatic Stay and No 
Management Stay) have the strongest impact and significance. We similarly find that the 
relation between creditor rights and the costs of high leverage is more pronounced for firms 
located in countries with a banking system (rather than a bond market system), as these 
firms are subject to a higher degree of creditor control, and for firms with higher liquidation 
costs, as they can easily sell assets and reduce the chance of liquidation (Acharya et al., 
2011).  
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When we separately consider how strong creditor protection affects customers and 
competitors, we find that the dark side of strong creditor rights is more pronounced for 
those customers and competitors that are more sensitive to high leverage. When we 
consider other stakeholder groups, we find that for highly leveraged firms, strong creditor 
protection increases employee exit but does not lead to a significant change in suppliers’ 
behavior.  
One may argue that our results can alternatively be explained by the bright-side 
effects of creditor rights. Specifically, the reduction in sale growth associated with high 
leverage could be a reflection of efficient downsizing because highly leveraged firms are 
subject to capital market scrutiny (Jensen, 1986), and creditor rights intensifying this effect 
suggests an accelerated process of efficient downsizing. According to this story, creditor 
protection plays a positive role because it provides more favorable financing terms (La 
Porta et al., 1997; Djankov et al., 2007; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009) and 
brings in the monitoring role of capital markets. However, our results suggest that creditor 
rights negatively affect the issuance of capital and stock return of highly leveraged firms, 
which is against this alternative story. In sum, these findings further support the view that 
the dark-side effects of creditor rights prevail for firms that are highly leveraged. 
Our study contributes to the literature in at least three ways. First, we outline the 
mechanisms through which the dark side of creditor rights operates. Recent studies 
generally focus on the suboptimal choices of managers, arguing that strong creditor rights 
impose private costs on managers, which managers try to reduce by decreasing the use of 
credit (Vig, 2013; Cho et al., 2014; Acharya et al., 2011), forgoing profitable investment 
opportunities (Acharya and Subramanian, 2009; Acharya et al., 2011), or taking excessive 
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risks (Favara et al., 2012, 2017). Our findings show that the dark side of creditor rights 
operates not only through its impact on the choices of managers but also through its impact 
on the choices of customers, competitors, and employees. Our results thus show that the 
dark side of creditor rights works through a number of channels. In this respect, the current 
study is also related to the work of Bae et al. (2016), who document that corporate social 
responsibility helps highly leveraged firms keep customers and guard against rival 
predation, and implies that firms located in a strong creditor protection environment may 
mitigate the dark-side effects of creditor rights by engaging in socially responsible 
activities. 
Second, it adds to the ongoing debate on the role of creditor rights (La Porta et al., 
1997; Djankov et al., 2007; Acharya et al., 2011; Vig, 2013; Cho et al., 2014; Adler et al., 
2013). Contributing to a recent trend of studies investigating the dark side of creditor rights, 
we show that the effects of strong creditor rights are not uniformly good, at least when 
firms are highly leveraged. In this respect, our study is also consistent with Favara et al. 
(2017), who suggest more pronounced underinvestment and risk-shifting problems when 
firms are financially weak (particularly when approaching financial distress). Our finding 
has practical implications. In particular, high leverage could be especially costly for firms 
located in a country with strong creditor rights. Managers of firms in such countries may 
choose to issue less long-term debt and more short-term debt or callable debt, as the latter 
forms of debt allow a firm to quickly adjust for its financial condition to avoid the dark 
side of creditor rights.  
Third, this paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of high leverage 
costs. Extant research examines corporate social responsibility (Bae et al., 2016) in a 
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single-country setting. We extend this literature to a global context and highlight the 
importance of understanding how the legal, regulatory, and institutional environment 
influence the costs of high leverage. 
The reminder of the article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review 
of the literature on the costs of high leverage and creditor rights and develops our main 
hypothesis. Section 3 describes the data, the key variables of interest, and methodology. 
Section 4 presents the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2.2.LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Countries differ in the extent to which bankruptcy codes favor creditors vs 
managers, shareholders, or other stakeholders. Some countries with strong creditor rights 
(e.g., United Kingdom) allow creditors to replace managers to run the firm during 
reorganization, and give creditors privilege to access collateral or firm assets before 
shareholders, managers, or other stakeholders. However, in other countries (e.g., U.S.) 
creditors have very weak influence over the reorganization plan. Instead, managers are 
granted the exclusive rights to devise a reorganization plan.  
Strong creditor rights can bring unintended consequences. The literature on the 
dark-side effects of creditor rights find that strong creditor rights lead to suboptimal 
financing and investment policies and excessive risks, which impair firm value. First, 
managers tend to avoid debt financing when they face threat of creditor takeover. Rajan 
and Zingales (1995, p. 1444) point out that strong creditor rights commit creditors “to 
penalizing management if the firm gets into financial crisis, thus giving management strong 
incentives to stay clear of it”. Consistently, Vig (2013) studies a securitization reform in 
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India that allows secured creditors to bypass the lengthy and judicial process to seize and 
liquidate the assets of the defaulting firm. Vig (2013) finds that this reform leads to a 
substantial decrease in the use of secured debt by firms. Similarly, Cho et al. (2013) show 
a negative relation between creditor rights and long-term leverage across countries. They 
attribute this finding to managers avoiding the risk of losing control in the case of financial 
distress. Second, managers tend to adopt conservative investment policies that are value 
reducing. Acharya et al. (2011) argue that strong creditor rights induce managers to engage 
in overly conservative investments such as diversifying acquisitions. Acharya and 
Subramanian (2009) suggest that excessive liquidations accompanied by creditor-friendly 
code cause levered firms to shun innovation. Additionally, Favara et al. (2017) show that 
debt enforcement intensifies the underinvestment problem, particularly for financially 
distressed firms. Third, managers take excessive risks. A debt renegotiation favorable to 
creditors is associated with greater equity risk (Favara et al., 2012), and more severe risk-
shifting problem for firms near default (Favara et al., 2017).  
In a similar vein, these dark-side effects of creditor rights can also apply to the 
product market performances of highly leveraged firms. A firm can be viewed as a nexus 
of explicit and implicit contracts between firm claimants, including creditors, managers, 
and other firm stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1985). For 
firms that are financially healthy (underleveraged), creditors’ interests are aligned with 
those of management and other firm stakeholders (e.g., customers, suppliers, employees), 
as the continuation of a healthy firm does not jeopardize the claims of each party. In this 
case, strong creditor rights do not pose a severe threat to other firm stakeholders and hence 
do not induce suboptimal responses from these parties. For financially weak firms, in 
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contrast, conflicts among claimants can become severe (Opler and Titman, 1994). For 
example, in an effort to protect their own claims, creditors may try to seize and liquidate 
firm assets, which would severely impair firm value and reduce the value of other 
stakeholders’ claims.22 In anticipation of such hold-up problems, customers may reduce or 
avoid purchases from highly leveraged firms (Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Titman, 
1984), and competitors may prey on the financially fragile firm (Bolton and Scharfstein, 
1990; Chevalier, 1995), all of which work to further reduce a highly leveraged firm’s 
performance. Creditor rights are thus likely to be accompanied by substantial deadweight 
losses due to the adverse behaviors of customers and competitors. This leads to our 
hypothesis: 
Ceteris paribus, by intensifying the value-reducing actions of customers and 
competitors when a firm is highly leveraged, strong creditor rights increase the costs of 
high leverage. 
2.3.DATA AND VARIABLES 
2.3.1. Sample Construction 
The primary data source for this study is Compustat, which provides annual 
financial accounting variables at the firm level. We obtain the creditor rights index from 
Djankov et al. (2007), who update the index of La Porta et al. (1998). To control for 
                                                          
22 Pulvino (1998) shows that immediate liquidation of distressed firms’ assets can leave claimants with only 
a fraction of the value of their assets and that liquidated assets may be sold at a discount to less productive 
users. 
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country-level macroeconomic conditions, we rely on World Development Indicators to 
obtain the change in countries’ GDP per capita growth rate and inflation rate. We obtain 
information on debt enforcement, renegotiation failure, unemployment, the relative size of 
bank loans to public bonds, international trade freedom, and stock returns from Djankov et 
al. (2008), Favara et al. (2012), International Labour Organization (ILO), International 
Financial Statistics (IFS), and Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) from Fraser 
Institute, respectively. 
To construct the sample, we begin with Compustat (North America and Global), 
which covers firms in 103 countries over the 1987–2010 period. We require that each firm-
year observation has positive total assets and sales, non-missing equity, and a long-term 
debt-to-asset ratio within [0, 1]. To control for outliers, we eliminate firm-years that exhibit 
growth in assets or sales higher than 200%. Financial institutions, utilities, and firms not in 
clearly defined industries according to the Fama-French (1997) 48-industry classification 
are also excluded.23 These filters lead to 463,583 observations from 49,786 unique firms. 
We next merge this sample with Djankov et al.’s (2007) creditor rights index. Based on the 
merged sample, we compute the country-industry-year means of the main financial 
variables. To ensure that the country-industry-year means are not biased toward outliers, 
we require that each country-industry have at least four observations. We further exclude 
firm-years with missing values for variables in the main regression and countries with 
fewer than 10 observations (i.e., Bangladesh, Croatia, Tunisia, and Venezuela). These 
filters result in a sample of 285,542 observations from 30,588 firms across 54 countries 
                                                          
23 Specifically, we exclude firms with Fama-French 48-industry classifications 31, 44, 45, 47, and 48. 
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during the period 1989–2010. In a last step, we restrict the sample to observations with 
non-missing Fama and French (1997) industry data and we left-merge the resulting sample 
with the additional data sources. 24  The final sample contains 203,920 firm-year 
observations from 30,041 unique firms across 54 countries ranging over the 1989–2010 
period. Appendix C summarizes the sample selection process. 
2.3.2. Measuring Creditor Rights 
Our main explanatory variable in this study is Djankov et al.’s (2007) creditor rights 
index (CRIGHTS), which measures the strength of creditors’ legal rights against defaulting 
debtors. This index extends the original index of La Porta et al. (1998) to the period 1981–
2004.25 To capture how the strength of creditor protection influences the costs of high 
leverage in more recent years (i.e., 2005–2010), we apply the creditor rights index available 
in the last year of the Djankov et al. sample (i.e., in 2004) to the missing years in our 
sample.26  
                                                          
24 We left-merge the main sample with data from Djankov et al. (2008), ILO, IFS, EFW, and CSRP to 
maximize the number of observations, as the intersection of these data sets may otherwise yield a limited 
number of observations. Note that missing values for variables are excluded from the main regression but are 
allowed in other specifications to retain as much information as possible. For example, in Table 3 the number 
of observations in Model 5 (UNEMPLOYGt) is 192,129 while the number of observations in our baseline 
models (Model 1 and 2) is 230,920. 
25 Djankov et al. (2007) also code bankruptcy procedures slightly differently. Nonetheless, the La Porta et al. 
(1998) and Djankov et al. (2007) measures are highly correlated. 
26 This adjustment is reasonable because there is a high degree of persistence in the creditor rights index 
(Djankov et al., 2007). Indeed, for this reason many papers use a cross-sectional creditor rights variable in 
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The index CRIGHTS captures the presence of four types of creditor protection in 
bankruptcy proceedings: 
(1) whether the reorganization procedure requires creditors’ consent, minimum 
dividends, or similar conditions for a debtor to file for reorganization (Restrictions 
on Reorganization); 
(2) whether secured creditors are able to seize their collateral when a reorganization 
petition is approved (No Automatic Stay); 
(3) whether secured creditors are paid first out of proceeds from liquidating a 
bankrupt firm (Secured Creditors Paid First); 
(4) whether creditors or an administrator is appointed in place of management to run 
the firm during reorganization (No Management Stay). 
A value of one is added to the CRIGHTS index for each of the above attributes that 
a country’s law provides to secured creditors. The aggregate index thus ranges from zero 
to four, with a higher score indicating stronger creditor rights. 
2.3.3. Measuring the Costs of High Leverage 
To measure the costs of high leverage, we build on the framework of Campello 
(2006; Model 1 of Table 2.2), who models the effect of high leverage on relative-to-rival 
                                                          
their panel sample studies (e.g., Djankov et al., 2007; Brockman and Unlu, 2009; Cho et al., 2014). In 
unreported analysis, we find that our main findings are qualitatively unchanged if we instead use a cross-
sectional creditor rights index. 
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sales growth, adapting it to a global setting. Specifically, we employ the following 
specification:  
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑎 + 𝜆1𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 +  𝜆2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + ∑  
2
𝑘=1
 𝜆3𝑘𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
+ ∑  
2
𝑘=1
𝜆4𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∑  
2
𝑘=1
𝜆5𝑘𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + + 𝜆6𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑐,𝑡
+  𝜆7𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,     (1) 
where i, t, and c index firms, years, and countries, respectively. SALES_G captures 
customer- and competitor-driven product market performance. To proxy for high leverage, 
we employ the dummy variable HLEV (high leverage), where a firm is classified as in high 
leverage in a given year if the firm’s long-term debt ratio is in the top three deciles of the 
country in which the firm is headquartered. A more negative coefficient on HLEV (𝜆1) thus 
indicates that customers and competitors have more adverse responses to high leverage.27 
Note that we use a firm’s long-term debt ratio as a basis for capturing high leverage to 
                                                          
27 One may wonder why a firm would choose to have high leverage if it is associated with costly consequences. 
With this question in mind, we follow prior research (e.g., Opler and Titman, 1994) and assume that 
otherwise-identical firms choose different leverage ratios. This assumption is justified by Maksimovic and 
Zechner (1991), who argue that firms in the same industry are indifferent between a high-leverage/high-risk 
strategy and a low-leverage/low-risk strategy, or by Opler and Titman (1994), who argue that otherwise-
identical firms may simultaneously choose a high-leverage/tax advantage strategy and a low-leverage/cheap 
assets acquisition strategy. This assumption is also supported empirically by our propensity score matching 
analysis, in which we match each high-leverage firm with a low-leverage firm with similar characteristics. 
We find that HLEV continues to load significantly negatively on SALES_G, with an impact of similar 
magnitude. 
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mitigate reverse causality between SALES_G and HLEV, as long-term debt is less subject 
to adjustment following firm forecasts of future performance than short-term debt 
(Campello, 2006). To isolate the impact of high leverage on sales growth, we follow 
Campello (2006) and control for SIZE (firm size), measured as the natural logarithm of 
total assets; PROFIT (profitability), measured as operating earnings plus depreciation 
divided by total assets; INVESTMENT (investment), measured as capital expenditures over 
total assets; and SELLEXP (sell expenses), measured as the ratio of advertising and selling 
expenses to total sales. To account for country-level macroeconomic influences, we further 
control for GDPG (GDP growth) and INFLATION (inflation). More detailed variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix D.  
Following common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), we 
adopt the relative measurement method when calculating the firm-level variables in 
Equation (1). In particular, a firm’s HLEV is defined relative to its country peers,28 and the 
other firm-level variables are subtracted from their country-industry-year means. This 
method helps strengthen the exogeneity of the firm-level regression variables because a 
firm has little control over the performance or strategies of its peers. To control for the 
influence of outliers, we winsorize PROFIT, INVESTMENT, and SELLEXP at the 1% and 
                                                          
28 Defining a firm’s HLEV relative to its country peers mitigates the concern of a high correlation between 
creditor rights and leverage (two components of the interaction term discussed in next subsection). As shown 
in Cho et al. (2014), creditor rights negatively affect a firm’s use of debt. However, our model suggests that 
around 30% of firm-year observations are highly levered, which means that country-level variables such as 
creditor rights are not likely to significantly influence HLEV. Consistent with this view, Table 2 find that 
correlation between CRIGHTS and HLEV is insignificant. 
 62 
99% levels. In addition, all reported t-statistics are based on standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm level. 
2.3.4. Empirical Design 
To test our main hypothesis, which posits that strong creditor rights increase the 
costs of high leverage by intensifying the adverse responses of customers and competitors, 
we run the following model:  
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑏 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑆𝑐,𝑡−2×𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑅𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑇𝑆𝑐,𝑡−2 + 𝛽3𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2
+  𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + ∑  
2
𝑘=1
 𝛽5𝑘𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∑  
2
𝑘=1
𝛽6𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
+ ∑  
2
𝑘=1
𝛽7𝑘𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +  𝛽8𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑐,𝑡+  𝛽9𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑐,𝑖,𝑡,     (2) 
where 𝛽1 captures the effect of creditor rights on the costs of high leverage. Our 
hypothesis that the dark side of creditor rights intensifies the costs of high leverage suggests 
a negative coefficient on CRIGHTS×HLEV (i.e., 𝛽1 <0). 
Table 2.1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables (before country-
industry-year adjustment) in Equation (2). Similar to prior studies (e.g., Cho et al., 2014), 
we find that the U.S. and Japan account for the largest percentage of firm-year observations 
(39% and 12%, respectively). In robustness tests, we show that these countries do not drive 
our results. Further, around 30% of firm-years in our sample are highly leveraged, 
consistent with our definition of HLEV. The results also reveal a large degree of variation 
in average sales growth, firm operating conditions, the macroeconomic indicators, as well 
as the strength of creditor protection. Table 2.2 reports pairwise correlation coefficients 
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between the key variables. We find a relatively low correlation between the control 
variables, reducing concerns that multicollinearity is affecting our results.29 
Since one cannot directly observe the interaction between CRIGHTS and HLEV for 
highly leveraged firms, we provide suggestive evidence on this effect by running Equation 
(1) separately for five groups of countries as classified by their creditor rights scores and 
plotting the costs of high leverage (𝜆1) for each group in an unreported figure. Consistent 
with our prediction, the figure shows that the costs of high leverage tend to increase the 
strength of creditor rights. In particular, the coefficient on HLEV is approximately zero for 
countries with a creditor rights score of zero, suggesting that weak creditor rights do not 
impact high leverage costs, while a medium degree of creditor protection (CRIGHTS=1 or 
2) leads to a 0.5% decline in country-industry-adjusted sales growth and strong creditor 
protection (CRIGHTS=3 or 4) leads to a 1.3% decline in sales growth on average.  
2.4.RESULTS 
In this section, we first provide evidence on the dark-side effects of creditor rights 
on the costs of high leverage, and show that this finding passes a battery of endogeneity 
tests and robustness checks. We then run subsample tests in which we explore which 
                                                          
29 An exception is the high correlation between the control variables and their own one-year lags. For example, 
the correlation between SELLEXPt-1 and SELLEXPt-2 is 0.84. However, we find that the multicollinearity 
problem is not severe. First, we examine the variance inflation factors (VIF) in the regression of Equation 
(2). We find a mean value of 2.17, which is substantially lower than the threshold value (10) of 
multicollinearity problems. Second, we replace the control variables with their six principal components and 
re-run the main regressions. The results are qualitatively similar. 
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groups of firms are likely to suffer more intense costs of high leverage under strong creditor 
rights. Next, we examine whether strong creditor protection leads to more adverse 
responses from customers and competitors as suggested by our theoretical arguments, as 
well as other stakeholder groups, in particular, employees and suppliers. Finally, we show 
that the main finding does not support the alternative explanation. 
2.4.1. The Dark-side Effects of Creditor Rights on the Costs of High Leverage 
Table 2.3, Models 1 and 2 present our baseline results on the dark-side effects of 
creditor rights. Model 1 reports OLS regression results for Equation (1), where we regress 
firm sales growth on the high-leverage dummy and controls. We find a significantly 
negative relation between the high-leverage dummy and sales growth, implying that high 
leverage (firm-years with a long-term debt ratio in the top three deciles of the country in 
which the firm is headquartered) is costly. Model 2 reports OLS regression results for 
Equation (2), where we add CRIGHTS and its interaction with HLEV to the model. We find 
a significantly negative coefficient on CRIGHTS×HLEV. Economically, an increase in the 
creditor rights index (from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile) approximately doubles 
the magnitude of the high leverage costs (a further decrease of highly leveraged firms’ 
relative-to-industry sales growth by 0.86% two years later). Taken together, the results 
show that high leverage leads to unfavorable reactions by customers and competitors, and 
that strong creditor rights magnify these costs associated with high leverage. These findings 
therefore support our main hypothesis.  
In Table 2.3, Model 3, we examine whether the severity of high leverage affects the 
relative dark-side effects of creditor rights. We gauge the severity of high leverage by 
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adopting a more extreme cutoff in defining high leverage. Recall that our main proxy for 
high leverage is a dummy that captures whether in a given year a firm’s leverage ratio is 
located in the top three deciles of the country in which the firm is headquartered. In Model 
3, we follow Opler and Titman (1994) and use an extreme leverage dummy that assigns a 
value of one to the top decile firm-year observations and zero to the bottom decile 
observations in each country. Comparisons based on this definition are thus between 
extremely leveraged and extremely healthy firms. As can be seen, the magnitude of the 
coefficient on CRIGHTS×HLEV is greater than that in the baseline model (-0.0062 
compared to -0.0043). This result suggests that the dark-side effects of creditor rights are 
more pronounced for firms that are extremely leveraged, further supporting the main 
hypothesis.30  
2.4.2. Endogeneity Tests and Robustness Checks 
Endogeneity. Endogeneity of creditor rights is not likely to be a major concern 
(Acharya et al., 2011). Reverse causality, for instance, is not likely because creditor rights 
are largely predetermined by a country’s legal origin (La Porta et al., 1998) and it is hard 
to imagine that the high leverage costs of individual firms would influence a county’s legal 
setting. However, the effect of creditor rights can be driven by unobserved country 
                                                          
30 In unreported additional analysis, we revisiting Favara et al. (2017) using our research setting. Consistently, 
we find creditor rights to be negatively associated with capital expenditure and asset growth, and positively 
associated with asset volatility. The results suggest that creditor rights intensify the underinvestment and risk-
shifting problems for highly leveraged firms, lending further support to the dark-side effects of creditor rights. 
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characteristics (Favara et al., 2017). We address this endogeneity concern of creditor rights 
by introducing the financial crisis analysis.  
The 2008–2009 global financial crisis is an exogenous shock from the perspective 
of any single firm. While the financial crisis did not likely change the creditor rights legal 
system of a particular country in the short period, it did greatly modify the hold-up 
incentives of creditors. The unexpected liquidity scarcity from the crisis can threaten the 
survival of the firms that are highly leveraged. Therefore, powerful creditors may be biased 
toward actions that help preserve their own shares at the expense of other stakeholders, 
such as quick seizing of firm assets or liquidation. Consequently, one should expect even 
more pronounced negative consequences of creditor rights during the crisis period. To test 
this conjecture, we follow Lins et al. (2013) and define years 2008 and 2009 as the financial 
crisis period (DURING CRISIS). The following years in our sample are defined as AFTER 
CRISIS. Table 2.4 reports the results of financial crisis analyses. We include additional 
interaction terms between the crisis indicators, and creditor rights and high leverage 
variables. In line with our expectations, the results suggest that compared to the pre-crisis 
period, the dark-side effects of creditor rights have significantly intensified (nearly 
doubled) during the past global financial crisis, and are relatively weak after the financial 
crisis. Thus, we find supportive evidence that the negative effects of creditor rights on the 
costs of high leverage are not likely driven by unobserved factors.  
In addition, endogeneity can be a problem for HLEV, as indicated by Opler and 
Titman (1994), because a decline in sales and profitability can induce firms to increase 
leverage. These problems are mitigated by our research design, however. First, we employ 
two-year lags between the high leverage measure and sales growth to mitigate reverse 
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causality. Second, we avoid capturing adjustments to firm leverage by measuring a firm’s 
financial condition relative to its country peers, which it cannot control, and by using a 
firm’s long-term debt ratio in calculating leverage, because it is harder for managers to 
adjust long-term debt than short-term debt (Campello, 2006). Nevertheless, we further 
address potential endogeneity of HLEV using the 2SLS approach and the system GMM 
technique developed by Blundell and Bond (1998); Table 2.5 reports the results. To 
instrument for HLEV, we employ its own values over the past two years, in the spirit of 
Campello (2003). In the first stage (Model 1), we obtain the fitted value of HLEV by 
regressing HLEV on a series of control variables and the two instrumental variables. The 
model shows a highly significant and positive correlation between each instrument and 
HLEV, implying that firms’ financial policy tends to be sticky. The first-stage F-statistics 
reported at the bottom of the table are much larger than the threshold value of 10, 
confirming that the instruments are relevant. In Models 2 and 3, we report the second-stage 
results using the fitted values of HLEV. Consistent with our main results, the coefficients 
in both models load significantly negatively, lending further support to the idea that the 
dark-side effects of creditor rights dominate when a firm is highly leveraged. To examine 
the exogeneity of the instruments, we regress the residuals of the 2SLS models on the 
instruments and control variables. As indicated by the exogeneity test (p-value is 0.33 for 
Model 2 and 0.35 for Model 3), the instruments are jointly insignificant. This test cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between the residuals and instruments, which 
suggests that our instruments are exogenous. In the system GMM models, SALES_Gt-1 
(one-year lagged sales growth) is added as an independent variable. Models 4 and 5 report 
the results. We continue to find that strong creditor rights significantly increase the costs 
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of high leverage. Taken together, the results indicate that endogeneity concerns are not 
likely to be driving our main results.31 
Sample composition. As the descriptive statistics suggest, our sample is dominated 
by U.S. and Japanese firms, which together account for 51% of the observations. To reduce 
the influence of this uneven sample distribution, in Table 2.6 we repeat the baseline 
regressions after removing firms from the U.S. (Models 1 and 2), Japan (Models 3 and 4), 
and both countries (Models 5 and 6). Additionally, we employ weighted least squares, 
which assigns each country a weight equal to the reciprocal of its number of observations 
(Models 7 and 8). All of these models show consistent and highly significant results, which 
supports the view that high leverage induces agency conflicts among stakeholders and rival 
predation, and the costs of high leverage are greater under strong creditor rights.  
Alternative definitions of key variables. In Table 2.7, we check the robustness of 
our baseline models to alternative measures of high leverage and creditor rights. First, as 
we discuss above, our main proxies for high leverage employ long-term debt because it is 
less subject to adjustment than short-term debt and therefore more exogenous (Campello, 
2006). However, to facilitate comparison with earlier research (e.g., Opler and Titman, 
                                                          
31 It is also worth noting that the coefficients in the 2SLS and system GMM models are somewhat larger than 
those in the baseline models. This means that our baseline models do capture some managerial leverage 
adjustments. Specifically, firms that face higher (lower) costs of high leverage are more likely to decrease 
(increase) their leverage. This endogeneity issue therefore leads to a higher proportion of firms with small 
high leverage costs in our high leverage sample, pushing the coefficient estimates toward zero. Nonetheless, 
the baseline models load significantly negatively, which suggests that our main effects are so strong that they 
overcome the offsetting effect of this endogeneity problem. 
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1994), in Models 1 and 2 of Table 2.7 we use the total debt ratio, which incorporates short-
term debt. We find that the coefficient on HLEV×CRIGHTS is negative and significant (at 
the 1% level), ruling out concerns that our main results hinge on the particular measure of 
HLEV. Second, to check whether our results are sensitive to the lag structure of our 
variables, in Models 3 and 4 we lag HLEV and CRIGHTS by three years. We find that the 
effects of high leverage persist. Third, recent research suggests that the effect of investor 
protection depends not only on the rules and regulations offering such protection but also 
on the enforcement of those rules and regulations (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2009). However, 
creditor rights may not be as strong as the rules suggest if enforcing those rights is time 
consuming, costly, and inefficient. To explore this possibility, in Models 5 to 7 we replace 
CRIGHTS with three alternative creditor protection indexes from Djankov et al. (2008) that 
capture different aspects of debt contract enforcement: the amount of time it takes for 
creditors’ claims to be honored after a firm defaults (TIME), the estimated cost of 
insolvency proceedings (COST), and the efficiency with which the insolvency process is 
resolved in terms of the value losses (EFFICIENCY). The results show that the interactions 
between these three creditor rights enforcement proxies and the high leverage dummy enter 
significantly at the 1% level, implying that the costs of high leverage are higher if creditors 
can enforce their contracts quickly, at low cost, and with high value preservation. 
Fourth, we adopt an alternative measure of creditor rights protection following 
Favara et al. (2012). Based on Djankov et al.’s (2008) survey, Favara et al. (2012) construct 
RENEGOTIATION FAILURE index, which gauges the difficulty shareholders will face if 
they attempt to renege on the outstanding debt, whether through a formal insolvency 
procedure or outside court. Higher value of the index suggests stronger protection of 
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creditors’ rights. Appendix D shows the detailed definition of this index. Again, we find 
this alternative measure of creditor rights continues to intensify the costs of high leverage, 
suggesting that our findings are not likely to be driven by our particular use of key 
variables.  
2.4.3. Subsample Tests 
Thus far, our results consistently support the view that strong creditor rights help 
creditors seize assets and liquidate the firm that is highly leveraged, which intensifies 
adverse responses from customers and competitors. This argument suggests that the dark-
side effects of creditor rights on the costs of high leverage should be more pronounced 
when creditors have greater power to seize assets and liquidate a highly leveraged firm. To 
test the conjecture, we conduct three types of subsample tests. 
First, we posit that among the different components of creditor rights, those that 
most drive creditors’ hold-up incentives have the greatest impact on the dark-side effects 
of creditor rights. As discussed above, we measure creditor rights using Djankov et al.’s 
(2007) creditor rights index, which incorporates four components: Restrictions on 
Reorganization, No Automatic Stay, Secured Creditors Paid First, and No Management 
Stay. Each component represents a different type of creditor protection. Because No 
Automatic Stay allows creditors to quickly seize firm assets and No Management Stay 
grants creditors discretionary rights to liquidate the firm at others’ expense, we expect the 
significance of the dark-side effects of creditor rights to be most closely related to these 
two components. In Table 2.8, Model 1 replicates the baseline regression. Models 2 to 5 
show that all four components of the creditor rights index lead to increased costs of high 
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leverage, but only No Automatic Stay and No Management Stay have a significant influence 
(at the 5% level or better). In addition, they have a stronger effect than the other two 
components (-0.0082 and -0.0090 compared with -0.0039 and -0.0035). Thus, consistent 
with our prediction, these results suggest that the types of creditor protection that drive 
creditors’ hold-up incentives are more likely to intensify agency conflicts for highly 
leveraged firms. 
Next, according to prior research (Brockman and Unlu, 2009; Nini et al., 2009), 
creditor rights are stronger for firms with a larger share of bank loans relative to public 
bonds. Bank loans typically contain covenants that are more detailed and comprehensive 
than public bonds, and hence can control or restrict nearly any dimension of corporate 
policy (Nini et al., 2009). These restrictive covenants reduce capital investment, suggesting 
potentially harmful influence of bank-dominated creditor controls. In addition, bank loans, 
compared to public bonds, can more efficiently enforce creditor rights. Diverse bond issues 
are accompanied by free-rider problems (Gertner and Scharfstein, 1991) because each 
individual creditor who enforces the rights bears the full costs but shares the benefits. In 
contrast, banks as concentrated lenders do not face these free-rider problems and are 
therefore associated with stronger creditor controls. In the same vein, Rajan (1992) argues 
that bank financing makes it easier for creditors to seize and liquidate assets, even when 
continuation of the firm would be efficient. Since firms can more easily access bank loans 
in better developed banking systems, taken together we expect the dark-side effects of 
creditor rights to be more pronounced for firms domiciled in better developed banking 
systems. We capture the relative importance of bank loans relative to bonds at the country 
level using the ratio of bank loans to public bonds, which is obtained from the World 
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Bank’s Financial Development and Structure dataset. 32  We define an economy as a 
banking system (bond market system) if the two-year lag of the ratio of bank loans to public 
bonds is above (below or equal to) the median. Consistent with our conjecture, in Models 
6 and 7 of Table 2.8 we find that the coefficient on CRIGHTS×HLEV is more pronounced 
for firms located in countries with a banking system (-0.0075) but is insignificant for firms 
located in countries with a bond market system (-0.0019). The results suggest that the dark-
side effects of creditor rights are more pronounced when creditors have stronger power of 
control. 
Last, the effect of legal creditor protection is contingent on firms’ liquidation costs 
(Acharya et al., 2011; Favara et al., 2012). As suggested by prior research (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1992; Pulvino, 1998), the liquidation of a firm is usually accompanied by a loss of 
firm value. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1992), firm value decreases because the 
firm’s assets are transferred to well-financed industry outsiders who can make less efficient 
use of the assets. Firm liquidation may therefore fail to maximize proceeds to a liquidating 
firm’s claimholders (Aghion et al., 1992). Liquidation costs are lower for firms with a 
higher share of tangible assets, as intangible assets such as brands and patents are less 
valuable to industry outsiders while tangible assets can be sold for closer to their 
fundamental value. Acharya et al. (2011) argue that these firms whose assets have high 
recovery value (or lower liquidation costs) can defer the likelihood of liquidation by selling 
assets and by using the proceeds to service debt. Since the dark-side effects of creditor 
                                                          
32 The ratio of bank loans to public bonds is computed as the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks 
to GDP divided by private and public bond market capitalization to GDP.  
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rights are based on concerns that creditors may force a highly leveraged firm into 
immediate liquidation, the argument of Acharya et al. (2011) suggests a weaker negative 
effect of creditor rights for firms with lower liquidation costs. Following Favara et al. 
(2012), we use firms’ intangibility of assets as a proxy for liquidation costs. Intangibility 
equals one minus the average of exit values per dollar of the various tangible assets, 
including receivables, inventories, cash, and net property, plant, and equipment, weighted 
by total asset (Berger et al., 1996). We classify a firm as a high-liquidation-cost (low-
liquidation-cost) firm if its two-year lag of intangibility is above (below or equal to) the 
sample median. In Models 8 and 9 of Table 2.8 we find that the dark-side effects of creditor 
rights are strong for highly leveraged firms with high liquidation costs, but are insignificant 
for highly leveraged firms with low liquidation costs. The difference in the effect of 
creditor rights on the high-liquidation-cost and low-liquidation-cost firm samples is 
significant. These results are consistent with our prediction. 
Overall, the subsample tests show that the relationship between creditor rights and 
the costs of high leverage is more pronounced if firms are domiciled in a country that ranks 
high in creditor rights terms that most drive creditors’ hold-up incentives, if firms are 
domiciled in a country with developed banking system (compared to bond market system), 
or if firms have higher liquidation costs. These findings lend further support to our main 
finding that the dark-side effects of creditor rights dominate for highly leveraged firms. 
2.4.4. Main Channels 
The above main analysis jointly captures the actions of customers and competitors. 
In this subsection we consider each group separately. Turning to customers, prior research 
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shows that they are more sensitive to highly leveraged firms with high product specificity 
(Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello and Fluck, 2006). When a customer buys a highly 
specialized product, a large portion of the price paid is for implicit claims such as 
availability of future servicing. To the extent that strong creditor rights help creditors 
liquidate a highly leveraged firm, customers of high-product-specificity firms face greater 
risk and thus are expected to respond more negatively. We therefore expect that strong 
creditor rights increase the customer-driven costs of high leverage to a greater extent if the 
firm has higher product specificity. To proxy for the degree of product specificity, we 
employ R&D expenditures (Titman and Wessels, 1988). Specifically, we classify a firm as 
having high (low) product specificity if its R&D/sales ratio is above (below or equal to) 
the median for the overall sample two years ago. Table 2.9 shows the separate effects of 
creditor rights on customers’ and competitors’ responses to high leverage. In Models 2 and 
3, we find that compared to our baseline model (Model 1), the coefficient on 
CRIGHTS×HLEV is pronounced for firms with high product specificity (-0.0065), but 
insignificant for firms with low product specificity. We further find that the difference in 
the coefficient on CRIGHTS×HLEV between the high-product-specificity and low-
product-specificity samples is significant (p-value=0.058). Thus the results suggest that 
strong creditor rights increase high leverage costs through the channel of customers. 
With respect to competitors’ incentives, predation is more likely to take place if the 
highly leveraged firm is located in a more competitive environment. For example, Opler 
and Titman (1994) find that competitor-driven costs are higher in more concentrated 
industries. If strong creditor protection intensifies predation from competitors for highly 
leveraged firms, then we would expect this effect to be stronger in a more competitive 
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environment. We therefore expect that creditor rights increase the competitor-driven costs 
of high leverage to a greater extent if the highly leveraged firm is located in a more 
competitive environment. To proxy for a firm’s competitive environment, we first use 
industry concentration following Opler and Titman (1994). We next extend Opler and 
Titman’s (1994) definition to the global setting by classifying high-concentration (low-
concentration) industries as country-industries with a four-firm concentration ratio in 2000 
that is higher than (lower than or equal to) 0.4. Table 2.9, Models 4 and 5 show that creditor 
rights have a stronger impact on firms in more concentrated industries, consistent with our 
hypothesis. The concentration ratio computed using information from public firms, 
however, may fail to capture the degree of competitiveness in less developed countries, 
where many major companies choose not to list in a stock market. To address this concern, 
we employ proxy for competitive environment using international trade freedom, a 
measure of the degree to which a firm is free to trade internationally as assessed by Fraser 
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World. Higher values of this variable indicate lower 
tariffs, fewer trade barriers, and less restriction on foreign investment, and hence are 
associated with greater competition from international rivals. Models 6 and 7 show that for 
firms that potentially face high (low) international rival predation, creditor rights exhibit a 
stronger (weaker) ability to magnify the costs of high leverage. The difference tests at the 
bottom of Table 2.4 suggest that the effect of creditor rights is significantly different 
between high- and low-industry-concentration samples, and between high- and low-
international-trade-freedom samples. Thus, we consistently find that strong creditor rights 
increase competitor-driven high leverage costs. In sum, the results in this subsection 
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suggest that the dark-side effects of creditor rights operate both through the channels of 
customers and competitors. 
2.4.5. Additional Channels 
The results so far indicate that creditor rights amplify the high leverage costs that 
arise from the adverse behaviors of customers and competitors. The focus on these two 
groups follows existing capital structure and product market performance literature (e.g., 
Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Titman, 1984; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Chevalier, 
1995; Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006). However, the dark-side effects of 
creditor rights for firms in high leverage may extend beyond these two groups. In his 
theoretical paper showing that firm liquidation imposes costs on customers that are 
ultimately borne by the firm, Titman (1984) suggests that similar models could draw 
implications for other groups such as employees and suppliers. Motivated by these studies, 
in this section we examine the effects of strong creditor rights on the behaviors of 
employees and suppliers when a firm is highly leveraged. 
Similar to customers, employees and suppliers have implicit and explicit claims on 
a firm. We therefore expect that, due to creditors’ hold-up incentives, high leverage can 
also severely impair the welfare of employees and suppliers. For example, in the extreme 
case in which a highly leveraged firm discontinues operation, employees would lose their 
jobs and suppliers may not get paid. To protect themselves from such outcomes, employees 
may leave the firm and suppliers may be unwilling to do business with the firm. These 
responses would further increase the costs of high leverage. Since strong creditor rights 
increase creditors’ hold-up incentives, we predict that strong creditor rights magnify these 
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costs. To test this conjecture, in Table 2.10 we re-run our main analysis after replacing 
sales growth (SALES_G) with employee growth (EMPL_G), which captures employees’ 
incentives to stay, or accounts payable growth (AP_G), which captures suppliers’ 
willingness to extend trade credit. In Models 1 and 3 we find that highly leveraged firms 
experience 1.38% lower relative-to-rival employee growth and 0.86% lower accounts 
payable growth. We thus find evidence of employee- and supplier-driven high leverage 
costs. In Models 2 and 4 we examine whether these costs are intensified by strong creditor 
rights. Model 2 shows that an increase in creditor rights score (from 25th percentile to 75th 
percentile) leads to an additional 0.5% loss in employee growth for highly leveraged firms. 
However, in Model 4 we find that CRIGHTS×HLEV loads insignificantly on AP_G. Taken 
together, these results show that strong creditor protection adversely influences employees’ 
incentives to stay with a highly leveraged firm. 
2.4.6. An Alternative Explanation 
We argue that the results so far support the dark-side effects of creditor rights. That 
is, creditor rights amplify the high leverage costs by increasing the hold-up incentive of 
creditors towards stakeholders. Greater costs of high leverage reflect more adverse 
behaviors of stakeholders, and imply reduced firm value.  
However, one may question whether the results can be alternatively explained by 
the bright-side view. For example, it is likely that reduced sales growth or employee growth 
associated with high leverage reflects the efficient downsizing. Highly leveraged firms 
have to shut down unprofitable product lines and lay off redundant labor because they are 
subject to the scrutiny of capital markets. In this case, strong creditor rights, which provide 
more favorable financing terms and facilitate financing in capital markets (La Porta et al., 
 78 
1997; Djankov et al., 2007; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Bae and Goyal, 2009), imply a higher 
extent of scrutiny and thus accelerate the efficient downsizing process. If this story holds, 
we should expect highly leveraged firms in countries with strong creditor protection to 
have better access to capital and to be associated with higher shareholder or firm value. 
 To investigate whether our main results are driven by this alternative story, we 
replicate the baseline model after replacing sales growth (SALES_G) with a set of variables 
reflecting firm performance. Specifically, we focus on DEBTISSUE (debt issuance), 
EQUITYISSUE (equity issuance), and STOCKRETURN (risk-adjusted stock returns). As 
can be seen from Models 1 to 3 of Table 2.11, highly leveraged firms from strong creditor 
rights countries are less likely to issue debt and equity, and tend to experience reduced risk-
adjusted stock returns. These findings are contrary to the predictions from bright-side view 
of creditor rights. We conclude that these findings confirm our main story that the dark-
side effects of creditor rights prevail for highly leveraged firms.  
2.5. CONCLUSION 
In an attempt to identify a potentially adverse consequence of creditor rights, in this 
paper we investigate the role of creditor rights on product market performances when firms 
have high leverage. High leverage leads to agency conflicts among firm stakeholders and 
predation by competitors. In this context, creditors have hold-up incentives to appropriate 
firm value from customers, employees, and other firm stakeholders, and thus trigger costly 
responses from these stakeholders as well as predatory behavior from competitors. We 
argue that strong creditor rights increase the costs of high leverage, and that the dark-side 
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effects of creditor rights operate through multiple channels: customers, competitors, and 
employees.  
Based on 203,920 firm-year observations from 30,041 unique firms across 54 
countries over the 1989 to 2010 period, we find that on average, an increase in creditor 
rights score from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile doubles the magnitude of high 
leverage costs, consistent with the dark-side effects of creditor rights intensifying adverse 
responses from customers and competitors for firms that are highly leveraged. The negative 
impact of creditor rights on the high leverage costs is robust to endogeneity tests as well as 
alternative sample compositions and measures, and is more pronounced for the types of 
creditor protection that most drive creditors’ hold-up incentives, for firms located in 
countries with developed banking system (rather than bond market system), for firms with 
higher liquidation costs, and for firms with customers or competitors more sensitive to high 
leverage. We also find that strong creditor protection increases employee exit for highly 
leveraged firms.  
In sum, our paper shows that the dark-side effects of creditor rights operate not only 
through management but also through customers, competitors, and employees. Second, our 
paper highlights the importance of firm-specific characteristics such as a firm’s financial 
health when considering the effect of strong creditor rights. Our results suggest that a more 
flexible (i.e., shorter-term) debt strategy may be optimal for firms operating in a strong 
creditor rights environment. Finally, our paper identifies strong creditor rights as a factor 
that influences high leverage costs, and is the first international study to shed light on the 
role of institutions in affecting the costs of high leverage. 
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Panel A. Descriptive statistics by country 
Argentina 120 0.07 1.00 0.29 5.23 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.17 1.99 12.06 
Australia 4,716 0.10 3.00 0.33 3.54 -0.08 -0.05 0.07 0.07 0.59 0.46 1.63 3.63 
Austria 320 0.10 3.00 0.36 5.65 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.06 1.43 1.48 
Belgium 436 0.10 2.00 0.34 5.91 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.94 1.95 
Brazil 1,545 0.13 1.00 0.32 5.93 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.21 0.20 2.18 8.12 
Canada 8,101 0.13 1.09 0.30 4.90 0.01 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.35 0.34 1.21 2.22 
Chile 747 0.10 2.00 0.34 5.67 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.19 2.50 5.98 
China 12,329 0.20 2.00 0.29 5.41 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.19 0.17 9.84 4.29 
Colombia 13 -0.11 0.00 0.31 5.50 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.17 0.16 -1.78 19.17 
Denmark 734 0.05 3.00 0.26 5.24 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.15 0.79 2.38 
Egypt 12 0.35 2.00 0.17 7.91 0.20 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.13 0.13 3.40 8.41 
Finland 890 0.09 1.00 0.26 5.70 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03 2.01 1.46 
France 5,567 0.10 0.00 0.30 5.70 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.07 0.86 1.70 
Germany 5,019 0.08 3.00 0.33 5.44 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.11 1.20 0.87 
Greece 643 0.06 1.00 0.35 5.60 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.17 0.07 2.84 
Hong Kong 1,044 0.14 4.00 0.28 5.39 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.23 0.22 3.88 -0.18 
India 10,377 0.20 2.00 0.29 4.12 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 6.42 6.10 
Indonesia 2,015 0.11 2.02 0.29 4.58 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.15 2.98 13.62 
Ireland 239 0.11 1.00 0.31 5.73 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.30 0.29 2.29 1.79 
Israel 629 0.13 3.00 0.26 4.83 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.35 0.33 2.14 2.28 
Italy 1,583 0.09 2.00 0.31 6.20 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.08 2.17 
Japan 24,917 0.07 2.83 0.23 6.08 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.21 0.21 0.74 -1.29 
Jordan 14 0.19 1.00 0.64 5.59 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 4.95 9.17 
Korea, Rep. 4,022 0.10 3.00 0.27 6.09 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.14 3.86 2.50 
Kuwait 42 0.03 3.00 0.40 6.43 0.08 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09 -4.50 7.63 
Latvia 12 0.06 3.00 0.50 4.96 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.10 -1.80 7.72 
Lithuania 20 0.13 2.00 0.25 4.46 0.12 0.14 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.10 2.88 4.63 
Malaysia 5,238 0.10 3.00 0.30 4.23 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.13 3.00 4.18 
Mexico 643 0.12 0.00 0.30 7.02 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.21 0.21 0.96 6.97 
Morocco 14 0.12 1.00 0.29 5.91 0.19 0.19 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.03 3.76 2.15 
Netherlands 1,145 0.08 3.00 0.32 6.10 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.10 1.82 2.24 
New Zealand 283 0.10 4.00 0.25 4.48 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.10 0.55 2.99 
Nigeria 30 0.18 4.00 0.23 4.91 0.13 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.12 8.85 10.74 
Norway 901 0.14 2.00 0.21 5.35 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.68 4.68 
Oman 145 0.21 0.00 0.26 3.55 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.11 0.11 2.10 8.65 
Pakistan 880 0.09 1.00 0.29 4.04 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 1.79 12.11 
Peru 222 0.17 0.00 0.31 5.23 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.15 4.10 3.30 
Philippines 363 0.10 1.00 0.25 4.51 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.19 0.18 2.93 4.99 
Poland 1,164 0.15 1.00 0.36 4.29 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.17 0.16 4.35 2.78 
Portugal 147 0.09 1.00 0.33 7.02 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.99 2.58 
Russian Fed.  351 0.20 1.97 0.38 7.87 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.12 4.02 13.95 
Saudi Arabia 45 0.16 3.00 0.44 7.21 0.14 0.14 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 3.89 5.29 
Singapore 3,396 0.14 3.00 0.25 4.38 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.14 0.13 4.08 1.77 
South Africa 1,155 0.16 3.00 0.34 5.00 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.12 2.00 7.43 
Spain 521 0.11 2.57 0.34 6.83 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03 1.08 2.71 
Sri Lanka 302 0.18 2.00 0.27 3.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.21 0.21 4.89 9.31 
Sweden 2,139 0.12 1.00 0.29 4.61 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.26 0.26 1.80 1.68 
Switzerland 1,722 0.09 1.00 0.27 6.15 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.11 1.12 0.96 
Thailand 3,393 0.10 2.05 0.29 4.29 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.17 3.14 2.87 
Turkey 357 0.10 2.00 0.33 5.83 0.10 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.12 1.87 14.49 
United Arab Emir 53 0.09 2.00 0.32 5.89 0.11 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.10 0.10 -10.94 7.46 
United Kingdom 13,826 0.10 4.00 0.32 4.98 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.27 0.27 1.93 2.26 
United States 79,289 0.09 1.00 0.29 4.91 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.37 0.37 1.60 2.25 
Vietnam 90 0.14 1.00 0.33 3.83 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.09 4.74 10.82 
Panel B. Descriptive statistics for the full sample 
Mean  0.11 1.84 0.29 5.09 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.27 0.26 2.40 2.49 
Min  -1.00 0.00 0.00 -6.91 -1.86 -1.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -16.59 -21.44 
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Q1  -0.05 1.00 0.00 3.74 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.84 1.16 
Median  0.08 1.00 0.00 5.06 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.17 0.16 2.18 2.23 
Q3  0.23 3.00 1.00 6.40 0.11 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.30 0.30 3.28 3.33 
Max  2.00 4.00 1.00 13.08 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.39 6.60 6.60 30.34 137.96 
SD  0.31 1.05 0.45 2.08 0.21 0.20 0.06 0.07 0.51 0.48 3.25 3.29 
This table reports the sample distribution by country, and summary statistics for all variables (before country-industry adjustments) in 
the main regression. The full sample includes 203,920 firm-year observations from 54 countries. Panel A presents the average of the 
key variables in the main regression by country. Panel B reports descriptive statistics of the full sample from 54 countries.  
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Table 2.2 Correlation matrix 
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  1                       
CRIGHTS 0.01*** 1                     
HLEV 0.01*** -0.01** 1                   
SIZE 0.06*** 0.04*** 0.22*** 1                 
PROFITt-1 0.11*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.31*** 1               
PROFITt-2 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.02*** 0.30*** 0.61*** 1             
INVESTMENTt-1 0.10*** -0.07*** 0.13*** 0.04*** 0.10*** 0.15*** 1           
INVESTMENTt-2 0.10*** -0.06*** 0.12*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.66*** 1         
SELLEXPt-1 -0.01*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.26*** -0.49*** -0.43*** -0.03*** -0.02*** 1       
SELLEXPt-2 -0.01*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.26*** -0.45*** -0.49*** -0.04*** -0.02*** 0.84*** 1     
GDPG 0.19*** 0.07*** -0.00 -0.04*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 0.06*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 1   
INFLATION 0.07*** -0.10*** 0.02*** -0.10*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.09*** 0.09*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 0.24*** 1 
Notes: This table reports pairwise correlations for the key variables (before country-industry adjustments) in the main regression. Detailed descriptions of 
variable definitions and data sources are provided in Appendix C. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.3 The dark-side effect of creditor rights 
 
              Main Findings           
 SALES_Gt SALES_Gt SALES_Gt 
  (1) (2) (3) 
CRIGHTSt-2* HLEVt-2  -0.0043*** -0.0062** 
  (-3.54) (-2.14) 
HLEVt-2 -0.0081*** -0.0003 -0.0104 
  (-4.83) (-0.11) (-1.54) 
CRIGHTSt-2  0.0043 0.0032 
  (1.63) (1.40) 
SIZEt  0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0166*** 
  (7.16) (7.60) (6.74) 
PROFITt-1  0.1385*** 0.1391*** 0.1097*** 
  (16.48) (16.80) (7.31) 
PROFITt-2  -0.0058 -0.0048 -0.0122 
  (-1.32) (-0.84) (-1.20) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.3730*** 0.3729*** 0.4339*** 
  (9.89) (10.04) (8.35) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.1521*** 0.1526*** 0.1096** 
  (5.45) (5.63) (2.50) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.0157* 0.0158* 0.0119* 
  (2.01) (1.97) (1.83) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.0314*** 0.0314*** 0.0231*** 
  (4.80) (5.48) (4.50) 
GDPGt 0.0002 0.0001 -0.0008 
  (0.26) (0.15) (-1.64) 
INFLATIONt 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 
  (0.95) (1.26) (0.97) 
CONSTANT -0.0176*** -0.0257*** -0.0074 
  (-4.36) (-4.66) (-1.26) 
N 203,920 203,920 57,660 
R-squared 0.0240 0.0241 0.0267 
This table reports results on the effect of creditor rights on the costs of high leverage using OLS. The 
dependent variable is country-industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The main variables of interest are 
creditor rights (CRIGHTS) and a dummy variable equal to 1 if in the given year the firm’s long-term debt 
ratio is in the top three deciles of the country in which the firm is headquartered. (HLEV). Additional variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix D. All control variables are adjusted to their country-industry-year 
means and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. To ensure that the 
country-industry mean is not biased toward outliers, we require each country-industry-year to contain at least 
4 observations. We further remove countries with fewer than 10 observations. Model 1 revisits the finding 
that high leverage leads to costly reactions from customers and competitors (Table 2 of Campello (2006)). 
Models 2 and 3 examine the effect of creditor rights on the costs of high leverage. Model 3 creates an 
extremely high-leverage dummy by assigning the value of 1 to the top decile firm-year observations and 0 to 
the bottom decile observations in each country. The merged data cover 54 countries for the period 1989–
2010. The t-statistic in parentheses is based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow 
for clustering at the country level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 2.4 Endogeneity tests: exogenous shock of financial crisis 
 
  Financial Crisis 
  (1) 
DURING CRISIS*CRIGHTSt-2 * HLEVt-2 -0.0047* 
  (-1.87) 
AFTER CRISIS*CRIGHTSt-2 * HLEVt-2 0.0043 
  (0.77) 
DURING CRISIS*CRIGHTSt-2  -0.0044 
  (-1.22) 
DURING CRISIS* HLEVt-2 0.0099* 
  (1.69) 
AFTER CRISIS*CRIGHTSt-2 -0.0026 
  (-0.96) 
AFTER CRISIS* HLEVt-2 -0.0097 
  (-0.62) 
CRIGHTSt-2* HLEVt-2 -0.0040*** 
  (-2.66) 
During Crisis 0.0190** 
  (2.38) 
After Crisis 0.0199*** 
  (3.45) 
CRIGHTSt-2 0.0044 
  (1.56) 
HLEVt-2 -0.0006 
  (-0.21) 
SIZEt  0.0104*** 
  (7.72) 
PROFITt-1  0.1394*** 
  (16.96) 
PROFITt-2  -0.0047 
  (-0.84) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.3729*** 
  (10.04) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.1523*** 
  (5.63) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.0156* 
  (1.98) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.0316*** 
  (5.48) 
GDPGt 0.0003 
  (0.33) 
INFLATIONt 0.0006 
  (1.21) 
CONSTANT -0.0286*** 
  (-4.92) 
N  203,920 
R-squared 0.0245 
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This table reports results on the effect of creditor rights on the costs of high leverage after introducing the 
exogenous shock of financial crisis. The dependent variable is country-industry-adjusted sales growth 
(SALES_G). The main variables of interest are creditor rights (CRIGHTS) and a dummy variable equal to 1 
if in the given year the firm’s long-term debt ratio is in the top three deciles of the country in which the firm 
is headquartered. (HLEV). Additional variable definitions are provided in Appendix D. All control variables 
are adjusted to their country-industry-year means and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate 
the influence of outliers. To ensure that the country-industry mean is not biased toward outliers, we require 
each country-industry-year to contain at least 4 observations. We further remove countries with fewer than 
10 observations. Model 1 includes the interaction terms between the crisis indicators, and creditor rights and 
high leverage variables. We follow Lins et al. (2013) and define 2008 and 2009 as the financial crisis period 
(DURING CRISIS). The following years in our sample are defined as AFTER CRISIS. The merged data cover 
54 countries for the period 1989–2010. The t-statistic in parentheses is based on standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the country level. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.5 Endogeneity tests: 2SLS and system GMM approaches 
 
  2SLS (instrumented by HLEVt-3 and HLEVt-4)     SYSTEM GMM       
  First Stage      Second Stage        
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
CRIGHTSt-
2×HLEVt-2   -0.0068***  -0.0058** 
  (-2.97) (-2.51) 
HLEVt-2  -0.0135*** -0.0008 -0.0200*** -0.0088* 
  (-5.08) (-0.16) (-7.45) (-1.77) 
CRIGHTSt-2   0.0068  0.0052*** 
  (1.59) (5.04) 
SIZEt  0.0160*** 0.0112*** 0.0111*** 0.0143*** 0.0143*** 
  (6.54) (7.78) (7.83) (26.74) (26.77) 
PROFITt-1  -0.0386*** 0.1303*** 0.1315*** 0.0856*** 0.0861*** 
  (-5.53) (13.34) (14.51) (10.27) (10.30) 
PROFITt-2  -0.1157*** 0.0059 0.0083 0.0065 0.0078 
  (-9.51) (1.26) (1.58) (0.80) (0.95) 
INVESTMENTt-1  -0.1889*** 0.3235*** 0.3220*** 0.2218*** 0.2244*** 
  (-4.01) (8.44) (8.46) (9.51) (9.59) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.5334*** 0.1488*** 0.1489*** 0.1221*** 0.1221*** 
  (5.68) (4.07) (4.10) (6.07) (6.04) 
SELLEXPt-1  -0.0160*** 0.0172 0.0172 0.0682*** 0.0677*** 
  (-4.37) (1.30) (1.30) (9.49) (9.38) 
SELLEXPt-2  -0.0131*** 0.0324*** 0.0321*** -0.0069 -0.0062 
  (-3.23) (3.65) (3.64) (-1.00) (-0.90) 
GDPGt -0.0008 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 
  (-1.08) (0.05) (-0.11) (0.01) (-0.32) 
INFLATIONt 0.0017* 0.0007 0.0010 0.0004 0.0005* 
  (1.95) (0.55) (0.83) (1.22) (1.67) 
IV1_HLEVt-3 0.5780***     
  (59.82) 
IV2_HLEVt-4  0.1570***     
  (22.25) 
SALES_Gt-1    0.1090*** 0.1090*** 
  (20.38) (20.38) 
CONSTANT 0.0722*** -0.0255*** -0.0385*** -0.0210*** -0.0306*** 
  (8.69) (-3.34) (-4.94) (-15.52) (-12.35) 
N 157,850 157,850 157,850 150,346 150,346 
R-squared 0.5147 0.0232 0.0236 23,581 23,581 
First stage F 
statistic 
75948.9         
Exogeneity test p 
value 
  0.33 0.35     
This table reports results of 2SLS and GMM regressions. The dependent variable is country-industry-
adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The main variables of interest are creditor rights (CRIGHTS) and a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if in the given year the firm’s long-term debt ratio is in the top three deciles of 
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the country in which the firm is headquartered. (HLEV). Additional variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix D. All control variables are adjusted to their country-industry-year means and are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. To ensure that the country-industry-year mean 
is not biased toward outliers, we require each country-industry to contain at least 4 observations. We further 
remove countries with fewer than 10 observations. The first-stage regressions are reported in Model 1. 
Models 2 and 3 report the second-stage regression using the fitted values of HLEV. Models 4 and 5 report 
the system GMM results. The merged data cover 54 countries for the period 1989–2010. The t-statistic in 
parentheses is based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the 
country level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.6 Robustness checks: sample composition 
 
                                                                                  Sample Composition                                                                            n                                         
  Exclude U.S. Exclude Japan Exclude Japan & U.S. Weighted Regression 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CRIGHTSt-
2×HLEVt-2  -0.0051***  -0.0039**  -0.0051**  -0.0053*** 
  (-3.08) (-2.54) (-2.62) (-5.30) 
HLEVt-2 -0.0094*** 0.0027 -0.0075*** -0.0008 -0.0092*** 0.0025 -0.0063*** 0.0006 
  (-4.79) (0.57) (-4.20) (-0.29) (-3.98) (0.46) (-5.27) (0.51) 
CRIGHTSt-2  -0.0003  0.0029  -0.0010  0.0084** 
  (-0.14) (1.49) (-0.65) (2.34) 
SIZEt  0.0090*** 0.0090*** 0.0111*** 0.0111*** 0.0104*** 0.0105*** 0.0112*** 0.0111*** 
  (3.45) (3.48) (8.65) (8.81) (3.51) (3.56) (17.18) (16.13) 
PROFITt-1  0.1613*** 0.1615*** 0.1384*** 0.1387*** 0.1620*** 0.1622*** 0.1328*** 0.1335*** 
  (11.12) (11.15) (16.48) (16.71) (10.34) (10.37) (147.47) (113.20) 
PROFITt-2  0.0002 0.0004 -0.0080* -0.0076 -0.0065 -0.0062 -0.0013 -0.0002 
  (0.02) (0.04) (-1.78) (-1.63) (-0.77) (-0.73) (-0.93) (-0.12) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.3575*** 0.3576*** 0.3897*** 0.3898*** 0.3857*** 0.3856*** 0.3823*** 0.3816*** 
  (5.82) (5.80) (11.62) (11.64) (6.88) (6.85) (25.03) (24.58) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.1860*** 0.1857*** 0.1480*** 0.1485*** 0.1835*** 0.1832*** 0.1132*** 0.1137*** 
  (8.07) (8.14) (5.25) (5.27) (7.33) (7.39) (6.41) (6.32) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.0052 0.0051 0.0156* 0.0157* 0.0050 0.0049 0.0255*** 0.0254*** 
  (0.76) (0.76) (1.98) (1.99) (0.74) (0.73) (8.75) (8.94) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.0231** 0.0231** 0.0311*** 0.0311*** 0.0223** 0.0222** 0.0348*** 0.0349*** 
  (2.16) (2.15) (4.65) (4.69) (2.08) (2.06) (27.89) (28.28) 
GDPGt 0.0005 0.0005 0.0004 0.0003 0.0007 0.0007 -0.0016 -0.0019 
  (0.71) (0.67) (0.41) (0.30) (0.98) (0.95) (-0.94) (-1.21) 
INFLATIONt 0.0003 0.0003 0.0012** 0.0012** 0.0008** 0.0007** 0.0007 0.0018 
  (0.80) (0.67) (2.44) (2.50) (2.45) (2.46) (0.34) (1.08) 
CONSTANT -0.0132*** -0.0122** -0.0218*** -0.0265*** -0.0176*** -0.0151*** -0.0195*** -0.0320*** 
  (-4.38) (-2.25) (-8.94) (-7.14) (-9.09) (-3.73) (-3.65) (-5.60) 
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N 124,631 124,631 179,003 179,003 99,714 99,714 203,920 203,920 
R-squared 0.0217 0.0218 0.0250 0.0250 0.0230 0.0232 0.0287 0.0290 
This table reports results for the main analyses on the costs of high leverage and the effect of creditor rights on the costs of high leverage using different sample 
compositions. The dependent variable is country-industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The main variables of interest are creditor rights (CRIGHTS) and a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if in the given year the firm’s long-term debt ratio is in the top three deciles of the country in which the firm is headquartered. (HLEV). 
Additional variable definitions are provided in Appendix D. All control variables are adjusted to their country-industry-year means and are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. To ensure that the country-industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we require each country-industry 
to contain at least 4 observations. We further remove countries with fewer than 10 observations. Models 1 and 2 remove firms from the U.S. Models 3 and 4 remove 
firms from Japan. Models 5 and 6 remove firms from both the U.S. and Japan. Models 7 and 8 employ weighted regressions where the weights equal the reciprocal 
of the number of observations in each country. The merged data cover 54 countries for the period 1989–2010. The t-statistic in parentheses is based on standard 
errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the country level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
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Table 2.7 Robustness checks: alternative definitions of key variables 
 
                         High leverage                                                  CRIGHTS                           
  Total Leverage Lag Three Years TIME COST EFFICIENCY RENEGOTIATIO
N 
_FAILURE 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
CRIGHTSt-
2×HLEVt-2  -0.0044**  -0.0042*** 0.0069*** 0.1032*** -0.0378*** -0.0195** 
  (-2.62) (-3.87) (3.15) (5.83) (-4.80) (-2.56) 
HLEVt-2 -0.0130*** -0.0048 -0.0079*** -0.0001 -0.0193*** -0.0168*** 0.0219*** 0.0029 
  (-4.19) (-1.39) (-3.92) (-0.08) (-5.68) (-7.28) (3.49) (0.70) 
CRIGHTSt-2  0.0043  0.0048 -0.0009 0.0494 -0.0293** -0.0180** 
  (1.60) (1.15) (-0.21) (1.46) (-2.35) (-2.63) 
SIZEt  0.0103*** 0.0103*** 0.0111*** 0.0110*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 0.0112*** 
  (7.06) (7.10) (8.19) (8.26) (8.40) (8.34) (8.34) (8.41) 
PROFITt-1  0.1379*** 0.1386*** 0.1389*** 0.1397*** 0.1282*** 0.1286*** 0.1290*** 0.1284*** 
  (16.71) (17.14) (13.23) (14.07) (17.35) (16.48) (16.31) (16.22) 
PROFITt-2  -0.0089* -0.0077 0.0055 0.0069 0.0081 0.0085 0.0093* 0.0083 
  (-2.00) (-1.56) (0.90) (0.98) (1.49) (1.66) (1.81) (1.64) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.3702*** 0.3699*** 0.3497*** 0.3490*** 0.3072*** 0.3068*** 0.3058*** 0.3068*** 
  (9.77) (9.79) (9.82) (9.83) (7.82) (7.80) (7.77) (7.74) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.1520*** 0.1523*** 0.1416*** 0.1420*** 0.1352*** 0.1337*** 0.1328*** 0.1336*** 
  (5.39) (5.42) (3.73) (3.74) (3.49) (3.49) (3.49) (3.53) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.0155* 0.0156* 0.0157* 0.0158* 0.0142 0.0140 0.0136 0.0137 
  (1.97) (1.98) (1.75) (1.76) (1.02) (1.02) (0.98) (0.98) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.0309*** 0.0309*** 0.0372*** 0.0371*** 0.0353*** 0.0349*** 0.0343*** 0.0347*** 
  (4.77) (4.81) (6.33) (6.41) (4.30) (4.27) (4.19) (4.24) 
GDPGt 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0009 -0.0015* -0.0015** -0.0015** 
  (0.29) (0.18) (0.06) (-0.05) (-1.19) (-1.95) (-2.08) (-2.54) 
INFLATIONt 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0009 0.0000 -0.0004 -0.0011 0.0001 
  (0.99) (1.30) (0.77) (1.02) (0.02) (-0.26) (-0.79) (0.07) 
CONSTANT -0.0162*** -0.0243*** -0.0243*** -0.0333*** -0.0256*** -0.0294*** -0.0005 -0.0164* 
  (-3.81) (-4.21) (-3.99) (-4.59) (-2.70) (-3.61) (-0.05) (-1.98) 
N 203,920 203,920 170,417 170,417 135,228 135,228 135,228 135,228 
9
0
 
 91 
R-squared 0.0242 0.0244 0.0252 0.0254 0.0248 0.0251 0.0254 0.0251 
This table reports results for the main analyses on the costs of high leverage and the effect of creditor rights on the costs of high leverage using alternative definitions 
of HLEV and CRIGHTS. The dependent variable is country-industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The main variables of interest are creditor rights (CRIGHTS) 
and a dummy variable equal to 1 if in the given year the firm’s long-term debt ratio is in the top three deciles of the country in which the firm is headquartered. 
(HLEV). Additional variable definitions are provided in Appendix D. All control variables are adjusted to their country-industry-year means and are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. To ensure that the country-industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we require each country-
industry to contain at least 4 observations. We further remove countries with fewer than 10 observations. Models 1 and 2 replace the long-term debt ratio with the 
total debt ratio. In Models 3 and 4, HLEV is lagged for 3 years to reflect the alternative definitions shown in Campello (2006). In Models 5 to 7, CRIGHTSt-2 is 
replaced by variables reflecting the time, cost and efficiency of enforcing creditor rights, which are from Djankov et al. (2008). In Model 8, CRIGHTSt-2 is replaced 
by RENEGOTIATION FAILURE (Favara et al., 2012), which gauges the difficulty shareholders will face if they attempt to renege on the outstanding debt, whether 
through a formal insolvency procedure or outside court. The merged data cover 54 countries for the period 1989–2010. The t-statistic in parentheses is based on 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the country level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 2.8 Subsample tests 
 
  Baseline Restrictions on No 
Automatic 
Secured Creditor No Management      Financing System          Liquidation Costs    
   Reorganizatio
n 
Stay Paid First     Stay banking bond market high low 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
CRIGHTSt-2×HLEVt-2 -0.0043*** -0.0039 -0.0082** -0.0035 -0.0090*** -0.0075*** -0.0019 -0.0079*** -0.0040* 
  (-3.54) (-0.67) (-2.54) (-0.63) (-2.70) (-3.53) (-0.68) (-10.85) (-1.67) 
HLEVt-2 -0.0003 -0.0072*** -0.0056*** -0.0049 -0.0049*** 0.0083 -0.0042 0.0097*** 0.0043 
  (-0.11) (-3.31) (-4.06) (-0.99) (-3.16) (1.35) (-1.15) (5.75) (0.77) 
CRIGHTSt-2 0.0043 0.0095 0.0072 -0.0031 0.0090* -0.0009 0.0096*** 0.0077** 0.0008 
  (1.63) (1.25) (1.51) (-0.67) (1.79) (-0.42) (6.64) (2.13) (0.71) 
SIZEt  0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0104*** 0.0098*** 0.0111*** 0.0087*** 0.0159*** 
  (7.60) (7.58) (7.56) (7.52) (7.51) (3.28) (8.12) (8.50) (20.68) 
PROFITt-1  0.1391*** 0.1388*** 0.1389*** 0.1386*** 0.1392*** 0.1701*** 0.1328*** 0.1464*** 0.1308*** 
  (16.80) (16.60) (16.76) (16.46) (16.83) (10.34) (31.07) (30.47) (12.85) 
PROFITt-2  -0.0048 -0.0052 -0.0052 -0.0057 -0.0048 0.0008 -0.0033 -0.0158** -0.0038 
  (-0.84) (-0.93) (-0.91) (-0.98) (-0.82) (0.08) (-0.57) (-2.14) (-0.38) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.3729*** 0.3728*** 0.3729*** 0.3729*** 0.3727*** 0.3622*** 0.3776*** 0.3558*** 0.3615*** 
  (10.04) (10.05) (10.03) (10.03) (10.03) (6.27) (8.63) (9.88) (13.50) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.1526*** 0.1524*** 0.1522*** 0.1522*** 0.1520*** 0.1879*** 0.0996*** 0.1664*** 0.1347*** 
  (5.63) (5.62) (5.64) (5.58) (5.66) (7.48) (4.94) (5.79) (5.28) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.0158* 0.0158* 0.0157* 0.0157* 0.0157* 0.0037 0.0267*** 0.0207 0.0127* 
  (1.97) (1.96) (1.96) (1.96) (1.97) (0.54) (9.68) (1.54) (1.83) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.0314*** 0.0313*** 0.0314*** 0.0313*** 0.0314*** 0.0297* 0.0275*** 0.0212** 0.0379*** 
  (5.48) (5.33) (5.48) (5.38) (5.49) (1.84) (3.96) (2.20) (5.36) 
GDPGt 0.0001 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0008 -0.0022 -0.0004 0.0001 
  (0.15) (-0.30) (0.38) (0.32) (0.41) (0.98) (-1.59) (-0.41) (0.21) 
INFLATIONt 0.0007 0.0004 0.0007 0.0005 0.0008 0.0007* 0.0010 0.0013** 0.0002 
  (1.26) (0.66) (1.18) (0.88) (1.49) (1.74) (1.45) (2.14) (0.77) 
CONSTANT -0.0257*** -0.0184*** -0.0203*** -0.0147*** -0.0216*** -0.0155** -0.0308*** -0.0404*** -0.0093*** 
  (-4.66) (-4.22) (-5.20) (-3.21) (-6.41) (-2.62) (-11.86) (-6.27) (-3.21) 
N 203,920 203,920 203,920 203,920 203,920 80,278 116,078 96,809 109,273 
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R-squared 0.0241 0.0241 0.0241 0.0240 0.0241 0.0229 0.0279 0.0263 0.0239 
Difference Test (CRIGHTSt-2* HLEVt-2)     (6)-(7) 0.128 (8)-(9) 0.060* 
This table reports results from running the regression of Equations (2) using OLS by splitting the samples by components of creditor rights, financing system, and liquidation costs. 
The dependent variable is country-industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The main variables of interest are creditor rights (CRIGHTS) and a dummy variable equal to 1 if in 
the given year the firm’s long-term debt ratio is in the top three deciles of the country in which the firm is headquartered. (HLEV). Additional variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix D. All control variables are adjusted to their country-industry-year means and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. To ensure that 
the country-industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we require each country-industry to contain at least 4 observations. We further remove countries with fewer than 10 
observations. Model 1 repeats the results of the baseline model in Table 2.3, Model 2. Models 2 to 5 separately report the four individual components of CRIGHTS. In Models 6 and 
7, we define an economy as banking system (bond market system) if the two-year lag of the ratio of bank loans to public bonds (computed as the ratio of private credit by deposit 
money banks to GDP divided by private and public bond market capitalization to GDP) is above (below or equal to) the median. In Models 8 and 9, following Favara et al. (2012), 
we classify a firm with high liquidation costs if its intangibles measure (one minus the average of exit values per dollar of the various tangible assets, including receivables, inventories, 
cash, and net property, plant, and equipment, weighted by total asset) is above (below or equal to) median of the overall sample two years before the base year. The merged data 
cover 54 countries for the period 1989–2010. The t-statistic in parentheses is based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the country 
level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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Table 2.9 Channels of the dark-side forces of creditor rights: customer and competitor 
 
            Customer                            Competitor                      
  Baseline Model Product Specificity Industry Concentration International Trade Freedom 
   high low high low high low 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
CRIGHTSt-2×HLEVt-2 -0.0043*** -0.0065*** -0.0019 -0.0064*** -0.0013 -0.0064*** -0.0008 
  (-3.54) (-2.77) (-1.23) (-5.04) (-0.51) (-3.04) (-0.29) 
HLEVt-2 -0.0003 0.0023 -0.0071** 0.0073** -0.0085** 0.0044 -0.0086 
  (-0.11) (0.44) (-2.27) (2.54) (-2.05) (0.99) (-1.45) 
CRIGHTSt-2 0.0043 0.0073*** 0.0019 -0.0005 0.0106*** 0.0012 0.0017 
  (1.63) (5.07) (1.20) (-0.42) (4.12) (0.92) (1.10) 
SIZEt  0.0104*** 0.0093*** 0.0119*** 0.0084*** 0.0126*** 0.0082*** 0.0115*** 
  (7.60) (13.40) (8.12) (5.17) (12.25) (11.42) (14.24) 
PROFITt-1  0.1391*** 0.1170*** 0.1630*** 0.1150*** 0.1511*** 0.1225*** 0.1552*** 
  (16.80) (11.89) (16.25) (13.05) (15.81) (11.53) (12.02) 
PROFITt-2  -0.0048 0.0130 -0.0139* -0.0017 -0.0123 0.0037 -0.0193 
  (-0.84) (1.33) (-1.68) (-0.21) (-1.13) (0.38) (-1.44) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.3729*** 0.1715*** 0.4191*** 0.3640*** 0.3824*** 0.3687*** 0.3487*** 
  (10.04) (4.52) (10.25) (10.55) (6.88) (10.00) (11.52) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.1526*** 0.2286*** 0.1292*** 0.1369*** 0.1471*** 0.0930*** 0.2110*** 
  (5.63) (6.40) (4.94) (3.37) (5.87) (2.78) (7.81) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.0158* 0.0262*** 0.0091 0.0142*** 0.0141 0.0052 0.0093 
  (1.97) (3.21) (1.03) (2.85) (1.23) (0.60) (1.13) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.0314*** 0.0326*** 0.0267*** 0.0294*** 0.0330** 0.0367*** 0.0254*** 
  (5.48) (4.02) (3.20) (7.19) (2.57) (4.37) (2.98) 
GDPGt 0.0001 -0.0006 0.0001 -0.0008 0.0004 -0.0021*** 0.0007** 
  (0.15) (-1.15) (0.20) (-1.31) (0.33) (-3.56) (2.26) 
INFLATIONt 0.0007 0.0004 0.0005 0.0005** 0.0014 -0.0011* 0.0002 
  (1.26) (0.82) (1.33) (2.53) (1.09) (-1.77) (0.65) 
CONSTANT -0.0257*** -0.0357*** -0.0169*** -0.0140*** -0.0394*** -0.0134*** -0.0127*** 
   (-4.66) (-10.29) (-6.33) (-6.50)  (-8.12) (-4.19) (-3.30) 
N 203,920 72,555 131,365 77,216 100,468 65,224 75,437 
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R-squared 0.0241 0.0206 0.0280 0.0197 0.0284 0.0210 0.0223 
Difference Test (CRIGHTSt-2* HLEVt-2) (2)-(3) 0.058* (4)-(5) 0.058* (8)-(9) 0.045** 
This table reports results from re-running the regression of the effect of creditor rights on the costs of high leverage using subsamples split by characteristics related 
to customer-driven and competitor-driven costs of high leverage. The dependent variable is country-industry-adjusted sales growth (SALES_G). The main variables 
of interest are creditor rights (CRIGHTS) and a dummy variable equal to 1 if in the given year the firm’s long-term debt ratio is in the top three deciles of the 
country in which the firm is headquartered. (HLEV). Additional variable definitions are provided in Appendix D. All control variables are adjusted to their country-
industry-year means and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. To ensure that the country-industry-year mean is not biased 
toward outliers, we require each country-industry to contain at least 4 observations. We further remove countries with fewer than 10 observations. Model 1 repeats 
the results of the baseline model using the full sample. In Models 2 and 3, we classify a firm as a high (low) product specificity firm if its R&D/sales ratio is above 
(below or equal to) median of the overall sample two years before the base year. In Models 4 and 5, high (low) industry concentration refers to country-industries 
with a four-firm concentration ratio in 2000 higher (lower) than 0.4. In Models 6 and 7, high (low) international trade freedom refers to country-years with an 
international trade freedom index above (below or equal to) median of the overall sample two years before the base year. The merged data cover 54 countries for 
the period 1989–2010. The t-statistic in parentheses is based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the country level. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.10 Additional channels of the dark-side forces of creditor rights: employee and supplier 
 
          Employee                Supplier        
  Employee Growth Account payable growth 
VARIABLES EMPL_Gt EMPL_Gt AP_Gt AP_Gt 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
CRIGHTSt-2×HLEVt-2  -0.0025**  0.0005 
  (-2.25) (0.20) 
HLEVt-2 -0.0137*** -0.0095*** -0.0086*** -0.0093** 
  (-11.54) (-2.78) (-4.20) (-2.38) 
CRIGHTSt-2  0.0025***  0.0025*** 
  (2.97) (2.75) 
SIZEt  0.0044*** 0.0043*** 0.0071*** 0.0070*** 
  (5.02) (5.05) (3.63) (3.58) 
PROFITt-1  0.1776*** 0.1780*** 0.1632*** 0.1637*** 
  (17.99) (18.00) (16.95) (17.21) 
PROFITt-2  0.0059 0.0066 0.0212*** 0.0219*** 
  (0.86) (0.93) (2.76) (2.86) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.2343*** 0.2340*** 0.2150** 0.2146** 
  (12.66) (12.60) (2.59) (2.59) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.0267*** 0.0270*** 0.1119*** 0.1116*** 
  (2.88) (2.92) (6.02) (6.02) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.0108*** 0.0109*** 0.0101 0.0101 
  (4.52) (4.47) (1.35) (1.36) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.0217*** 0.0217*** 0.0225*** 0.0225*** 
  (4.88) (4.87) (4.70) (4.73) 
GDPGt -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003* 0.0003 
  (-0.88) (-1.06) (1.85) (1.49) 
INFLATIONt -0.0000 0.0001 0.0005* 0.0005** 
  (-0.10) (0.35) (1.68) (2.63) 
CONSTANT -0.0055*** -0.0100*** -0.0075*** -0.0121*** 
  (-3.23) (-8.65) (-3.71) (-8.01) 
N 142,428 142,428         196,993 196,993 
R-squared 0.0279 0.0280 0.0098 0.0098 
This table reports results on our analyses on the additional channels of the dark-side forces of creditor rights. The 
dependent variables are country-industry-adjusted employee growth (EMPL_G) and country-industry-adjusted account 
payable growth (AP_G). The main variables of interest are creditor rights (CRIGHTS) and a dummy variable equal to 1 
if in the given year the firm’s long-term debt ratio is in the top three deciles of the country in which the firm is 
headquartered. (HLEV). Additional variable definitions are provided in Appendix D. All control variables are adjusted 
to their country-industry-year means and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate the influence of outliers. 
To ensure that the country-industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we require each country-industry to contain 
at least 4 observations. We further remove countries with fewer than 10 observations. The merged data cover 54 countries 
for the period 1989–2010. The t-statistic in parentheses is based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent 
and allow for clustering at the country level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 2.11 Alternative explanation: creditor rights and firm performance 
 
VARIABLES DEBTISSUEt EQUITYISSUEt STOCKRETURNt 
  (1) (2) (3) 
CRIGHTSt-2×HLEVt-2 -0.0068*** -0.0037** -0.0058*** 
  (-2.70) (-2.62) (-3.72) 
HLEVt-2 0.0008 0.0084*** -0.0013 
  (0.11) (3.81) (-0.59) 
CRIGHTSt-2 0.0154*** 0.0026 0.0017 
  (3.58) (1.34) (0.38) 
SIZEt  0.0079*** -0.0035*** 0.0168*** 
  (5.91) (-4.25) (9.94) 
PROFITt-1  0.0302 -0.1680*** 0.1860*** 
  (1.14) (-9.69) (9.77) 
PROFITt-2  0.0330 -0.1288*** 0.0050 
  (1.10) (-13.40) (0.52) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.5618*** 0.2441*** -0.1217*** 
  (7.54) (6.25) (-2.68) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.0063 0.0616*** -0.0160 
  (0.24) (3.16) (-0.37) 
SELLEXPt-1  -0.0367 0.0432*** -0.0132 
  (-1.62) (4.41) (-1.47) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.1154*** 0.0054 0.0059 
  (4.20) (0.85) (0.74) 
GDPGt 0.0057 -0.0003 0.0007 
  (1.23) (-0.46) (1.26) 
INFLATIONt 0.0004 0.0002 0.0003 
  (0.75) (1.38) (0.91) 
CONSTANT -0.0582*** -0.0110*** 0.0212 
  (-2.97) (-3.08) (1.43) 
N 200,088 158,092 168,596 
R-squared 0.0038 0.1298 0.0140 
This table examines the relation between creditor rights and firm performance for highly leveraged firms 
using OLS. The dependent variables comprise country-industry-adjusted debt issuance (DEBTISSUE), 
country-industry-adjusted equity issuance (EQUITYISSUE), and country-industry-adjusted stock returns 
(STOCK). The main variables of interest are creditor rights (CRIGHTS) and a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
in the given year the firm’s long-term debt ratio is in the top three deciles of the country in which the firm is 
headquartered. (HLEV). Additional variable definitions are provided in Appendix D. All control variables 
are adjusted to their country-industry-year means and are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to mitigate 
the influence of outliers. To ensure that the country-industry-year mean is not biased toward outliers, we 
require each country-industry to contain at least 4 observations. We further remove countries with fewer than 
10 observations. The merged data cover 54 countries for the period 1989–2010. The t-statistic in parentheses 
is based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the country level. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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CHAPTER 3 
COLLECTIVISM AND THE COSTS OF HIGH LEVERAGE 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
A growing body of literature examines the role of national cultural values in 
influencing corporate financial policy choices and financial outcomes. For example, 
cultural values impact stock price synchronicity (Eun, Wang, and Xiao, 2015), capital 
structure and dividend policies (e.g., Chui, Lloyd, and Kwok, 2002; Li et al., 2011; El 
Ghoul et al., 2016; Shao, Kwok, and Guedhami, 2010), corporate risk-taking (Li et al., 
2013), ownership structure (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008; Holderness, 2016; 
Boubakri et al., 2016), and research and development expenditures (Shao, Kwok, and 
Zhang, 2013). According to these studies, culture affects financial decisions through beliefs 
or values that condition individuals’ (investors or managers) perceptions, preferences, and 
behaviors. 33  However, little is known about how culture shapes simultaneously key 
                                                          
33 Culture also affects financial outcomes by influencing legal institutions (e.g., Stulz and 
Williamson, 2003; Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz, 2005).    
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stakeholders34 in and around the firm and influences financial outcomes.35 In this paper we 
examine the impact of the national culture dimension of collectivism over individualism—
an interdependent relationship between self and group (Hofstede, 2001)—on the 
interactions between capital structure and product market competition.  
Prior literature on capital structure and product market interactions suggests that 
high leverage leads to substantial stakeholder-induced dead-weight costs. On the one hand, 
high leverage can lead to lower sales, as customers anticipate that a highly leveraged firm 
will face strong incentives to cut costs by reneging on warranties, for example, or reducing 
product quality (Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Titman, 1984). On the other hand, high 
leverage can induce predatory attacks from competitors (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; 
Opler and Titman, 1994; Chevalier, 1995). We argue that under the condition of high 
leverage, where the coordination function of formal institutions (e.g., laws) is less 
efficient,36 collectivism can reduce these costs of high leverage. In particular, the tight 
                                                          
34 Following Freeman (1984), we define stakeholders as those entities who can affect or are affected 
by the actions and performance of the firm. This definition includes entities with implicit or explicit 
contracts with the firm, such as customers, suppliers, and employees, as well as those who have no 
contracting relationship with the firm, but exert influences on the firm, such as competitors.  
35 According to Maksimovic (1995), firms’ financial outcomes are influenced by different classes 
of stakeholders. 
36 As we discuss below, the ties between a firm and its customers generally take the form of implicit 
contracts, which have little legal standing, and thus regulators have limited ability to constrain 
opportunism on the part of highly leveraged firms. Further, because a firm typically has no 
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group structures in collectivist countries can reduce a highly leveraged firm’s incentives to 
break implicit contracts with customers through increased monitoring of the firm, and can 
reduce competitors’ incentives to take predatory actions against a highly leveraged firm by 
reducing the success of predatory attacks. The mental conditioning of a collectivist culture 
can further constrain customers and competitors from taking actions that would harm a 
highly leveraged firm. Overall, we expect collectivist countries to experience lower costs 
of high leverage in the form of market share losses. 
To capture the extent to which a given country is collectivist, we employ Hofstede’s 
(2001) widely used collectivism/individualism index. Next, we define high leverage as a 
dummy that is equal to one in a given year if the firm’s long-term debt ratio is in the top 
three deciles in the country in which the firm is headquartered. To capture the costs of high 
leverage, we follow Campello (2006) and use the sensitivity of industry-adjusted sales 
growth to high leverage. Industry-adjusted sales growth measures “the ﬁrm’s sales growth 
relative to that of its industry rivals in a given year; this roughly gauges a ﬁrm’s market 
share growth” (Campello, 2006, p. 148). 37  Following Campello (2006), we regress 
industry-adjusted sales growth on the high leverage dummy; a more negative coefficient 
                                                          
contractual relationship with its competitors, regulators have even less ability to restrict 
opportunism on the part of highly leveraged firms’ competitors. 
37  Positive (negative) industry-adjusted sales growth implies that the firm’s market share is 
increasing (decreasing). 
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on the high leverage dummy would indicate more adverse actions from customers and 
competitors and thus greater costs associated with maintaining high leverage.  
Using a large sample of 158,612 firm-year observations from 46 countries over the 
1989–2010 period, we document significantly lower costs of high leverage for countries 
with higher collectivism scores. In subsample analysis we find that the impact of 
collectivism on high leverage costs is more pronounced for firms that are likely to 
experience more severe costs of high leverage, namely, firms that are not cross-listed in 
the U.S., firms with high product specificity, and firms with financially healthy rivals. In 
addition, we find a stronger impact of collectivism on high leverage costs in countries with 
weak formal institutions. Taken together, these results support the view that collectivism 
decreases the costs of high leverage.  
To determine whether our findings on the relation between collectivism and high 
leverage costs operate through the tight group structures or the mental conditioning 
associated with collectivist countries, we conduct several additional tests. We find that 
collectivist countries on average have a higher prevalence of business groups, consistent 
with the tight group structures channel. We further find that the mitigating effect of 
collectivism on high leverage costs persists in samples with a low prevalence of business 
groups, and that collectivism constrains customers and competitors from taking 
unfavorable actions that will harm a highly leveraged firm, consistent with the mental 
conditioning channel. 
Next, we consider whether collectivism mitigates high leverage costs through 
stakeholder groups other than customers and competitors. While Titman (1984) suggests 
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that his model of customer-driven leverage costs could be applied to other stakeholders 
such as suppliers and employees, to date there is little empirical evidence on supplier- and 
employee-driven leverage costs. We find that both supplier- and employee-driven leverage 
costs are significant, and that the beneficial role of collectivism extends to both channels. 
Economically, an increase in collectivism score from the 25th percentile to the 75th 
percentile increases highly leveraged firms’ relative-to-industry sales growth by 1%, 
relative-to-industry employee growth by 1.14%, and relative-to-industry accounts payable 
growth by 2.14%.  
One could be concerned that our analysis above suffers from potential endogeneity 
of collectivism and high leverage costs. Endogeneity could arise if omitted factors 
determine both collectivism and high leverage costs. In addition, to the extent that declining 
sales can force a firm to incur debt to cover expenses, our estimates may be biased and 
inconsistent, which would lead to spurious inferences. To tackle these concerns, we 
conduct instrumental variables estimation using the “license to drop pronouns” as an 
instrument for collectivism and the two-year lagged high-leverage dummy as an instrument 
for high leverage. Our results continue to hold. In additional robustness tests, we address 
concerns related to an unbalanced sample, variable measurement, and alternative 
explanations. We find that none of these alternative explanations drives the negative 
relation between collectivism and high leverage costs. 
Our study contributes to the growing literature on culture and finance (Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008; Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2010; Gorodnichenko and Roland, 
2011; Eun, Wang, and Xiao, 2015; Karolyi, 2016). Prior studies suggest that culture shapes 
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firms’ financial outcomes by influencing investors’ and managers’ subjective perceptions, 
preferences, and behaviors. For example, trust affects investors’ perception of the risk of 
being cheated and, hence, their inclination to participate in the stock market (Guiso, 
Sapienza, and Zingales, 2008); individualism fosters investors’ overconfidence and self-
attribution bias that generate momentum trading strategies (Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2010); 
cultural tightness externally constrains investors’ deviant behavior from a country’s social 
norms and collectivism internally guides investors not to differentiate their behaviors from 
those of others, leading to similar trading behaviors and, hence, higher stock return co-
movements (Eun, Wang, and Xiao, 2015); conservativism conditions managers to be self-
disciplined, reducing the need for leverage as a disciplinary device for managers (Chui, 
Lloyd, and Kwok, 2002; El Ghoul et al., 2016). Our findings extend this literature by 
showing that in addition to conditioning investors’ or managers’ behavior, culture imposes 
informal constraints on the preferences and behaviors of a range of key stakeholders, such 
as upstream suppliers, downstream customers, external competitors, and internal 
employees, and hence affect firm-level outcomes. Unlike most prior studies on culture and 
finance, the unique setting of the interactions between capital structure and product market 
competition facilitates the task of analyzing the role of national culture in conditioning the 
behavior of a firm’s key stakeholders. 
Our paper also contributes to the literature on capital structure and product market 
performance. Prior studies mainly focus on the consequences of high leverage policies, 
with little attention paid to the factors that mitigate high leverage costs. In particular, our 
study is related to that of Bae et al. (2016), who find for a sample of U.S. firms that 
corporate social responsiblity alleviates customer dissatisfaction and competitor predation 
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associated with high leverage. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first international 
study to show that informal institutions can influence the costs of high leverage. Our 
findings suggest that national culture as captured by collectivism versus individualism 
affects firms’ interactions with key stakeholders, such as customers and competitors, and 
mitigates the costs of high leverage. Our paper also adds to the literature on the costs of 
high leverage (e.g., Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006) by documenting the 
costs driven by various types of stakeholders. Extant research has traditionally focused on 
the behavior of customers (e.g., Matsa, 2011; Kini, Shenoy, and Subramaniam, 2016) and 
competitors (e.g., Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Chevalier, 1995) of highly-levered firms. 
Our study provides the first empirical analysis of the behavior of these previously studied 
stakeholders (i.e., customers and competitors) as well as other relatively overlooked 
stakeholders (i.e., employees and suppliers).38 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews related literature 
and develops our hypotheses. Section 3.3 describes our sample, variables, and empirical 
design. Section 3.4 provides results on the relation between collectivism and the costs of 
high leverage. Section 3.5 concludes the paper.  
                                                          
38 One notable exception is Cohn and Wardlaw (2016) who find higher employee injury rates with 
increased leverage. 
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3.2. RELATED LITERATURE AND HYPOTHESIS  
3.2.1. The Costs of High Leverage 
Prior literature shows that high leverage is costly because it triggers a series of 
behavioral changes among customers and competitors that adversely affect the highly 
leveraged firm’s product market performance.  
3.2.1.1. Customer-driven High Leverage Costs (Agency Cost Theory)  
According to Coase (1937), a firm consists of interconnecting contracts among 
different stakeholder groups, for example, shareholders, debtholders, customers, suppliers, 
and employees. However, for all of these contracts, agency problems can arise: because 
the residual claims on a firm’s assets can generally be sold without the permission of the 
other contracting parties, managers can dispossess other contracting parties of their residual 
claims (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Such agency problems are especially severe in highly 
leveraged firms. The model of Maksimovic and Titman (1991) shows that in firms that 
take high leverage, shareholders have a strong preference for the firm to retain cash flows 
in an effort to avoid bankruptcy. A highly leveraged firm might therefore stop honoring its 
warranties or may produce lower-quality products. Anticipating these problems associated 
with high leverage, customers may avoid purchasing from these firms (Opler and Titman, 
1994). High leverage can therefore lead to a customer-driven loss in market share.  
3.2.1.2. Competitor-driven High Leverage Costs (Predation Theory)  
Predation theory (Telser, 1966; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Chevalier, 1995) 
suggests that a highly leveraged firm is vulnerable to attacks from competitors. The 
rationale is as follows. Because of of capital market frictions, a highly leveraged firm faces 
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reduced access to capital as well as higher costs of capital, hence becoming less 
competitive. This provides an opportunity for financially healthy competitors to take 
advantage of this situation by lowering prices and intensively advertising their products in 
an effort to attract customers from the highly leveraged firm. If the leveraged firm can 
quickly obtain new capital, it can defend its market share by mimicking the predatory 
firm’s price reduction or advertising campaign. However, in the face of financial 
constraints, highly leveraged firms generally cannot raise sufficient capital to fight back 
and, as a result, surrender a large part of their market share to the predator. High leverage 
can therefore also lead to a competitor-driven loss of market share. 
3.2.2. Collectivism and the Costs of High Leverage 
Culture refers to those “beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups 
transmit fairly unchanged from generation to generation” (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 
2006, p. 23), or the “unwritten codes of conduct” (North, 1990, p. 4) that define appropriate 
decisions and behaviors in a country. The influence of culture on economic activities goes 
beyond that of legal institutions, as formal institutions cannot fully eliminate opportunistic 
behaviors due to incomplete contracts (Hart and Moore, 1988; Williamson, 1998). 
Consistent with this view, North (1990) observes that the informal constraints imposed by 
culture exhibit a stronger influence than formal laws in shaping choices in daily 
interactions. We expect the greater influence of culture to hold in the context of high 
leverage. As we discuss above, a highly leveraged firm has incentives to opportunistically 
renege on its implicit contracts with customers (e.g., maintaining product quality, honoring 
warranties). Since implicit contracts cannot be enforced, culture is expected to play a more 
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important role than legal institutions in shaping leveraged firms’ behaviors. Similarly, a 
highly leveraged firm’s competitors have incentives to take predatory actions against the 
firm. Because a firm typically has no contractual relationship with its competitors, legal 
institutions have even less ability to constrain such actions, and thus culture is also expected 
to play a more important role in shaping the behaviors of highly leveraged firms’ 
competitors.  
Hofstede (2001) suggests that a country’s culture can be captured by four value 
dimensions: collectivism/individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, and 
masculinity. In this paper we focus on the collectivism/individualism dimension as it is a 
fundamental driver of cultural differences across countries (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; 
Triandis, 2001) and, as we argue below, it has a theoretical link to high leverage. According 
to Hofstede (2001, p. 225), individualist countries are characterized by loose ties between 
individuals, whereas in collectivist countries people are integrated into in-groups that 
provide support in exchange for loyalty. Miller (1994) further describes individualist 
countries as having a focus on meeting the individual’s preferences and needs, while in 
collectivist countries people are expected to fulfill their duty to others and an individual’s 
interest is subsumed under the collective interest. Agents in individualist countries also 
attempt to change the outer environment by expressing their inner attributes (Markus and 
Kitayama, 1991), tend to be overconfident in their decision-making (Gelfand et al., 2002), 
and respond more to calculative incentives than moral incentives (Etzioni, 1975; Hofstede, 
2001), whereas agents in collectivist countries tend to suppress their inner attributes, avoid 
standing out, and are more morally driven. 
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Building on the theory of incomplete contracts and the value traits of collectivist 
countries, we argue that collectivism reduces the costs of high leverage by constraining 
opportunistic behaviors on the part of both highly leveraged firms and their competitors 
through two channels: tight group structures and mental conditioning. We discuss these 
channels in the context of customer-driven and competitior-driven costs below.  
3.2.2.1. Collectivism and Customer-driven Costs 
As we discuss above, agency cost theory suggests that high leverage increases a 
firm’s incentives to expropriate customers and thus decreases customers’ willingness to 
purchase. We argue that collectivism can mitigate such expropriation and thus reduce 
customer-driven high leverage costs.  
In collectivist countries, people are integrated into cohesive in-groups (Hofstede, 
2001) wherein people build trust, share information, and bond their interests. Various in-
group structures can be observed in the business world. In Japan, for instance, keiretsus are 
sets of firms with interlocking business relationships that center on a main bank that 
provides financing [see, for example, Berglöf and Perotti (1994) and Hoshi, Kashyap, and 
Scharfstein (1990)]. Inter-firm relationships in a keiretsu are cemented through cross-
shareholdings among the main bank, the firm, and the firm’s trading partners (Gerlach, 
1992) 39  and through frequent information sharing, for example, at monthly council 
meetings. These strong connections facilitate extensive intragroup sales. Similarly, in 
                                                          
39 Gerlach (1992) estimates that the intragroup holdings of the 20 largest owners range from 33% 
to 74%. 
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Korean chaebols, which are the dominant business structure in Korea,40 firms operate as 
business units of a large corporation. Among these “business units” exist extensive 
reciprocal shareholding agreements, cross-debt guarantees, internal sales, and information 
sharing [see, for example, Bae, Cheon, and Kang (2008)].41  
 The tight group structures prevalent in collectivist countries play an important role 
in disciplining firm behavior. Because of strong business ties through, for example, large 
cross-holdings of shares, in-group firms actively monitor potentially opportunistic 
behaviors by financially distressed firms (Berglöf and Perotti, 1994). Sanctions would be 
imposed on a highly leveraged firm if it discontinued after-sales service to customers or if 
it decreased product quality. The monitoring and sanctioning mechanism of tight group 
structures can thus lead a highly leveraged firm to choose not to behave opportunistically. 
Consistent with this view, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) show that a typical tight 
group structure, such as a Japanese keiretsu, substantially reduces distress costs among 
affiliated firms. We therefore expect that the tight group structures associated with 
                                                          
40 The top 30 chaebols account for 62.5% of total assets and 72.6% of gross sales of all listed firms 
in Korea (Bae, Cheon, and Kang, 2008). 
41 In yet another example, Fisman and Wang (2010) find evidence of “coinsurance relationships” 
between listed firms and non-listed firms in China. Under this arrangement the listed firm, which 
has better access to finance, serves as guarantor on loans for the non-listed firm. In turn, if the listed 
firm has consecutive negative earnings and is at risk of delisting, the non-listed firm may return the 
favor by paying a higher premium on purchased goods or services (e.g., through transfer pricing or 
trade favors). 
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collectivism lead to a negative relation between collectivism and customer-driven high 
leverage costs.  
Turning to the mental conditioning channel, collectivist cultures emphasize a 
group’s or community’s goals (Markus and Kitayama, 1991). Since an individual’s goals 
typically collide with the group’s goals (Schwartz, 1994), individuals in collectivist 
countries are conditioned to suppress their own objectives to serve the collective interest 
(Markus and Kitayama, 1991). We argue that this mental conditioning reduces agency 
costs between a highly leveraged firm and its customers.42 On the one hand, a focus on 
others’ interests will constrain a highly leveraged firm from acting opportunistically at the 
cost of customers. On the other hand, customers with collectivist mental conditioning will 
view survival of the highly leveraged firm as a goal of their own and thus be more patient 
with a highly leveraged firm that cannot quickly fulfill its warranty or product quality 
obligations. For example, when Mazda experienced severe financial difficulties in the 
1970s, other firms in the same keiretsu—the Sumitomo group—asked their employees to 
buy a new Mazda car.  
                                                          
42 In related work, high embeddedness in Schwartz’ (1994) framework [the analog of Hofstede’s 
(2001) collectivism dimension] is found to reduce manager-shareholder or controlling shareholder–
minority shareholder agency problems (Shao, Kwok, and Guedhami, 2010) as well as the agency 
costs of debt (Chui, Kwok, and Zhou, 2016). 
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3.2.2.2. Collectivism and Competitor-driven Costs 
We next argue that collectivism can mitigate predatory behaviors of highly 
leveraged firms’ competitors and thus reduce competitor-driven costs. Tight group 
structures in collectivist countries provide highly leveraged firms a defense against 
competitive attacks, which reduces competitors’ incentives to pursue predatory activities. 
As discussed above, tight in-group ties through, for example, cross-holdings of shares, 
bond the interests of the firms in a group. If a highly leveraged firm were to face price 
competition from an out-group firm, the other firms in the group are likely to provide 
financial capital to the leveraged firm to help it protect its market share by mimicking the 
price reduction. Anticipating in-group support of the highly leveraged firm, competitors 
are less likely to prey in the first place. We therefore expect that the tight group structures 
associated with collectivism lead to a negative relation between collectivism and 
competitor-driven costs. 
The mental conditioning associated with collectivism should also reduce 
competitors’ predation behavior and in turn competitor-driven costs, for three reasons. 
First, Markus and Kitayama (1991) and Li et al. (2013) suggest that while individualistic 
managers favor decision rules that are based on their own judgment, demonstrate their 
autonomy, and make them stand out, managers in collective countries avoid standing out. 
Since predatory strategies signal a firm’s attempt to change the business environment by 
distinguishing itself from rivals, which may be viewed as violating the cultural norm and 
lead the firm to being out-grouped, firm managers in collectivist countries are less likely 
to take predatory actions against highly leveraged firms.  
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Second, while individualism is strongly associated with an overconfidence bias 
(Heine et al., 1999; Odean, 1998; Markus and Kitayama, 1991), whereby people believe 
that their abilities are above average and that they can achieve better outcomes than others, 
collectivism favors constant self-monitoring and self-adjustment (Church et al., 2006), 
which reduces the cognitive biases caused by overconfidence (Biais et al., 2005). In the 
high leverage context, predation is risky. On the one hand, it can increase economic profits 
through an increase in market share. On the other hand, the firm could lose its investments 
in this strategy if it fails to drive the highly leveraged firm out of the market. Based on the 
argument that competitors in collectivist countries demonstrate less overconfidence bias, 
competitors in collectivist countries are less likely to prey on highly leveraged firms. 
Third, using Etzioni’s (1975) terminology, Hofstede (2001) argues that 
individualism is associated more with calculative involvement while collectivism is 
associated more with moral involvement. Hofstede (2001) finds that survey respondents in 
individualist countries tend to support the statements “a corporation is not responsible for 
its employees” and “for getting ahead in industry, knowing influential people is usually 
more important than ability” (Hofstede, 2001, p. 219)—statements that reflect more 
calculative involvement. Applying this rationale to predation theory, we argue that while 
preying on a financially weak firm is a potentially economically beneficial strategy, it may 
be perceived as unethical. In weighing the benefits against the costs, firms in individualist 
countries will stress the calculative side, justifying predation as in line with natural 
selection or creative destruction, while firms in collectivist countries will put more 
emphasis on moral involvement and thus view predatory activities as taking advantage of 
the weak. As a result, the mental conditioning of competitors in collectivist countries is 
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expected to further constrain them from taking predatory actions against the highly 
leveraged firms.  
Based on the above discussions, our main hypothesis is that, ceteris paribus, 
collectivism is associated with lower costs of high leverage. 
3.3. SAMPLE, VARIABLES, AND EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
3.3.1. Sample Construction 
To examine the impact of culture on the costs of high leverage, we compile data 
from six sources: 
(1) Compustat, which we use to construct firm-level financial variables; 
(2) Hofstede (2001), which we use to obtain cultural indexes; 
(3) The World Development Indicators (WDI) database, which we use 
to construct country-level economic development variables; 
(4) Djankov et al. (2008), which we use to obtain a country’s revised 
anti-director rights index; 
(5) International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), which we use to obtain a 
country’s law and order index; 
(6) Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World (EFW), which 
we use to construct a country’s legal system and property rights index. 
To construct the sample, we start with Compustat North America and Global for the 
period 1987–2010. We exclude firm-year observations if total assets and sales are negative, 
if the equity value is missing, or if the long-term debt-to-asset ratio is below 0 or beyond 
1. We also omit firm-years with asset growth or sales growth higher than 200% to control 
for outliers. Following prior research, we remove financial firms (SIC codes between 6000 
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and 6999) and utilities (SIC codes between 4900 and 4999). To further ensure that our 
measures of industry or country means are not biased by outliers, we require that each 
country-industry-year has no fewer than four observations and that each country has no 
fewer than ten observations. These filters lead to an initial sample of 380,181 observations 
representing 41,062 unique firms from 76 countries. Next, we merge this sample with 
Hofstede’s (2001) cultural indexes, WDI, Djankov et al. (2008), ICRG, and EFW to obtain 
our main explanatory and conditioning variables. We exclude firm-years with missing 
values for variables in the main regression. The final sample comprises an unbalanced 
panel of 158,612 observations representing 27,930 firms from 46 countries over the period 
1989–2010.  
3.3.2. Measuring National Culture 
Our measure of national culture comes from Hofstede (2001), whose framework is 
extensively applied in prior finance studies (Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2010; Gorodnichenko 
and Roland, 2011; Eun, Wang, and Xiao, 2015) and is arguably the most influential of the 
various cultural classifications in cross-cultural research (Kirkman, Lowe, and Gibson, 
2006). As we discuss above, we employ Hofstede’s individualism/collectivism index 
(IDV) as our main measure of national culture. This index captures the strength of ties 
among people in a community. The index is based on a survey of IBM employees that 
asked them to rate 1) work-life balance, 2) physical working conditions (good ventilation 
and lighting, adequate work space, etc.), 3) job security, and 4) degree of variety and 
adventure on the job. Higher ratings in areas 1) and 4) and lower ratings in areas 2) and 3) 
suggest higher individualism (lower collectivism). For ease of interpretation, we construct 
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collectivism (COL) as an index equal to (100% – IDV/100). In supplementary tests we also 
include Hofstede’s (2001) power distance (PDI), uncertainty avoidance (UAI), and 
masculinity (MAS) dimensions.  
3.3.3. Measuring the Costs of High Leverage 
Campello (2006) finds a negative relation between high leverage and relative-to-
rival sales growth.43 We extend Campello’s (2006) model to measure the costs of high 
leverage in a cross-country setting. Specifically, we estimate the following specification:  
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑎 + 𝜆1𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉 𝑖,𝑡−2 +  𝜆2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + ∑  
2
𝑘=1
 𝜆3𝑘𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
+ ∑  
2
𝑘=1
𝜆4𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∑  
2
𝑘=1
𝜆5𝑘𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +  𝜆6𝐷𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝐷𝑐
+  𝜆7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑐,𝑡 +  𝜆8𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑐,𝑡+ 𝜆9𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,     (1) 
where i indexes firms, c indexes countries, and t indexes years. Our outcome 
variable, SALES_G, captures both the purchasing behavior of customers and the predation 
behavior of competitors. We expect a decrease in sales growth if customers choose not to 
purchase from a highly leveraged firm or if competitors attempt to take over the market 
share of the highly leveraged firm. Our measure of high leverage, HLEV, is a dummy 
variable equal to one in a given year if the firm’s long-term debt ratio is in the top three 
                                                          
43 Campello’s (2006) main model, which is used to test a non-monotonic relation between leverage 
and sales growth, is not our focus. Rather, because we are interested in the effect of high leverage, 
we use the model in Campello (2006) that revisits the work of Opler and Titman (1994). 
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deciles in the country in which the firm is headquartered.44 A more negative coefficient on 
HLEV (𝜆1) would thus indicate greater costs of high leverage.
45 Note that if firms anticipate 
greater costs of high leverage, they may adjust their debt financing downward. In this case, 
reverse causality problems could arise. Two features of our model mitigate this concern. 
First, since firms can more readily adjust short-term debt compared to long-term debt, we 
rely only on the long-term debt ratio when calculating HLEV [following Campello (2006)]. 
Second, HLEV dummy is lagged two years relative to the year in which SALES_G is 
measured (the base year), which implies that debt adjustment in response to firm 
                                                          
44 Measuring a firm’s HLEV relative to its country peers alleviates the concern that our findings 
may reflect the influence of collectivism on leverage (e.g., El Ghoul et al., 2016). In our study, 
nearly 30% of firm-year observations in each country in our sample are considered highly leveraged, 
suggesting that country-level variables such as national culture are not likely to influence HLEV.  
45 One might wonder why a firm would choose to have high leverage if high leverage is costly. With 
this in mind, we follow prior research (e.g., Opler and Titman, 1994) and assume that otherwise 
identical firms choose different leverage ratios. This assumption is justified by Maksimovic and 
Zechner (1991), who argue that firms in the same industry are indifferent between a high 
leverage/high-risk strategy and a low leverage/low-risk strategy, and by Opler and Titman (1994), 
who argue that otherwise identical firms may simultaneously choose a high leverage/tax advantage 
strategy and a low leverage/cheap assets acquisition strategy. This assumption also finds empirical 
support in our propensity score matching analysis, where we match each high-leverage firm to a 
low-leverage firm that shares similar characteristics. To preview the results, HLEV continues to 
load significantly negatively on SALES_G with an impact of similar magnitude. 
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performance is less likely to take place. The firm-level control variables come from 
Campello (2006). Specifically, we control for firm size (SIZE), the natural logarithm of 
total assets; profitability (PROFIT), operating earnings plus depreciation divided by total 
assets; investment (INVESTMENT), capital expenditures over total assets; and selling 
expenses (SELLEXP), the ratio of advertising and selling expenses to total sales. As 
country-level controls, we include a developed country indicator (DEVELOPED), GDP 
growth (GDPG), inflation (INFLATION), and the strength of a country’s legal regime 
(LEGAL) to account for potential macroeconomic influences.  
Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), 
we use the relative measurement method when calculating the firm-level variables in 
Equation (1). Specifically, a firm’s HLEV is measured relative to its country peers,46 and 
the other firm-level variables are constructed relative to their country-industry-year means. 
This method accounts for the fact that firm-level variables are determined in part by peer 
performance or financial condition. Since peer performance is beyond a given firm’s 
control, relative-to-peer variables are less subject to endogeneity (Campello, 2003, 2006). 
To control for the influence of outliers, we winsorize PROFIT, INVESTMENT, and 
                                                          
46 Employing the relative measurement method to measure HLEV mitigates concerns about a high 
correlation between collectivism and leverage (Chui, Lloyd, and Kwok, 2002), the two components 
of the interaction term discussed in Section 3.4. As Table 1 Panel A suggests, for each country 
around 30% of firm-year observations are highly levered, which means that country-level variables 
such as collectivism are not likely to significantly influence HLEV. Consistent with this view, Table 
1 Panel C shows that the correlation between COL and HLEV is minimal (0.01). 
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SELLEXP at the 1% and 99% levels. In addition, to mitigate concerns that observations 
from the same firm are autocorrelated across years, we cluster t-statistics at the firm level. 
3.3.4. Empirical Design 
To investigate the impact of national culture, in particular, collectivism, on the costs 
of high leverage, we augment Equation (1) by adding COL and its interaction with HLEV. 
Specifically, we run the following model:  
𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆_𝐺𝑖,𝑡 =  𝑏 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑂𝐿𝑐×𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑂𝐿𝑐 + 𝛽3𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉 𝑖,𝑡−2 +  𝛽4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑  
2
𝑘=1
 𝛽5𝑘𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∑  
2
𝑘=1
𝛽6𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
+ ∑  
2
𝑘=1
𝛽7𝑘𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +  𝛽8𝐷𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝐷𝑐 +  𝛽9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑐,𝑡
+  𝛽10𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑐,𝑡+ 𝛽11𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 .     (2) 
We are interested in the coefficient on COL×HLEV (𝛽1). If collectivism reduces 
the costs of high leverage as we predict, 𝛽1 should be positive and significant. 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics for the key variables in our analysis (before 
country-industry-year adjustment) by country (Panel A) and for the full sample (Panel B). 
The sample distribution in Panel A exhibits a fair amount of variation. Similar to other 
cross-country studies, we find that the U.S. and Japan account for the largest percentage of 
firm-year observations (26.8% and 15.3%, respectively). However, in robustness tests we 
show that this unbalanced sample does not drive our main findings. Table 3.1 Panel C 
presents pairwise correlation coefficients between the variables used in our analysis. We 
find that the correlations between the variables in Equation (2) are relatively low, 
suggesting that multicollinearity is not a serious issue in our tests. 
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3.4. RESULTS 
Building on extant literature, in Section 3.1 we conduct our main analysis on the 
effects of collectivism on customer- and competitor-driven high leverage costs. To shed 
more light on the relationship between collectivism and the high leverage costs, we also 
conduct subsample tests and examine the channels through which collectivism influences 
the costs of high leverage. In Section 3.2 we extend our analyses by examining whether 
collectivism influences high leverage costs through a wider set of stakeholder groups, in 
particular, whether collectivism impacts high leverage costs through internal employees 
and upstream suppliers in addition to external competitors and downstream customers. In 
Section 3.3 we conduct robustness tests. 
3.4.1. Collectivism and the Costs of High Leverage 
3.4.1.1. Main Analysis 
Model 1 of Table 3.2 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results for 
Equation (1). We find that the control variables exhibit significant coefficients that are 
consistent with our expectations: firm size, profitability, investment, and selling expenses 
tend to be positively related to sales growth while the developed country indicator is 
negatively related to sales growth. More importantly for our purposes, we find that the high 
leverage dummy enters the regression with a negative coefficient that is statistically 
significant at the 1% level, which implies that high leverage (firm-years with a long-term 
debt ratio in the top three deciles of the country in which the firm is headquartered) is 
costly.  
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In Models 2 through 5 of Table 3.2, we examine how a country’s culture as captured 
by collectivism influences the costs of high leverage. Model 2 reports OLS regression 
results for Equation (2). We find a positive and significant coefficient on COL×HLEV. 
Economically, increasing collectivism from the first to the third quartile is associated with 
a 1% increase in highly leveraged firms’ relative-to-industry sales growth two years later. 
This finding supports our hypothesis that the costs of high leverage are lower in collectivist 
countries.  
In Model 3 we run a horserace using all four of Hofstede’s (2001) cultural 
dimensions to address concerns that collectivism may capture other cultural values. We 
continue to find that COL×HLEV enters the regression with a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient at the 1% level. In contrast, the interaction terms for the other 
cultural dimensions (PDI×HLEV, UAI×HLEV, and MAS×HLEV) load insignificantly. 
These results suggest that collectivism is the only cultural dimension that affects the costs 
of high leverage.  
Finally, in Models 4 and 5, we examine whether our main effect holds using a more 
extreme measure of high leverage. Recall that our main measure of high leverage is a 
dummy equal to one if a firm’s leverage ratio in a given year is in the top three deciles of 
the full sample. To address the concern that the three-decile cutoff might be arbitrary, we 
follow Opler and Titman (1994) and assign the value of one to top decile leverage 
observations and zero to bottom decile observations. Comparisons based on this definition 
are thus between extremely high-leveraged firms and extremely low-leveraged firms. We 
expect that under this more extreme definition of high leverage, the effect of collectivism 
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on high leverage costs should be more pronounced. As can be seen in Models 5 and 6, 
extremely high-leveraged firms experience larger losses in market share, and collectivism 
exerts greater ability to mitigate the losses associated with extreme high leverage (the 
magnitude of the coefficient on COL×HLEV more than doubles compared to the baseline 
model, going from 0.022 to 0.049). These findings lend further support to our hypothesis 
that collectivism is associated with lower costs of high leverage.  
3.4.1.2. Subsample Tests 
Our main theoretical argument holds that in an incomplete contracts environment, 
collectivism allows firms with high leverage to retain customers and constrains the 
predatory actions of the highly leveraged firms’ competitors. Taking this argument further, 
we posit that the effect of collectivism on the costs of high leverage should be greater for 
firms whose customers and competitors are more sensitive to the condition of high 
leverage. We test this conjecture in Table 3.3 using three proxies for greater high leverage 
costs: cross-listing, asset turnover, and industry debt level. Model 1 in Table 3.3 replicates 
earlier results for ease of comparison. 
First, firms cross-listed on major U.S. markets bond themselves to higher 
governance and disclosure standards (Stulz, 1999) and thus enjoy increased access to 
capital (Lins, Strickland, and Zenner, 2005). As a result, these firms should experience 
lower customer- and competitor-driven costs, while the costs of high leverage should be 
higher for non-cross-listed firms. We therefore expect the cost-reducing impact of 
collectivism to be greater for non-cross-listed firms. We define a non-U.S. firm as cross-
listed (not-cross-listed) if two years before the base year it has (does not have) a Central 
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Index Key (CIK) code, which is used to identify corporations registered with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission. In line with our expectation, Models 2 and 3 of 
Table 3.3 report a larger and significant coefficient on COL×HLEV for non-listed firms, 
but a smaller and insignificant coefficient for cross-listed firms.47  
Second, firms that produce highly specialized products tend to experience higher 
customer-driven costs. When customers purchase highly specialized products, they have 
more to lose if the firm fails to honor its implicit contracts. Because highly leveraged firms 
face strong incentives to renege on their implicit contracts, customers of these firms are 
particularly likely to avoid purchasing from these firms. To proxy for the degree of product 
specialization, we use the asset turnover ratio, which is given as the ratio of total sales to 
total assets. A lower asset turnover ratio indicates a longer production cycle (Long, Malitz, 
and Ravid, 1993), which suggests more specialized products. A firm is classified as having 
low (high) product specialization if its asset turnover ratio is above (below) the sample 
median two years before the base year. Consistent with our expectation, Models 4 and 5 of 
Table 3.3 show that the impact of collectivism on high leverage costs is indeed stronger in 
the low asset turnover subsample.  
Third, firms’ competitor-driven costs are larger if their competitors are financially 
healthy (Campello, 2003), as financially sound competitors can more easily raise capital to 
                                                          
47 Care should be taken in interpreting this result. As shown at the bottom of Table 4.3, the 
difference in the coefficients on COL×HLEV between listed and non-listed firms is not statistically 
significant. 
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fund predatory activities (e.g., reducing prices). Following Campello (2003) and Campello 
and Fluck (2006), we employ the industry debt level to proxy for the financial condition of 
a firm’s competitors. In particular, we classify the industry peers of a highly leveraged firm 
as financially unhealthy (healthy) if the industry average long-term debt ratio is greater 
than (less than or equal to) the median of the overall sample two years before the base year. 
As expected, the influence of collectivism on high leverage costs is stronger for industries 
with more aggressive competitor predation (Model 7) and insignificant for industries with 
low competitor predation (Model 6).  
We also posit that in weak legal environments, where contracts cannot efficiently 
regulate the behaviors of market participants, collectivism exerts greater influence on the 
costs of high leverage. To a certain extent, high leverage costs reflect contracting costs: 
customer-driven costs arise because highly leveraged firms may renege on implicit 
contracts with customers, and competitor-driven costs arise because imperfect financing 
contracts limit the ability of highly leveraged firms to raise external funds, which induces 
competitors to take predatory actions. Under incomplete contracts (Hart and Moore, 1988; 
Williamson, 1998), the degree to which these contracting costs can be reduced depends on 
a country’s contracting environment, which includes both formal institutions, such as rule 
of law and property rights protection, and informal institutions, such as national culture. A 
country’s legal systems and culture can serve as substitutes in regulating the behaviors of 
economic agents and hence in reducing the costs of high leverage. For example, in 
countries with a highly developed legal framework, firms’ implicit contracts with 
customers (e.g., promises on product quality) may turn into explicit contracts (warranties 
on products sold), in which case high leverage costs would be regulated largely by the legal 
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system. In contrast, in a country with a weak legal system, culture becomes more important 
in mitigating high leverage costs. We test this idea in Table 3.4 using two proxies for the 
strength of a country’s legal system: the law and order index from ICRG and the legal 
system and property rights index from EFW.  
A country is defined as having a strong (weak) legal system if its law and order 
index is greater than (less than or equal to) the median of the overall sample two years 
before the base year. Similarly, a country is defined as having a good (bad) legal system 
and secure (insecure) property rights if the legal system and property rights index is greater 
than (less than or equal to) the median of the overall sample two years before the base year. 
Models 2 to 5 of Table 3.4 show that, consistent with our expectation, the effects of 
collectivism on high leverage costs are significant and more pronounced for firms in 
countries with weak legal systems, but are insignificant for firms in countries with better 
developed legal systems.48 
                                                          
48  One could argue that these results are an outcome of the effect of national culture on the 
effectiveness of a country’s legal system (Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Licht, Goldschmidt, and 
Schwartz, 2005). In unreported tests, we repeat our split sample anlysis using the residuals from 
regressing legal protection proxies on collectivism and a set of controls. Our results remain 
unaffected. 
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3.4.1.3. How Collectivism Affects High Leverage Costs: Tight Group Structures and 
Mental Conditioning 
Our theoretical motivation is based on the idea that the tight group structures and 
the mental conditioning associated with collectivism drive our main finding on the relation 
between collectivism and high leverage costs. In this section we provide empirical evidence 
on these two channels.  
Collectivism fosters integrated firm networks. The tight group ties of firms in these 
networks can reduce a highly leveraged firm’s incentives to break implicit contracts with 
customers through increased monitoring of the firm, and can reduce competitors’ 
incentives to take predatory actions against a highly leveraged firm by reducing the success 
of predatory attacks. To shed light on whether our main effect operates through the tight 
group structures channel, we examine whether higher levels of collectivism are associated 
with tighter group structures as proxied by the prevalence of business groups 
(BUSINESSG), which, following Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011), is defined as the 
percentage of all listed firms in a country that belong to a business group. Building on 
Masulis, Pham, and Zein’s (2011) model, we regress BUSINESSG on COL and a set of 
control variables.49  The results reported in Table 3.5 indicate positive and significant 
                                                          
49 Following Masulis, Pham, and Zein (2011), the control variables include measures related to the 
restriction of private benefits (Investor Protection and News Circulation), economic deveopment 
(Log GDP), capital availability (Savings to GDP and Political Stability), and other regulatory 
factors (Consolidation Tax, Intra-group Tax, and Takeover Index). 
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relations between collectivism and the prevalence of business groups. These fidnings 
suggest that collectivist countries are indeed associated with tight group structures, in line 
with the tight group structures channel.  
Collectivism also conditions the minds of customers and competitors to support 
values likely to constrain customers and competitors from taking actions that will harm a 
highly leveraged firm. To examine this channel, we conduct two tests. First, we examine 
whether the effect of collectivism on high leverage costs persists in samples with a low 
prevalence of business groups. Specifically, we rank countries in descending order 
according to the prevalence of business groups, and then re-run our baseline regressions 
for Equation (2) after dropping the observations belonging to the top 25%, 50%, and 75% 
of countries. In Table 3.6 we find that the effect of collectivism on high leverage costs 
persists, which suggests that collectivism operates through some channel in addition to the 
tight group structures channel, for example, through the mental conditioning channel. Next, 
we directly examine whether collectivism influences the value traits that mentally 
condition customers and competitors. Data on the value traits “attentive to others”, “avoid 
standing out”, “overconfidence bias”, and “calculative & moral involvement” come from 
the 1990, 1995, 1999, 2005, and 2010 waves of the World Values Survey (WVS).50 
                                                          
50 To capture the value trait “attentive to others”, we rely on whether survey respondents indicate 
that responsibility is a quality that children should be encouraged to learn at home (Child 
responsibility). To capture the value trait “avoid standing out”, we rely on whether survey 
respondents indicate that they feel upset when somebody criticizes them (Upset when criticized). 
We expect that in countries where people are more sensitive to external judgement, people tend to 
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Consistent with the mental conditioning channel, in Table 3.7 we find that collectivism is 
significantly positively correlated with the value traits “attentive to others” and “avoid 
standing out”, and significantly negatively correlated with value traits “overconfidence 
bias” and “calculative & moral involvement”. 
Taken together, our findings in this section suggest that the beneficial effect of 
collectivism on the costs of high leverage operates through both the tighter group structures 
and the mental conditioning associated with collectivist cultures. 
                                                          
avoid standing out. To capture the value trait “overconfidence bias”, we rely on whether survey 
respondents indicate that the described person’s view on “adventure and taking risks are important” 
(Taking risk) is very much like them (1), not at all like them (6), or somewhere in between. We 
invert this scale so that a higher risk-taking assessment corresponds to greater overconfidence bias. 
To capture the degree of calculative versus moral involvement in decision-making, we construct 
two proxies based on whether survey respondents indicate that “keeping money that you have found” 
(Keep money found) or “failing to report damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked vehicle” 
(Not report car damage) can always be justified (10), never be justified (1), or somewhere in 
between. A higher value indicates that people tend to have more calculative (less moral) 
involvement in decision-making. We regress these proxies for value traits on COL and a set of 
respondent- and country-level control variables. Respondent-level control variables include MALE, 
AGE, EDUCATION, and INCOME. Country-level control variables include Law and Order, 
Efficient Judiciary, GDPG, and INFLATION. In addition, we control for WVS wave dummies and 
adjust standard errors for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the country level. 
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3.4.2. Other Stakeholder Groups 
So far, our results suggest that collectivism reduces costs of high leverage driven 
by customers (downstream stakeholders) and competitors (external stakeholders). Our 
focus on these two particular stakeholder groups builds upon the extant high leverage costs 
literature, that has generally overlooked the potential role of other stakeholders (e.g., 
Maksimovic and Titman, 1991; Titman, 1984; Bolton and Scharfstein, 1990; Chevalier, 
1995; Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006). However, while Titman (1984) and 
Maksimovic and Titman (1991) model the behavior of customers, they argue that their 
analyses can be applied to other stakeholder groups such as employees (internal 
stakeholders) and suppliers (upstream stakeholders).51 Accordingly, in this section we 
extend our analysis on the relation between collectivism and the costs of high leverage to 
include these stakeholder groups. In particular, in the spirit of Titman (1984) and 
Maksimovic and Titman (1991), we extend the “customer” story to the costs of high 
leverage that are driven by employees and suppliers.  
Like customers, employees and suppliers are less likely to do business with highly 
leveraged firms because they have strong incentives to retain more cash flows by cutting 
those costs not guaranteed in explicit contracts. Focusing on employees, high leverage can 
be costly because highly leveraged firms may cut job training, the quality of the work 
                                                          
51 Titman (1984) argues that liquidation can impose costs on employees and suppliers, in addition 
to customers. Similarly, Maksimovic and Titman (1991) suggest that while high leverage negatively 
impacts a firm’s ability to assure product quality, their analysis is applicable to many other types 
of implicit contracts, such as those with suppliers or employees.  
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environment, or salaries and benefits in an effort to increase cash flows.52 High leverage is 
therefore expected to induce employees to leave a firm. We conjecture that this effect is 
stronger for more talented employees in labor-intensive industries because their contracts 
contain more implicit components such as training and quality of facilities. Turning to 
suppliers, high leverage can be costly because a highly leveraged firm can have unstable 
or lower demand for a supplier’s products, or may have difficulty making timely payments 
on trade credit.53 High leverage should therefore induce suppliers to extend less trade credit 
to the firm.  
Also, as in the case of customers, we posit that collectivism mitigates unfavorable 
actions on the part of employees and suppliers for highly leveraged firms, which results in 
lower costs of high leverage. For example, tight group structures reduce agency conflicts 
between a highly leveraged firm and its employees and suppliers, and mental programming 
that emphasizes other stakeholders’ interests reduces the tendency to behave 
opportunistically towards employees and suppliers. Accordingly, we hypothesize that, in 
addition to its effects on the actions of downstream customers and external competitors, 
                                                          
52 For example, according to the Washington Post (October 28, 2004, E07), “Delta is seeking $1 
billion in pay and benefit cuts from its pilots” because “without the cuts, it would have to file for 
bankruptcy court protection.”  
53 For example, according to The Economist (January 22, 2002), “Kmart's suppliers became nervous 
as they saw the cash run out. Fleming, which supplies food and groceries to the discount chain's 
2,100 stores, stopped making shipments. Other vendors kept their delivery trucks away.” 
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collectivism mitigates high leverage costs through its effects on the actions of internal 
employees and upstream suppliers.  
To test this conjecture, we re-run our main analysis by replacing the dependent 
variable SALES_G with stakeholder performance variables as follows: 
𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌𝐸𝐸_𝐺𝑖,𝑡or 𝐴𝑃_𝐺𝑖,𝑡
=  𝑐 + 𝜂1𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉 𝑖,𝑡−2 +  𝜂2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + ∑  
2
𝑘=1
 𝜂3𝑘𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
+ ∑  
2
𝑘=1
𝜂4𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∑  
2
𝑘=1
𝜂5𝑘𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +  𝜂6𝐷𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝐷𝑐
+  𝜂7𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑐,𝑡 +  𝜂8𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑐,𝑡+ 𝜂9𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,     (3) 
𝐸𝑀𝑃𝐿𝑂𝑌𝐸𝐸_𝐺𝑖,𝑡  or 𝐴𝑃_𝐺𝑖,𝑡
=  𝑑 + 𝛾1𝐶𝑂𝐿𝑐×𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛾2𝐶𝑂𝐿𝑐 + 𝛾3𝐻𝐿𝐸𝑉𝑖,𝑡−2 +  𝛾4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡
+ ∑  
2
𝑘=1
 𝛾5𝑘𝑃𝑅𝑂𝐹𝐼𝑇 𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 + ∑  
2
𝑘=1
𝛾6𝑘𝐼𝑁𝑉𝐸𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡−𝑘
+ ∑  
2
𝑘=1
𝛾7𝑘𝑆𝐸𝐿𝐿𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑘 +  𝛾8𝐷𝐸𝑉𝐸𝐿𝑂𝑃𝐸𝐷𝑐 +  𝛾9𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐺𝑐,𝑡
+  𝛾10𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁𝑐,𝑡+ 𝛾11𝐿𝐸𝐺𝐴𝐿𝑐,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡.    (4) 
 
Under the employee dimension, we examine employee growth (EMPLOYEE_G), 
which captures employees’ willingness to work for a firm. We classify an industry as a 
high (low) labor intensity industry in a given year if it has a wage-to-capital ratio greater 
than (smaller than or equal to) the median of all industries two years before the base year. 
In Models 1 through 4 of Table 3.8, we find that high leverage is negatively associated 
with relative-to-industry employee growth. Additionally, an increase in collectivism from 
the 25th to the 75th percentile allows highly leveraged firms to reduce relative-to-industry 
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employee growth losses by 1.14% (2.63% for high labor intensity industries, 0.86% for 
low labor intensity industries). These results suggest that employees tend to leave a highly 
leveraged firm, but are less likely to do so if the firm is in a high collectivism country.  
Under the supplier dimension, we examine accounts payable growth (AP_G), 
which captures suppliers’ incentives to extend trade credit. In Model 5 we find that high 
leverage significantly lowers accounts payable growth. This result suggests that suppliers 
are less willing to extend trade credit to highly leveraged firms. Model 6 further shows that 
increasing collectivism from the 25th to the 75th percentile is associated with 2.14% higher 
relative-to-industry accounts payable growth for highly leveraged firms, which indicates 
that collectivism significantly attenuates suppliers’ reluctance to extend trade credit. 
Taken together, the results in this section are consistent with collectivism reducing 
high leverage costs driven by downstream (customers) and external (competitors) 
stakeholder groups, as well as internal (employees) and upstream (suppliers) stakeholder 
groups. These findings suggest that national culture affects financial outcomes by 
simultaneously influencing various stakeholders in the firm and its environment. 
3.4.3. Robustness Tests 
Our previous analysis shows that collectivism reduces high leverage costs. 
However, one could be concerned that this finding is due to endogeneity, the unbalanced 
sample composition, the choice of measures used in the analysis, or alternative 
explanations. In this section we conduct robustness tests to address these concerns.  
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3.4.3.1. Endogeneity 
A primary concern with our analysis above is potential endogeneity problems. First, 
on the collectivism side, reverse causality could occur if firms operating in countries with 
specific characteristics actively shape their institutional environment. However, because 
culture changes at a slow pace, on the order of centuries (Williamson, 2000), it is unlikely 
that individual firms’ high leverage costs influence the extent to which a country is 
collectivist. In addition, unobserved institutional factors that correlate with collectivism 
may also affect high leverage costs. Second, on the HLEV side, a reduction in sales and 
profitability can force a firm to take higher leverage to cover expenses. To the extent any 
of these effects hold, our results could reflect a spurious negative correlation between 
collectivism and the costs of high leverage.  
As we discuss above, in our main analyses we attempt to mitigate potential 
endogeneity by using the relative measurement method (Opler and Titman, 1994; 
Campello, 2003, 2006). Relative-to-peer measures are more likely to be exogenous because 
peer firms’ performance is beyond a focal firm’s control. In addition, we measure high 
leverage costs using long-term debt, which is less sensitive to short-term performance 
(Campello), and we use two-year lags between the high leverage and CSR measures and 
sales growth. However, to further address these concerns, in this section we employ the 
2SLS approach. Following Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz (2007), we use the license 
to drop pronouns (PRONOUN DROP) as an instrument for collectivism. Kashima and 
Kashima (1998) argue that a language that allows pronouns to be omitted from a 
conversation reduces the conceptual differentiation between a person and the context, and 
that this contextualization of the person is positively associated with collectivism. Based 
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on this argument, PRONOUN DROP satisfies the relevance condition of an instrument. 
Further, PRONOUN DROP likely satisfies the exclusion condition because grammar rules 
cannot plausibly affect firms’ high leverage costs, other than through collectivism. As an 
instrument for HLEV, we follow Campello (2003) and use two-year lagged HLEV.  
Models 1 and 2 of Table 3.9 report the first-stage regression results. We obtain the 
fitted values of collectivism by regressing COL on the control variables and the instruments 
for COL and HLEV. We obtain the fitted values of HLEV using an analogous approach. 
We find that PRONOUN DROP enters significantly positively on collectivism and the 
instrument for HLEV loads significantly positively on HLEV, consistent with our 
predictions. The first-stage F-statistics reported at the bottom of Table 3.9 are much larger 
than the threshold value of 10 (37,623.43 for HLEV and 66,602.86 for COL), further 
confirming the relevance of our instruments.  
Models 3 through 8 of Table 3.9 report the second-stage regression results. Here 
we use the fitted values of COL and HLEV instead of the original variables. Consistent 
with our OLS findings, the results confirm the existence of high leverage costs driven by 
customers, competitors, employees, and suppliers. Moreover, the results continue to show 
that collectivism can reduce these costs of high leverage. Economically, an increase from 
the 25th to the 75th percentile in collectivism score increases highly leveraged firms’ 
relative-to-industry sales growth by 1.17%, relative-to-industry employee growth by 
1.30%, and two-year lagged relative-to-industry accounts payable growth by 2.61%.  
Note that in Models 3 through 8 we also conduct statistical tests of instrument 
exogeneity. First, we run a regression of the residuals of the 2SLS models on the 
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instruments and control variables. We find that the p-values of the exogeneity tests are all 
larger than 10%, suggesting that the instruments are jointly insignificant. Second, we 
conduct a J-test of over-identifying restrictions and again find p-values larger than 10%. 
Neither set of tests can reject the null hypothesis that there is no correlation between the 
residuals and instruments, which confirms the exogeneity of our instrumental variables.  
Taken together, the results in this section show that our main findings survive 
endogeneity checks. 
3.4.3.2. Sample Composition  
Similar to other cross-country studies, our sample is unbalanced across countries. 
As shown in Table 3.1, U.S. and Japanese firms account for the largest percentage of firm-
year observations at 26.8% and 15.3%, respectively. To mitigate concerns that our main 
findings are driven by sample composition biases, in Table 3.10 we separately re-estimate 
our baseline regressions after excluding U.S. firms (Row 1), Japanese firms (Row 2), and 
firms from both countries (Row 3).54 In addition, we run a weighted regression (Row 4) in 
which each country is assigned a weight equal to the reciprocal of its number of 
observations. The results show significant positive loadings of COL×HLEV on SALES_G, 
EMPLOYEE_G, and AP_G and thus mitigate concerns about sample composition biases.  
                                                          
54 In unreported tests, we exclude countries with fewer than 100 observations. Our results remain 
qualitatively unchanged. 
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3.4.3.3. Alternative Proxies 
We next consider whether our main evidence on the link between collectivism and 
the costs of high leverage is sensitive to alternative proxies for high leverage and 
collectivism. Recall that our main measure of high leverage is two-year lagged HLEV. 
When we instead lag HLEV by three years (Table 3.10, Row 5), we find that while the 
impact of collectivism weakens after three years, it is still significant.  
Turning to alternative proxies for COL, we first use the Institutional Collectivism 
(Coll) measure from the GLOBE database constructed by House et al. (2004) (Table 3.10, 
Row 6). We also use the collectivism index of Tang and Koveos (2008) (Table 3.10, Row 
7), who update Hofstede’s index by incorporating the changing economic environment 
within each country. Results based on both of these alternative measures of collectivism 
are in line with collectivism reducing the costs of high leverage. 
3.4.3.4. Alternative Explanation 
An alternative explanation for our main empirical results is firm exit bias. Firms 
that go out of business cannot be tracked by Compustat. As a result, the surviving firms are 
usually good performers with low costs of high leverage. If either COL or HLEV is highly 
correlated with firms’ exit rate, then the observed relation between collectivism and high 
leverage costs could simply reflect firm exit bias. 
To address this concern, in Table 3.11 we examine the mean rate of firm exit based 
on Compustat data item DLRSN (reason for deletion). We find that highly leveraged firms 
are more likely to exit the sample. This means that, if anything, our high leverage sample 
should be biased toward better-performing (i.e., surviving) firms, which works against 
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documenting a negative relation between high leverage and sales growth. These findings 
suggest that our evidence on high leverage costs cannot be explained by firm exit bias. 
Next, we investigate whether the relation between collectivism and high leverage 
costs is driven by firm exit bias. We find that firms in high collectivism countries have a 
significantly lower probability of exiting the sample. The high collectivism sample is 
therefore biased toward low-performing firms, which works against documenting a 
negative relation between collectivism and high leverage costs. This suggests that the 
relation between collectivism and high leverage costs is not affected by firm exit bias. 
Another alternative explanation is product market structure. Culture may be 
correlated with product market structure if, for instance, industries in high (low) 
collectivism countries are less (more) competitive. In less competitive environments, 
customers may have limited choices and may tend to stick with the original products 
regardless of the financial conditions of the firm. Consequently, our evidence of lower 
costs of high leverage in high collectivism countries may simply reflect less competition.  
To test whether our results are driven by this explanation, in Table 3.12 we further 
control for product market structure variables as well as their interactions with high 
leverage. We employ two types of market structure variables. In Model 1, we use the 
natural logarithm of the Four-Firm concentration ratio (FFC), which captures the total 
market share of the four largest firms in an industry. In Model 2, we use the logarithm of 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), which captures the degree of market 
concentration. We find that the interaction terms FFC×HLEV and HHI×HLEV load 
insignificantly, suggesting that the product market structure explanation is not likely to 
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hold. More importantly, our main interaction term COL×HLEV is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1%, consistent with our main evidence. 
Overall, the results in this section reinforce our main finding that collectivism 
mitigates the costs of high leverage.  
3.5. CONCLUSION 
Prior research suggests that high leverage is costly because firms have incentives 
to take opportunistic actions that result in a loss of customers, and the financial weakness 
of highly leveraged firms induces competitors to take predatory actions that result in 
reduced sales growth. In this study, we investigate whether collectivism mitigates the 
market share losses of high leverage. 
We argue that due to incomplete contracting, national culture as captured by 
collectivism is an important determinant of the costs of high leverage. First, collectivism 
leads to the formation of tight group structures that can mitigate opportunistic behaviors 
by highly leveraged firms through increased monitoring and can mitigate opportunistic 
behaviors by competitors by decreasing the chance that such actions are successful. 
Second, collectivism mentally constrains customers and competitors from taking actions 
that would harm the highly leveraged firm.  
Based on a large sample of 158,612 firm-year observations from 46 countries over 
the 1989–2010 period, we find that collectivism reduces highly leveraged firms’ relative-
to-industry market share (i.e., sales growth) losses, suggesting that customer- and 
competitor-driven high leverage costs are lower in collectivist countries. In addition, 
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subsample tests show that the impact of collectivism on the costs of high leverage is more 
pronounced for firms that are more vulnerable to high leverage costs and for firms in 
countries that have less developed legal systems, lending further support to our main 
finding. We next confirm that our main finding is driven by the two posited channels: tight 
group structures and mental conditioning. Building on extant theoretical models of high 
leverage, we additionally examine whether high leverage costs are also driven by 
employees and suppliers and whether collectivism reduces high leverage costs for this 
wider set of stakeholders. Using the extended model, we find that collectivism helps highly 
leveraged firms retain customers, guard against rival predation, retain employees, and 
obtain trade credit from suppliers. These findings persist after addressing endogeneity 
concerns and are not sensitive to accounting for the unbalanced sample composition, 
considering alternative measures of culture, or addressing alternative explanations.  
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Panel A. Descriptive statistics by country       
Argentina 197 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.54 0.49 0.86 0.56 0.30 4.99 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.18 0.00 2.37 11.81 5.85 
Australia 4460 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.36 0.51 0.61 0.31 3.50 -0.08 -0.06 0.07 0.07 0.60 0.47 1.00 1.55 3.76 22.72 
Austria 496 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.45 0.11 0.70 0.79 0.34 5.90 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 1.00 1.26 1.61 15.00 
Belgium 640 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.25 0.65 0.94 0.54 0.32 5.89 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.09 1.00 0.82 2.04 15.00 
Brazil 1602 0.17 0.09 0.20 0.62 0.69 0.76 0.49 0.33 5.99 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.21 0.21 0.00 2.59 8.19 10.21 
Canada 5352 0.14 0.06 0.14 0.20 0.39 0.48 0.52 0.26 4.86 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.39 0.37 1.00 1.02 2.46 23.64 
Chile 858 0.11 -0.03 0.16 0.77 0.63 0.86 0.28 0.34 5.65 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.19 0.20 0.00 2.81 6.25 19.83 
China 12210 0.20 0.08 0.22 0.80 0.80 0.30 0.66 0.29 5.41 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.19 0.17 0.00 9.84 4.30 4.42 
Colombia 44 0.15 0.21 0.18 0.87 0.67 0.80 0.64 0.32 6.02 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.19 0.00 2.29 9.70 4.47 
Denmark 832 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.26 0.18 0.23 0.16 0.28 5.22 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.18 0.16 1.00 0.46 2.55 24.00 
Finland 986 0.10 0.04 0.10 0.37 0.33 0.59 0.26 0.24 5.58 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.04 1.00 1.65 1.43 21.00 
France 4618 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.29 0.68 0.86 0.43 0.30 5.66 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.08 1.00 0.63 1.85 17.24 
Germany 4572 0.09 0.03 0.11 0.33 0.35 0.65 0.66 0.34 5.38 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.12 1.00 1.17 0.92 17.64 
Greece 784 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.65 0.60 1.12 0.57 0.36 5.58 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.18 0.17 1.00 0.29 2.84 8.68 
Hong Kong 1218 0.15 0.07 0.13 0.75 0.68 0.29 0.57 0.30 5.40 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.23 0.21 0.00 3.92 -0.30 24.40 
Hungary 40 0.10 -0.01 0.23 0.20 0.46 0.82 0.88 0.48 5.91 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.21 0.21 1.00 2.85 5.48 8.07 
India 10002 0.20 0.08 0.18 0.52 0.77 0.40 0.56 0.28 4.14 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.00 6.40 6.17 20.00 
Indonesia 1909 0.12 0.01 0.16 0.86 0.78 0.48 0.46 0.28 4.59 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.00 3.77 11.60 10.55 
Ireland 311 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.30 0.28 0.35 0.68 0.34 5.82 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.28 0.28 0.00 1.88 2.11 30.00 
Israel 798 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.46 0.13 0.81 0.47 0.28 4.96 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.32 0.32 0.00 2.15 2.08 20.00 
Italy 1623 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.24 0.50 0.75 0.70 0.33 6.19 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 1.00 0.02 2.17 8.28 
Jamaica 14 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.61 0.45 0.13 0.68 0.29 4.65 0.20 0.21 0.04 0.04 0.17 0.17 0.00 -1.42 11.73 8.76 
Japan 24217 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.54 0.54 0.92 0.95 0.23 6.07 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.21 0.20 1.00 0.74 -1.30 22.51 
Korea, Rep. 3696 0.10 0.13 0.12 0.82 0.60 0.85 0.39 0.24 6.06 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.15 0.00 3.97 2.51 21.68 
Luxembourg 109 0.13 0.04 0.11 0.40 0.40 0.70 0.50 0.35 7.64 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.18 1.00 0.99 3.36 12.00 
Malaysia 5100 0.10 0.05 0.11 0.74 1.04 0.36 0.50 0.31 4.24 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.14 0.13 0.00 3.01 4.19 19.09 
Mexico 699 0.11 0.07 0.13 0.70 0.81 0.82 0.69 0.31 7.02 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.85 5.89 7.51 
Morocco 52 0.08 . 0.13 0.54 0.70 0.68 0.53 0.40 5.20 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.00 3.33 2.11 10.05 
Netherlands 1048 0.08 0.02 0.09 0.20 0.38 0.53 0.14 0.34 6.33 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.12 1.00 1.15 2.33 15.00 
New Zealand 387 0.11 0.05 0.14 0.21 0.22 0.49 0.58 0.25 4.24 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.10 1.00 0.52 2.98 22.44 
Norway 993 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.31 0.31 0.50 0.08 0.21 5.35 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.05 1.00 0.58 4.91 21.00 
Pakistan 935 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.86 0.55 0.70 0.50 0.30 4.09 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.00 1.97 12.51 12.23 
Peru 395 0.16 0.01 0.21 0.84 0.64 0.87 0.42 0.30 5.06 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.16 0.00 4.30 3.33 10.84 
Philippines 587 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.68 0.94 0.44 0.64 0.25 4.34 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.17 0.16 0.00 3.04 4.69 9.45 
Poland 1355 0.15 0.11 0.12 0.40 0.68 0.93 0.64 0.36 4.36 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.18 0.17 1.00 4.31 2.76 8.78 
Portugal 273 0.09 0.04 0.12 0.73 0.63 1.04 0.31 0.41 6.47 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 1.00 0.66 2.44 12.50 
1
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Russian Fed. 432 0.22 0.08 0.20 0.61 0.93 0.95 0.36 0.38 7.66 0.12 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.00 4.11 13.86 15.87 
Singapore 3359 0.14 0.08 0.12 0.80 0.74 0.08 0.48 0.26 4.36 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.15 0.14 0.00 4.09 1.76 25.27 
South Africa 1318 0.15 0.05 0.14 0.35 0.49 0.49 0.63 0.34 5.06 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.12 0.00 2.03 7.46 11.73 
Spain 626 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.49 0.57 0.86 0.42 0.36 6.77 0.08 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 1.00 0.42 2.68 23.81 
Sweden 2190 0.12 0.03 0.12 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.05 0.28 4.66 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.27 0.27 1.00 1.63 1.75 21.00 
Switzerland 1589 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.32 0.34 0.58 0.70 0.26 6.15 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.12 1.00 1.05 1.14 15.48 
Thailand 3130 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.80 0.64 0.64 0.34 0.28 4.33 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.16 0.16 0.00 3.62 3.06 12.14 
Turkey 502 0.13 0.06 0.21 0.63 0.66 0.85 0.45 0.33 5.98 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.07 0.14 0.14 0.00 2.29 12.89 12.99 
United Kingdom 9564 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.35 0.35 0.66 0.34 4.97 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.30 0.30 1.00 1.39 2.35 28.61 
United States 42490 0.08 0.03 0.10 0.09 0.40 0.46 0.62 0.28 5.25 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.40 0.40 1.00 1.04 2.29 16.07 
Argentina 197 0.09 0.02 0.11 0.54 0.49 0.86 0.56 0.30 4.99 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.18 0.18 0.00 2.37 11.81 5.85 
                     
 Panel B. Descriptive statistics for the full sample  
Mean   0.11 0.03 0.11 0.39 0.53 0.56 0.62 0.28 5.24 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.25 0.25 0.69 2.43 2.59 17.88 
Min   -1.00 -0.64 -1.00 0.09 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.00 -6.91 -1.75 -1.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -11.73 -6.01 3.00 
Q1   -0.05 -0.05 -0.14 0.09 0.40 0.40 0.52 0.00 3.92 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.83 0.89 15.00 
Median   0.09 0.01 0.07 0.33 0.50 0.46 0.62 0.00 5.19 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.15 0.15 1.00 1.91 2.29 18.00 
Q3   0.24 0.09 0.30 0.54 0.68 0.81 0.66 1.00 6.50 0.11 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.28 0.28 1.00 3.76 3.70 22.50 
Max   2.00 1.27 2.00 0.87 1.04 1.12 0.95 1.00 13.08 0.35 0.35 0.39 0.39 6.00 6.00 1.00 13.57 52.85 30.00 
SD   0.31 0.23 0.44 0.27 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.45 2.03 0.20 0.19 0.06 0.07 0.49 0.46 0.46 3.53 3.28 6.10 
                     
Panel C. Correlation matrix                 
SALES_Gt   1.00                   
EMPLOYEE_Gt   0.43*** 1.00                  
AP_Gt   0.37*** 0.31*** 1.00                 
COLc   0.03*** 0.01 0.01* 1.00                
PDIc   0.04*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.75*** 1.00               
UAIc   -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.04*** 0.55*** 0.27*** 1.00              
MASc   -0.05*** -0.03*** -0.05*** 0.29*** 0.13*** 0.66*** 1.00             
HLEVt   0.01 0.01* -0.01** -0.03*** -0.01*** -0.04*** -0.05*** 1.00            
SIZEt   0.07*** 0.07*** 0.03*** 0.07*** -0.00 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.23*** 1.00           
PROFITt-1  0.10*** 0.16*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.04*** -0.01*** 0.02*** 0.33*** 1.00          
PROFITt-2  0.05*** 0.10*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.03*** -0.01*** 0.02*** 0.31*** 0.63*** 1.00         
INVESTMENTt-1  0.09*** 0.09*** 0.04*** -0.07*** -0.02*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 0.12*** 0.05*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 1.00        
INVESTMENTt-2  0.10*** 0.07*** 0.05*** -0.08*** -0.03*** -0.14*** -0.16*** 0.13*** 0.05*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.69*** 1.00       
SELLEXPt-1  -0.01** -0.04*** -0.01*** -0.19*** -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.01* -0.09*** -0.29*** -0.54*** -0.48*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 1.00      
SELLEXPt-2  0.00 -0.03*** -0.01** -0.19*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.01** -0.09*** -0.28*** -0.51*** -0.54*** -0.06*** -0.05*** 0.88*** 1.00     
DEVELOPEDc   -0.07*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.58*** -0.68*** 0.22*** 0.28*** -0.01 0.09*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 1.00    
GDPGc,t   0.21*** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.22*** 0.31*** -0.18*** -0.16*** -0.01** -0.06*** 0.06*** 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.04*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.43*** 1.00   
INFLATIONc,t   0.06*** 0.03*** 0.05*** -0.08*** 0.18*** -0.50*** -0.57*** 0.03*** -0.13*** 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.00 0.00 -0.53*** 0.28*** 1.00  
LEGALc,t   -0.03*** -0.00 -0.04*** 0.13*** -0.10*** 0.13*** 0.33*** -0.00 0.01** 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** -0.06*** 0.19*** -0.06*** -0.37*** 1.00 
This table reports the summary statistics. Panel A presents the average of the key variables in the main regression by country. Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the full sample. Panel C shows the 
correlation matrix for the key variables in the main regression. The full sample comprises 158,612 firm-year observations from 46 countries.   
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Table 3.2 Collectivism and the costs of high leverage 
 
              Top 3 Deciles                           Top 1 Decile     
    COLc ALL COLc ALL 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COLc×HLEVt-2  0.022*** 0.029*** 0.049*** 0.048** 
  (3.49) (2.90) (4.23) (2.40) 
COLc  0.007 -0.024*** -0.009 -0.023 
  (1.26) (-2.95) (-0.85) (-1.37) 
PDIc×HLEVt-2   -0.013  0.004 
  (-0.90) (0.13) 
PDIc   0.024***  0.023 
  (2.71) (1.17) 
UAIc×HLEVt-2   -0.001  -0.016 
  (-0.11) (-1.00) 
UAIc   0.020***  0.015 
  (3.52) (1.21) 
MASc×HLEVt-2   -0.011  0.014 
  (-1.28) (0.79) 
MASc   0.017***  -0.007 
  (2.88) (-0.54) 
HLEVt-2 -0.009*** -0.017*** -0.006 -0.041*** -0.043*** 
  (-5.29) (-5.79) (-0.71) (-6.89) (-2.61) 
SIZEt  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
  (20.37) (20.45) (20.47) (15.54) (15.48) 
PROFITt-1  0.144*** 0.145*** 0.145*** 0.110*** 0.110*** 
  (18.04) (18.09) (18.11) (8.36) (8.36) 
PROFITt-2  -0.013* -0.012 -0.012 -0.015 -0.015 
  (-1.65) (-1.56) (-1.53) (-1.14) (-1.14) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.323*** 0.322*** 0.321*** 0.356*** 0.356*** 
  (15.13) (15.07) (15.02) (9.19) (9.19) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.175*** 0.173*** 0.173*** 0.146*** 0.146*** 
  (9.18) (9.04) (9.06) (4.21) (4.20) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
  (1.53) (1.49) (1.49) (1.15) (1.15) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.036*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
  (5.76) (5.71) (5.69) (3.16) (3.15) 
DEVELOPEDc -0.013*** -0.006* -0.017*** -0.002 -0.003 
  (-5.31) (-1.70) (-3.54) (-0.26) (-0.29) 
GDPGc,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002*** -0.001** 
  (-0.79) (-0.85) (-0.11) (-2.97) (-2.46) 
INFLATIONc,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-1.58) (-0.40) (-0.27) (-1.37) (-1.51) 
LEGALc,t -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001** -0.001** 
  (-0.11) (0.03) (0.53) (-2.54) (-2.34) 
CONSTANT -0.003 -0.011** -0.028*** 0.024** 0.014 
  (-0.75) (-2.07) (-3.99) (2.27) (0.98) 
N    158,612    158,612      158,612         46,950         46,950 
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R-squared 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.025 0.026 
This table reports OLS regression results for Equations (1) and (2). The dependent variable is SALES_G, firm sales 
growth, which is influenced by customers and competitors. The independent variables include the proxy for collectivism, 
high leverage, and firm- and country-level controls. Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; 
Campello, 2003, 2006), we use the relative measurement method when calculating firm-level variables. Specifically, a 
firm’s HLEV is measured relative to its country peers, and the other firm-level variables are constructed relative to their 
country-industry-year means. Model 1 presents results for Equation (1) on the costs of high leverage. Models 2 and 3 
present results for Equation (2) on the effect of collectivism on the costs of high leverage. Models 4 and 5 repeat Models 
2 and 3 using a more extreme definition of high leverage that assigns a value of one to the top decile firm-year 
observations and a value of zero to the bottom decile observations. Comparisons based on this definition are between 
extremely high-leveraged firms and extremely low-leveraged firms. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors 
that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.3 Subsample tests: the costs of high leverage 
 
     Customer       Competitor           
  Baseline Model Cross Listing Asset Turnover Industry Debt Level 
   yes no high low high low 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
COLc×HLEVt-2 0.022*** 0.015 0.031*** 0.017* 0.040*** 0.015 0.033*** 
  (3.49) (0.49) (3.36) (1.94) (4.47) (1.63) (3.27) 
COLc 0.007 -0.028 -0.003 0.044*** -0.042*** 0.000 0.031*** 
  (1.26) (-0.81) (-0.44) (6.44) (-5.18) (0.04) (3.82) 
HLEVt-2 -0.017*** -0.031** -0.023*** -0.012*** -0.031*** -0.013*** -0.028*** 
  (-5.79) (-2.09) (-4.39) (-3.20) (-6.61) (-3.65) (-4.91) 
SIZEt  0.011*** 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 
  (20.45) (3.94) (16.65) (13.79) (13.86) (13.54) (16.55) 
PROFITt-1  0.145*** 0.119*** 0.166*** 0.181*** 0.133*** 0.129*** 0.160*** 
  (18.09) (3.22) (14.40) (16.88) (11.80) (11.66) (13.95) 
PROFITt-2  -0.012 -0.029 -0.010 0.014 -0.038*** -0.003 -0.019* 
  (-1.56) (-0.74) (-0.86) (1.47) (-3.08) (-0.25) (-1.68) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.322*** 0.532*** 0.289*** 0.226*** 0.383*** 0.371*** 0.265*** 
  (15.07) (4.09) (11.98) (7.96) (12.80) (12.42) (8.77) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.173*** 0.283** 0.190*** 0.138*** 0.186*** 0.126*** 0.225*** 
  (9.04) (2.43) (8.74) (5.19) (7.11) (4.84) (8.00) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.010 -0.032 0.010 0.028* 0.004 0.005 0.012 
  (1.49) (-1.30) (1.21) (1.93) (0.60) (0.53) (1.42) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.036*** 0.043* 0.023*** 0.046*** 0.028*** 0.046*** 0.025*** 
  (5.71) (1.65) (2.79) (3.13) (4.01) (4.83) (2.97) 
DEVELOPEDc -0.006* -0.029* -0.005 0.009* -0.017*** -0.015*** 0.008* 
  (-1.70) (-1.90) (-1.36) (1.84) (-3.60) (-2.78) (1.86) 
GDPGc,t -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001** -0.001** 0.001*** -0.001** 
  (-0.85) (0.06) (0.04) (2.44) (-1.97) (2.74) (-2.55) 
INFLATIONc,t -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
  (-0.40) (0.99) (-0.60) (-0.02) (-0.78) (-1.31) (-0.26) 
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LEGALc,t 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.03) (-0.94) (-0.03) (-1.83) (0.28) (-1.03) (-1.36) 
CONSTANT -0.011** 0.016 -0.006 -0.039*** 0.028*** 0.006 -0.029*** 
  (-2.07) (0.56) (-0.76) (-5.14) (3.52) (0.65) (-3.61) 
N        158,612          7,074        109,048          78,517           80,095           71,775           86,837 
R-squared 0.024 0.038 0.022 0.031 0.022 0.025 0.024 
difference test (p-value)   0.314   0.039**   0.096*   
This table reports OLS regression results for Equation (2) using different subsamples related to the costs of high leverage. The dependent variable is SALES_G, 
firm sales growth, which is influenced by customers and competitors. The independent variables include the proxy for collectivism, high leverage, and firm- and 
country-level controls. Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), we use the relative measurement method when 
calculating firm-level variables. Specifically, a firm’s HLEV is measured relative to its country peers, and the other firm-level variables are constructed relative to 
their country-industry-year means. Model 1 repeats the results of the baseline model using the full sample. In Models 2 and 3, we define a non-U.S. firm as cross-
listed (not cross-listed) if two years before the base year it has (does not have) a Central Index Key (CIK) code, which is used to identify corporations registered 
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. In Models 4 and 5, a firm is classified as having a low (high) degree of product specialization if its asset 
turnover ratio is above (below) the sample median two years before the base year. In Models 6 and 7, industries with a high (low) debt level make up those with 
an average long-term debt ratio above (below or equal to) the median of the overall sample two years before the base year. t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
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Table 3.4 Subsample tests: legal environment 
 
  Baseline Law and Order Legal system and Property rights 
    high low high low 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COLc×HLEVt-2 0.022*** -0.022 0.026*** 0.003 0.025*** 
  (3.49) (-0.73) (3.40) (0.26) (2.93) 
COLc 0.007 0.036* -0.012* 0.031*** -0.017** 
  (1.26) (1.77) (-1.90) (3.02) (-2.52) 
HLEVt-2 -0.017*** -0.010* -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.018*** 
  (-5.79) (-1.72) (-4.81) (-3.37) (-3.75) 
SIZEt  0.011*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
  (20.45) (12.27) (17.08) (14.80) (14.96) 
PROFITt-1  0.145*** 0.136*** 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.130*** 
  (18.09) (11.86) (13.87) (15.13) (10.10) 
PROFITt-2  -0.012 -0.015 -0.011 -0.017* -0.003 
  (-1.56) (-1.24) (-1.08) (-1.70) (-0.21) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.322*** 0.291*** 0.338*** 0.299*** 0.344*** 
  (15.07) (6.97) (13.96) (8.86) (12.71) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.173*** 0.158*** 0.182*** 0.137*** 0.207*** 
  (9.04) (4.16) (8.49) (4.49) (8.67) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.010 0.008 0.011 0.011 0.005 
  (1.49) (0.95) (1.15) (1.44) (0.47) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.036*** 0.033*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.040*** 
  (5.71) (3.73) (4.30) (4.29) (3.87) 
DEVELOPEDc -0.006* -0.002 -0.006 0.016** -0.010** 
  (-1.70) (-0.13) (-1.58) (2.21) (-2.41) 
GDPGc,t -0.000 -0.002** 0.000 -0.001 0.001* 
  (-0.85) (-2.22) (1.39) (-1.02) (1.67) 
INFLATIONc,t -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
  (-0.40) (-0.13) (0.73) (-0.75) (0.20) 
LEGALc,t 0.000 0.000 0.001*** -0.000 0.001*** 
  (0.03) (0.41) (2.93) (-0.73) (4.09) 
CONSTANT -0.011** -0.028 -0.012** -0.035*** -0.010 
  (-2.07) (-1.39) (-1.98) (-2.96) (-1.57) 
N    158,612     45,420    113,192     73,689     84,923 
R-squared 0.024 0.025 0.023 0.026 0.022 
difference test (p-value)   0.063**   0.066*   
This table reports OLS regression results for Equation (2) using different subsamples related to the legal 
environment. The dependent variable is SALES_G, firm sales growth, which is influenced by customers and 
competitors. The independent variables include the proxy for collectivism, high leverage, and firm- and 
country-level controls. Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), 
we use the relative measurement method when calculating firm-level variables. Specifically, a firm’s HLEV 
is measured relative to its country peers, and the other firm-level variables are constructed relative to their 
country-industry-year means. Model 1 repeats the results of the baseline model using the full sample. In 
Models 2 and 3, a country is defined as having a strong (weak) legal system if its law and order index is 
greater than (less than or equal to) the median of the overall sample two years before the base year. In Models 
4 and 5, a country is defined as having a good (bad) legal system and secure (insecure) property rights if the 
legal system and property rights index is greater than (less than or equal to) the median of the overall sample 
two years before the base year. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors that are 
heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.5 Collectivism and prevalence of business group 
 
  Cross-sectional Regression Panel Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
COL 22.191** 18.986* 22.649*** 19.486***  
(2.16) (1.89) (11.75) (10.42) 
Investor Protection 2.343 4.131 1.963*** 4.199***  
(0.94) (1.33) (4.25) (7.34) 
News Circulation -0.018 -0.024 -0.022*** -0.024***  
(-0.80) (-1.19) (-5.50) (-6.64) 
Log GDP -2.446 0.680 -1.365*** 1.614***  
(-0.82) (0.18) (-2.71) (2.68) 
Savings to GDP -0.260  -0.248***   
(-0.61)  (-3.09)  
Political Stability  -7.409  -8.758***  
 (-0.93)  (-6.28) 
Consolidation Tax -3.188 -5.668 -3.551*** -6.004***  
(-0.72) (-1.34) (-4.30) (-7.78) 
Intra-group Tax -2.381 -0.710 -2.693*** -0.622  
(-0.73) (-0.30) (-4.49) (-1.42) 
Takeover Index -27.021* -34.923** -26.687*** -35.351***  
(-1.90) (-2.35) (-10.07) (-12.96) 
CONSTANT 69.568** 41.288 61.190*** 33.066***  
(2.12) (1.25) (10.14) (5.81) 
N 27 28 540  560 
R-squared 0.646 0.643 0.637 0.647 
This table reports OLS regressions results on the influence of collectivism on the prevalence of business group. The 
dependent variable is BUSINESSG, defined as the percentage of all listed firms in a country that belong to a business 
group. COL is constructed based on Hofstede (2001) and meaures the extent of collectivism in a country. Investor 
Protection is the principal component of revised anti-director rights, an enforcement index, and corporate disclosure. 
News Circulation is the total average circulation of daily newspapers per 1000 inhabitants. Log GDP is the natural 
logarithm of GDP. Savings to GDP is the ratio of total domestic savings over GDP. Political Stability is the perceived 
likelihood that the government will be overthrown or destabilized for unconstitutional or violent reasons. Consolidation 
Tax is a dummy variable indicating whether a parent firm can consolidate its subsidiary in which the parent has an 
ownership stake of less than 90%. Intra-group Tax is a measure of country’s tax law regulating intra-group transactions. 
Takeover Index gauges the extent of fair and equitable treatment of all shareholders in the takeover process and the 
transparency of this process. Models 1 and 2 follow the cross-sectional regression setting in Masulis, Pham, and Zein 
(2011), in which the control variables are measured in the year 2001. Models 3 and 4 employ panel regressions, which 
consider the time-variant features of the control variables. The panel regressions cover 28 countries over the 1991–2010 
period. t-statistic in parentheses is based on standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering 
at the country level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.6 Collectivism and the costs of high leverage: drop countries according to the rank of 
business group prevalence 
 
    Full Sample Drop Top 25% Drop Top 50% Drop Top 75% 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
COL×HLEVt-2 0.022*** 0.016** 0.029*** 0.044***  
(3.50) (2.27) (2.72) (3.03) 
COL 0.007 0.024*** 0.053** -0.113  
(1.26) (3.72) (2.04) (-0.80) 
HLEVt-2 -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.016*** -0.032***  
(-5.79) (-5.04) (-4.89) (-3.79) 
SIZEt  0.011*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 0.011***  
(20.44) (18.73) (16.51) (6.74) 
PROFITt-1  0.145*** 0.146*** 0.132*** 0.145***  
(18.09) (17.63) (13.31) (5.82) 
PROFITt-2  -0.012 -0.009 -0.005 0.011  
(-1.56) (-1.05) (-0.51) (0.46) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.322*** 0.304*** 0.409*** 0.462***  
(15.07) (12.18) (12.54) (9.42) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.173*** 0.176*** 0.155*** 0.253***  
(9.04) (7.82) (5.32) (5.62) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.010 0.009 0.006 -0.008  
(1.49) (1.37) (0.69) (-0.43) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.036*** 0.037*** 0.051*** 0.059***  
(5.71) (5.63) (6.31) (3.49) 
DEVELOPED -0.000 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*  
(-0.85) (-2.95) (-4.05) (-1.66) 
GDPGt -0.006* 0.009** 0.028 -0.053  
(-1.70) (1.97) (1.50) (-1.12) 
INFLATIONt -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001  
(-0.40) (-1.04) (1.51) (0.70) 
LEGALt 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002  
(0.03) (-2.98) (-3.07) (-0.78) 
CONSTANT -0.011** -0.019*** -0.036* 0.096  
(-2.07) (-2.78) (-1.67) (0.80) 
N   158,612      132,777      73,247       22,381 
R-squared 0.024 0.025 0.030 0.030 
This table shows results from the regressions of Equation (2) using OLS after dropping the top 25%, 50%, 75% of the 
observations that are ranked by the prevalence of business groups. The dependent variable is SALES_G, firm sales growth, 
which is influenced by customers and competitors. The independent variables include the proxy for collectivism, high 
leverage, and firm- and country-level controls. Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 
2003, 2006), we use the relative measurement method when calculating firm-level variables. Specifically, a firm’s HLEV 
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is measured relative to its country peers, and the other firm-level variables are constructed relative to their country-
industry-year means. Model 1 repeats the results of the baseline model using the whole sample. In Models 2 through 4, 
we rank the countries in descending order according to the prevalence of business groups, and then re-run our baseline 
regressions for Equation (2) after dropping the observations belonging to the top 25% (Model 2), 50% (Model 3), and 
75% (Model 4) ranking countries. t-statistic in parentheses is based on standard errors that are heteroscedasticity-
consistent and allow for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% 
levels, respectively.  
149 
 
Table 3.7 Collectivism and value traits
 
  Attentive to Others Avoid Standing Out Overconfidence Bias Calculative & Moral Involvement 
 Child responsibility Upset when criticized Taking risk Keep money found Not report car damage 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
COL 1.687*** 1.038*** -0.967*** -5.574*** -0.718***  
(3.13) (6.67) (-2.88) (-36.19) (-5.86) 
MALE -0.070*** -0.156** 0.505*** 0.259** 0.189  
(-3.08) (-2.34) (12.71) (2.45) (1.40) 
AGE 0.253*** -0.262*** -0.955*** -1.000*** -1.024***  
(5.01) (-3.73) (-10.21) (-3.63) (-4.22) 
EDUCATION 0.094*** 0.003 0.056*** 0.019 0.106***  
(6.61) (0.09) (3.35) (0.53) (7.86) 
INCOME 0.019 0.016 0.052*** 0.003 0.001  
(1.52) (0.62) (5.16) (0.28) (0.04) 
Law and Order 0.140*** -0.088*** -0.063 0.117*** 0.149***  
(3.28) (-4.13) (-1.06) (6.88) (11.02) 
Efficient Judiciary 0.032 -0.186*** -0.093* -0.810*** -0.318***  
(0.60) (-8.19) (-1.84) (-21.11) (-10.90) 
GDPG -0.001 0.000 0.010 0.000 -0.000  
(-0.11) (0.11) (0.58) (0.00) (-0.00) 
INFLATION 0.000 -0.000 0.022 -0.000 0.000  
(1.02) (-0.13) (1.44) (-0.00) (0.00) 
N            535,228               35,490                188,189                 30,205                 30,005 
This table shows OLS regressions examining the influence of collectivism on different value traits. To capture the value trait “attentive to others”, we rely on whether survey 
respondents think that “feeling of responsibility” is a quality that children can be encouraged to learn at home (Child responsibility). To capture the value trait “avoid standing out”, 
we rely on whether survey respondents feel upset because somebody criticized them (Upset when criticized). We expect that in countries where people are more sensitive to external 
judgement, people would tend to avoid standing out. To capture the value trait “overconfidence bias”, we rely on whether the survey respondents think the described person’s view 
on “adventure and taking risks are important” (Taking risk) is very much like them (1), not at all like them (6), or something in between. We revert the scale so that people with 
overconfidence bias tend to take more risks. To capture the degree of calculative or moral involvement in decision-making, we construct two proxies. The two proxies are respectively 
based on whether survey respondents think that “keeping money that you have found” (Keep money found) or “failing to report damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked vehicle” 
(Not report car damage) can always be justified (10), never be justified (1), or something in between. The higher value indicates that people tend to have more calculative (less 
moral) involvement in decision-making. Our proxies for the value traits come from the 1990, 1995, 1999, 2005, and 2010 waves of the World Values Survey. COL is constructed 
based on Hofstede (2001) and meaures the extent of collectivism in a country. MALE is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the survey respondent is male. AGE is the natural logarithm 
of a respondent’s age. EDUCATION reflects the highest education level a respondent attained. INCOME reflects self-evaluated scale of household income by a survey respondent. 
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Law and Order gauges the strength of the legal system, and the extent to which the citizens of a country are willing to rely on the established institutions to make and implement 
laws and adjudicate disputes. Efficient Judiciary is the assessment of the “efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business, particularly foreign firms”. GDPG 
is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita. Wave dummies are included but not reported for brevity. t-statistic in parentheses is based on standard errors that are 
heteroscedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the country level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.8 Collectivism and the costs of high leverage driven by employees and suppliers 
 
                Employee (EMPL_Gt)                    Supplier (AP_Gt)     
      Total sample    High labor intensity Low labor intensity  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
COLc×HLEVt-2  0.025*** 0.059*** 0.019*  0.048*** 
  (3.75) (2.58) (1.80) (5.44) 
COLc  0.007 -0.011 0.002  0.000 
  (1.36) (-0.81) (0.14) (0.04) 
HLEVt-2 -0.018*** -0.025*** -0.031*** -0.021*** -0.013*** -0.032*** 
  (-10.92) (-9.05) (-7.38) (-4.07) (-5.84) (-8.05) 
SIZEt  0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
  (9.89) (9.97) (8.02) (5.49) (13.52) (13.72) 
PROFITt-1  0.168*** 0.169*** 0.170*** 0.148*** 0.150*** 0.151*** 
  (21.92) (21.94) (19.16) (8.71) (15.46) (15.53) 
PROFITt-2  -0.003 -0.002 -0.005 -0.005 0.021** 0.022** 
  (-0.36) (-0.29) (-0.63) (-0.28) (2.18) (2.24) 
INVESTMENTt-1  0.240*** 0.239*** 0.160*** 0.322*** 0.242*** 0.241*** 
  (10.59) (10.52) (4.64) (9.07) (7.93) (7.87) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.043** 0.041* 0.054* 0.030 0.118*** 0.113*** 
  (1.96) (1.87) (1.65) (0.88) (4.10) (3.92) 
SELLEXPt-1  0.006 0.005 -0.002 0.017* 0.006 0.006 
  (1.05) (1.01) (-0.24) (1.82) (0.97) (0.90) 
SELLEXPt-2  0.023*** 0.023*** 0.032*** 0.005 0.025*** 0.025*** 
  (4.23) (4.16) (4.71) (0.56) (4.00) (3.93) 
DEVELOPEDc -0.008*** 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 -0.009*** -0.002 
  (-2.58) (0.21) (-0.29) (-0.14) (-2.88) (-0.35) 
GDPGc,t -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.63) (-0.58) (-0.92) (0.17) (-0.17) (-0.20) 
INFLATIONc,t -0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
  (-1.66) (0.04) (0.27) (0.09) (-0.13) (0.65) 
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LEGALc,t 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.69) (0.36) (0.20) (-0.23) (0.72) (0.86) 
CONSTANT 0.002 -0.008 -0.002 -0.004 0.000 -0.007 
  (0.41) (-1.30) (-0.13) (-0.32) (0.00) (-0.91) 
N   101,065   101,065    49,950    26,647    152,908    152,908 
R-squared 0.028 0.029 0.032 0.024 0.010 0.010 
difference test (p-value)  0.058*    
This table reports results OLS regression results for Equations (3) and (4). The dependent variables are EMPLOYEE_G (employee growth) or AP_G (accounts 
payable growth). The independent variables include the proxy for collectivism, high leverage, and firm- and country-level controls. Consistent with common 
practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), we use the relative measurement method when calculating firm-level variables. Specifically, a firm’s 
HLEV is measured relative to its country peers, and the other firm-level variables are constructed relative to their country-industry-year means. We classify an 
industry as a high (low) labor intensity industry in a given year if it has a wage-to-capital ratio greater than (smaller than or equal to) the median of all industries 
two years before the base year. t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm 
level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3.9 Endogeneity tests 
 
     First Stage                                     Second Stage                                   
  HLEVt-2 COLc SALES_Gt EMPLOYEE_Gt AP_Gt 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
COLc(fitted)×HLEVt-2(fitted)    0.026**  0.029**  0.058*** 
  (2.22) (2.32) (3.63) 
COLc (fitted)    0.066***  0.027***  0.026*** 
  (8.43) (3.40) (2.60) 
HLEVt-2(fitted)   -0.017*** -0.014** -0.018*** -0.015** -0.016*** -0.041*** 
  (-6.54) (-2.47) (-7.40) (-2.58) (-4.66) (-5.20) 
SIZEt  0.018*** 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
  (30.95) (6.44) (20.40) (20.02) (9.52) (9.45) (12.23) (12.26) 
PROFITt-1  -0.041*** -0.023*** 0.134*** 0.138*** 0.175*** 0.177*** 0.145*** 0.148*** 
  (-5.73) (-10.15) (13.61) (13.98) (19.76) (19.88) (12.06) (12.25) 
PROFITt-2  -0.117*** -0.034*** -0.002 0.005 0.010 0.013 0.043*** 0.047*** 
  (-13.72) (-13.36) (-0.16) (0.49) (1.21) (1.60) (3.65) (3.94) 
INVESTMENTt-1  -0.191*** -0.007 0.279*** 0.275*** 0.233*** 0.231*** 0.203*** 0.201*** 
  (-7.66) (-0.90) (11.21) (11.07) (9.17) (9.09) (5.48) (5.41) 
INVESTMENTt-2  0.593*** 0.006 0.182*** 0.177*** 0.044* 0.042* 0.123*** 0.117*** 
  (23.10) (0.90) (8.26) (8.04) (1.83) (1.74) (3.51) (3.32) 
SELLEXPt-1  -0.018*** 0.004*** 0.005 0.005 0.016** 0.016** 0.007 0.006 
  (-4.85) (2.88) (0.59) (0.51) (2.10) (2.07) (0.93) (0.84) 
SELLEXPt-2  -0.012*** 0.010*** 0.038*** 0.035*** 0.021*** 0.020** 0.023*** 0.021*** 
  (-2.87) (5.98) (4.35) (4.10) (2.61) (2.46) (2.90) (2.67) 
DEVELOPEDc -0.005 -0.207*** -0.025*** 0.012*** -0.015*** 0.008 -0.020*** 0.005 
  (-1.34) (-62.18) (-8.29) (2.71) (-3.87) (1.42) (-4.94) (0.75) 
GDPGc,t 0.000 0.002*** -0.001** -0.001** -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001** 
  (1.17) (10.61) (-2.27) (-2.47) (-1.19) (-1.21) (-1.72) (-2.11) 
INFLATIONc,t 0.001*** -0.008*** -0.001*** 0.001 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001 0.001 
  (2.87) (-22.89) (-4.18) (1.49) (-3.38) (0.65) (-1.41) (1.20) 
LEGALc,t 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (1.40) (-14.33) (0.64) (1.93) (1.23) (0.31) (1.50) (0.43) 
IV1_HLEVt-3 0.574*** -0.001       
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  (145.41) (-1.61) 
      
IV2_HLEVt-4  0.156*** 0.000       
  (39.99) (0.06) 
IV3_PRONOUN DROPc -0.018*** 0.348***       
  (-6.79) (148.62) 
CONSTANT 0.078*** 0.420*** 0.001 -0.060*** 0.002 -0.033*** 0.002 -0.029*** 
  (13.93) (131.15) (0.27) (-8.39) (0.30) (-3.73) (0.39) (-2.90) 
N    118,635    118,635     118,635     118,635      81,571     81,571     115,257     115,257 
R-squared 0.518 0.870 0.023 0.025 0.029 0.030 0.010 0.010 
First stage F statistic  37,623.43 66,602.86             
F statistic of exogeneity     0.23 0.07 0.17 0.10 0.72 0.43 
Exogeneity test p value     0.79 0.98 0.84 0.96 0.49 0.73 
J-statistic     0.69 0.21 0.51 0.30 2.16 1.29 
J-statistic p value     0.41 0.65 0.48 0.58 0.14 0.26 
This table reports results of 2SLS instrumental variable regressions. Consistent with common practice (Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), we use the relative measurement method 
when calculating firm-level variables. Specifically, a firm’s HLEV is measured relative to its country peers, and the other firm-level variables are constructed relative to their country-industry-
year means. Models 1 and 2 present the first-stage results. Following Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz (2007), we use the license to drop pronouns (PRONOUN DROP) as an instrument for 
collectivism. To instrument for HLEV, we follow Campello (2003) and use two-year lagged HLEV. Models 3 through 8 report the second-stage results. t-statistics in parentheses are based on 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3.10 Robustness tests: sample composition and alternative measures 
 
           SALES_Gt                       EMPLOYEE_Gt                     AP_Gt                
  COLc×HLEVt-2 COLc COLc×HLEVt-2 COLc COLc×HLEVt-2 COLc 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
Panel A. Sample Composition 
(1) Exclude U.S. 0.034*** 0.001 0.028** 0.008 0.045*** -0.003  
(3.89) (0.07) (2.85) (1.04) (3.83) (-0.28) 
(2) Exclude Japan 0.024*** -0.024*** 0.030*** -0.002 0.050*** -0.009  
(3.65) (-3.09) (3.48) (0.29) (5.40) (0.94) 
(3) Exclude Japan & U.S. 0.036*** -0.040*** 0.032** -0.010 0.048*** -0.021  
(4.06) (-3.95) (2.95) (-0.78) (4.01) (-1.60) 
(4) Weighted Regression 0.012* 0.014** 0.022*** 0.008 0.048*** 0.001  
(1.66) (1.98) (2.82) (0.94) (4.86) (0.08) 
Panel B. Alternative Proxy for High Leverage 
(5) Lag Three Years 0.013** 0.022*** 0.016** 0.016*** 0.039*** 0.012*  
(2.13) (9.24) (2.32) (3.11) (4.40) (1.68) 
Panel C. Alternative Proxies for Collectivism 
(6) COL_TK (Updated Hofstede by Tang and 
Koveos 2008) 0.016** 0.045*** 0.033*** 0.009 0.031*** 0.018*  
(2.17) (5.55) (3.73) (1.05) (2.97) (1.78) 
(7) INST_COL (Globe) 0.007* 0.000 0.012*** -0.004 0.015*** -0.002 
  (1.77) (0.10) (2.60) (-1.28) (2.81) (-0.58) 
This table reports results from a series of robustness tests. Only coefficients of COL×HLEV and COL are reported for brevity. In Panel A, we re-estimate 
our baseline regressions after excluding U.S. firms (Row 1), Japanese firms (Row 2), and firms from both countries (Row 3). In addition, we run a weighted 
regression in which each country is assigned a weight equal to the reciprocal of its number of observations (Row 4). In Panel B, the robustness test employs 
an alternative proxy for high leverage. In Panel C, the robustness tests employ alternative proxies for collectivism. t-statistic in parentheses is based on 
standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3.11 Robustness tests: firm exit bias 
 
Mean Rate of Bankruptcy Merger Others All 
Firm Exit          
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A. Split by High Leverage 
[1] Yes   0.43% 3.66% 1.98% 6.07% 
[2] No   0.28% 3.52% 1.59% 5.40% 
Panel B. Split by Collectivism 
[3] High   0.06% 1.15% 0.61% 1.82% 
[4] Low   0.58% 5.89% 2.77% 9.24% 
[1]-[2] Difference between High and Low Leverage Sample (p-value) 
     0.000***     0.159  0.000***  0.000*** 
[3]-[4] Difference between High and Low Collectivism (p-value)   
     0.000***   0.000***   0.000***   0.000*** 
This table reports the mean rate of firm exit due to reasons documented in Compustat Global data item 
DLRSN (Reason for deletion). Mean rate of Bankruptcy is the proportion of firm-year observations that exit 
Compustat because of bankruptcy or liquidation (DLRSN=02 or 03). Mean rate of Merger is the proportion 
of firm-year observations that exit Compustat because of acquisition or merger (DLRSN=01). Mean rate of 
Others is the proportion of firm-year observations that exit Compustat for reasons other than bankruptcy or 
merger (DLRSN=04-07, 09 or 10). Mean rate of All is the proportion of firm-year observations that exit 
Compustat for reasons listed in Models 1 to 3 (DLRSN=01-07, 09 or 10). Panel A presents the mean rate of 
firm exit split by high leverage. A firm is assigned to the high (low) leverage subsample if HLEV=1 (0) two 
years before the base year. Panel B presents the mean rate of firm exit split by high and low collectivism 
samples. Countries with high (low) collectivism have a collectivism score above (below or equal to) the 
median of the overall sample. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 3.12 Robustness tests: market structure explanation 
 
  (1) (2) 
COL×HLEVt-2 0.0237*** 0.0222***  
(3.39) (3.49) 
COL 0.0040 0.0067  
(0.62) (1.28) 
FFCt-2×HLEVt-2 -0.0026   
(-1.27) 
FFCt-2 -0.0023*   
(-1.82) 
HHIt-2×HLEVt-2  -0.0004  
(-0.24) 
HHIt-2  -0.0001  
(-0.11) 
HLEVt-2 -0.0209*** -0.0185***  
(-5.61) (-3.11) 
Controls Yes Yes 
N 127,437 158,612 
R-squared 0.0237 0.0236 
This table reports OLS regression results for Equations (2) and further control for market structure variables 
and their interactions with HLEV. The dependent variable is SALES_G, firm sales growth, which is influenced 
by customers and competitors. The independent variables include the proxy for collectivism, high leverage, 
and firm- and country-level controls. FFC is the natural logarithm of the Four-Firm concentration ratio, which 
is the total market share of the four largest firms in an industry. HHI is the natural logarithm of the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index, which captures the degree of market concentration. Consistent with common practice 
(Opler and Titman, 1994; Campello, 2003, 2006), we use the relative measurement method when calculating 
firm-level variables. Specifically, a firm’s HLEV is measured relative to its country peers, and the other firm-
level variables are constructed relative to their country-industry-year means. Model 1 additionally controls 
for FFC and its interaction with HLEV. Model 2 additionally controls for HHI and its interaction with HLEV. 
t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors that are heteroskedasticity-consistent and allow for 
clustering at the firm level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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CHAPTER 4 
CONCLUSION
This dissertation investigates how multi-layers of governance or institutional 
factors influence firms’ costs of taking high leverage. 
The literature on capital structure and product market interactions (Opler and 
Titman, 1994; Chevalier, 1995) suggests that high leverage is costly. The reason is that 
financial weakness could induce unfavorable actions by product market participants such 
as customers and competitors. While the costs of high leverage are well documented in the 
extant literature, little is known about the factors that influence the costs of high leverage, 
which is crucial for understanding the impact on firm value. The three essays, respectively, 
examine three factors that are embedded in the analytical framework of Williamson, the 
2009 Nobel Prize winner in Economics. Williamson (2000) explains different level of 
factors that influence economic behavior. The framework consists of four levels, with each 
imposing constraints on the level immediately below. The bottom level (Level 4) consists 
of resource allocation and employment. This is where incentive alignment is analyzed. 
Therefore, the costs of high leverage, which arise from the conflicts of incentives, lie in 
this level. Level 3 highlights the governance structure factors. Essay 1 in Chapter 1 
examines corporate social responsibility (CSR), which is shown to play a governance role 
that reduces financing costs (El Ghoul et al., 2011). Level 2 is where legal rules are located. 
Property rights and contract law are important features of this level. Essay 2 in Chapter 2 
focuses on creditor rights protection. The top level (Level 1) consists of culture, norms, or 
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traditions that serve as informal constraints on credible contracting. In this level, Essay 3 
in Chapter 3 studies national culture, particularly the most critical dimension of culture: 
collectivism (Hofstede, 2001). 
Chapter 1 examines whether CSR affects firms’ interactions with customers and 
competitors, and reduces the costs of high leverage. In a recent survey of 285 company 
executives, 80% indicate that corporate social responsibility (CSR) is important for firms’ 
long-term performance. Despite its perceived importance, however, whether CSR creates 
value is subject to debate. Using a large sample of 16,390 firm-year observations for 2,739 
firms over the 1996–2012 period, we find that CSR reduces losses in market share for 
highly leveraged firms. In particular, CSR helps highly leveraged firms keep customers 
and guard against rival predation. Our findings support the value-enhancing view of CSR 
and highlight an additional mechanism through which CSR can add value. 
Chapter 2 explores the influence of creditor rights on the costs of high leverage. 
Based on a large sample of 203,920 firm-year observations representing 30,041 firms from 
54 countries over the 1989-2010 period, we find evidence that strong creditor rights 
increase the costs of high leverage. This result is consistent with the dark-side effects of 
strong creditor rights when a firm is highly leveraged. The negative impact of creditor 
rights on high leverage costs is more pronounced for the types of creditor protection that 
drive creditors’ hold-up incentives as well as for firms facing more severe costs of high 
leverage, firms located in countries where bank loans are relatively more prevalent than 
bond issues, and firms with higher liquidation costs. When we explore the dark-side effects 
of creditor rights on specific players, we find that strong creditor rights intensify the 
adverse responses of customers, competitors, and employees. The novelty of this essay is 
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that it highlights the importance of firm-specific characteristics such as a firm’s financial 
health when considering the effect of strong creditor rights. More specifically, the results 
suggest that a more flexible (i.e., shorter-term) debt strategy may be optimal for firms 
operating in a strong creditor rights environment. In addition, this essay identifies strong 
creditor rights as a factor that influences high leverage costs, and is the first international 
study to shed light on the role of institutions in affecting the costs of high leverage.  
Chapter 3 examines how collectivism influences the costs of high leverage. In this 
essay, we hypothesize that these costs should be less pronounced in collectivist countries, 
which are characterized by tight group structures and group-oriented values. Using a large 
sample of 158,612 firm-year observations from 46 countries over the 1989–2010 period, 
the results suggest that collectivism reduces customer- and competitor-driven market share 
losses for high-leveraged firms. This effect is stronger where the costs of high leverage are 
higher and where legal systems are less developed. When we extend the analysis to include 
employee and supplier stakeholder groups, the results indicate that collectivism helps high-
leveraged firms retain employees and obtain trade credit from suppliers. These findings are 
robust to accounting for potential endogeneity and alternative explanations. This essay 
highlights a condition – high leverage – under which collectivism improves firm value. 
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APPENDIX A – CHAPTER 1 MSCI ESG STATS
 
 Concerns Strengths 
Community Investment controversies Charitable giving 
 Negative economic effect  Innovative giving 
 Indigenous peoples relations Non-U.S. charitable giving 
 Tax disputes  Support for housing 
 Other concerns Support for education 
  Indigenous peoples relations 
  Volunteer programs 
  
Other strengths 
 
Diversity  Controversies  CEO 
 Non-representation Promotion 
 Other concerns Board of directors 
  Work/life benefits 
  Women and minority contracting 
  Employment of the disabled 
  Gay and lesbian policies 
  
Other strengths 
 
Employee relations  Union relations  Union relations 
 Health and safety concern No-layoff policy 
 Workforce reductions Cash profit sharing 
 Retirement benefits concern  Employee involvement 
 Other concerns Retirement benefits strength 
  Health and safety strength 
  
Other strengths 
 
Environment  Hazardous waste  Beneficial products and services 
 Regulatory problems  Pollution prevention 
 Ozone-depleting chemicals  Recycling 
 Substantial emissions  Clean energy 
 Agricultural chemicals  Communications 
 Climate change  Property, plant, and equipment 
 
Other concerns 
  
Other strengths 
 
Human rights  South Africa  Positive record in South Africa 
 Northern Ireland  Indigenous peoples relations strength 
 Burma concern  Labor rights strength 
 Mexico  Other strengths 
 Labor rights concern  
 Indigenous peoples relations  
 Other concerns 
 
 
Product characteristics  Product safety Quality 
 Marketing/contracting concern  R&D/innovation 
 Antitrust  Benefits to economically disadvantaged 
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 Other concerns 
 
Other strengths 
 
Notes: We consider six CSR areas from MSCI ESG STATS to construct firms’ CSR and CSR_NET (as 
defined in Appendix B): community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product 
characteristics. This table lists the specific strength and concern factors that MSCI assesses in each area.  
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APPENDIX B – CHAPTER 1 VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
 
Variable Definition 
Source: Authors’ 
calculations based 
on 
 
Panel A. Corporate social responsibility variables 
 
CSR_NET Raw CSR score, computed based on six CSR areas in MSCI ESG STATS: 
community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and 
product characteristics. Within each of these areas, various strength and 
concern factors are assigned a value of 0 or 1. For each firm-year, we 
calculate a score for each CSR area that is equal to the number of strengths 
minus the number of concerns. We then sum the scores of the six areas. 
MSCI ESG 
STATS 
CSR Adjusted CSR score, computed based on six CSR areas in MSCI ESG 
STATS: community, diversity, employee relations, environment, human 
rights, and product characteristics. For each firm-year, we divide the raw 
strength and concern scores of each area by the number of factors in that area. 
We then take the difference between the adjusted strength and concern scores 
for that area. 
As above  
CSRPASSED  Dummy variable equal to 1 if, in the given year, the CSR proposal is adopted, 
and 0 otherwise. 
RiskMetrics& 
SharkRepellent 
IV1_BLUE Instrument for CSR equal to 1 if a firm’s headquarters is in a blue state and 
0 otherwise. Blue states are those whose residents vote predominantly for the 
Democratic party’s presidential candidate. 
270towin.com 
IV2_CSR Instrument for CSR, defined as one-year lagged CSR. MSCI ESG 
STATS 
 
Panel B. High-leverage variables 
 
HLEV High-leverage dummy variable equal to 1 if, in the given year, the firm’s long-
term debt ratio (= long-term debt/total assets) is in the top three deciles of the 
overall sample (across industries and over time). 
Compustat 
data 
IV1_HLEV Instrument for HLEV defined as one-year lagged HLEV. As above 
IV2_HLEV Instrument for HLEV defined as two-year lagged HLEV. As above 
   
 
Panel C. Outcome variable 
 
SALES_G Sales growth, equal to (SALES – SALES in previous year)/SALES in the 
previous year. SALES is total sales. 
Compustat 
data 
 
Panel D. Other variables 
 
SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets.  As above 
PROFIT Profitability, equal to (operating earnings + depreciation)/total assets. As above 
INVESTMENT Investment, equal to capital expenditures/total assets. As above 
SELLEXP Selling expenses, equal to (advertising + selling, general, & administrative 
expenses)/total sales. 
As above 
  175 
Post_reduction Dummy variable equal to one if the tariff reduction has taken place in industry 
j by time t (Valta, 2012). Tariff reduction is defined as a “shock” when the 
reductions of import tariff rates exceed a certain threshold. In particular, we 
consider industry-years with a tariff reduction at least twice the average annual 
change in the same industry.  
Feenstra 
(1996), 
Feenstra et al. 
(2002), and 
Schott (2010) 
PU Policy uncertainty, equal to the raw policy uncertainty index from Baker et al. 
(2015) weighted by year (or quarter) and then scaled by 100. The raw policy 
uncertainty index contains three components: count of newspaper articles 
containing key terms related to political uncertainty; the dollar effect of tax 
provisions set to expire in the near future; and dispersion in the economic 
forecasts of CPI and government spending. 
Baker et al. 
(2015) 
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APPENDIX C – CHAPTER 2 SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION
 
Step Firm-years Countries Firms Years 
Start with Compustat Global database. Drop 
observations if total assets and sales are 
negative, equity value is missing, long-term 
debt-to-asset ratio is below 0 or beyond 1, sales 
growth or asset growth is larger than 200%. 
Drop observations from financial institutions, 
utility firms, and industries that are not clearly 
defined (Fama-French 48-industry 
classification: 31, 44, 45, 47, and 48). 
463,583 103 49,786 1987-2010 
Merge with creditor rights index from Djankov 
et al. (2007). Drop country-industries with 
fewer than 4 observations. Merge with World 
Development Indicators to obtain GDP and 
Inflation information. Drop observations with 
missing values in SALES_Gt, HLEVt-2, SIZEt, 
PROFITt-1(t-2), INVESTMENTt-1(t-2), SELLEXPt-
1(t-2), GDPGt and INFLATIONt. Remove 
countries with fewer than 10 observations.  
285,542 54 30,588 1989-2010 
Keep observations with non-missing Fama and 
French (1997) industry classification. Left 
merge with debt enforcement data from 
Djankov et al. (2008). Left merge with 
renegotiation failure index from Favara et al. 
(2012). Left merge with International Labour 
Organization to obtain unemployment rate. Left 
merge with International Financial Statistics to 
compute the relative size ratio of bank loans to 
public bonds. Left merge with Fraser Institute’s 
Economic Freedom of the World to obtain 
international trade freedom index.  
203,920 54 30,041 1989-2010 
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APPENDIX D – CHAPTER 2 VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
 
Variable Definition Source: Authors' 
calculations based on 
Panel A. Creditor rights variables 
 
CRIGHTS creditor rights index, the sum of four binary variables. A score of one is assigned 
if an automatic stay on the assets of the firm is not imposed upon filing the 
reorganization petition (No Automatic Stay), if secured creditors are ranked first 
in the distribution of the proceeds payment as opposed to government or 
workers (Secured Creditor Paid First), if the reorganization procedure imposes 
restrictions, such as creditors' consent or minimum dividends for a debtor to be 
able to file for reorganization (Restrictions on Reorganization), and if 
management does not retain administration of its property pending the 
resolution of the reorganization process (No Management Stay). This index 
ranges from 0 to 4. 
Djankov et al. (2007) 
Panel B. High leverage variables 
 
HLEV a dummy variable equal to 1 if in the given year the firm’s long-term debt ratio 
is in the top three deciles of the country in which the firm is headquartered, and 
0 otherwise. 
Compustat Global 
Panel C. Control variables 
 
SIZE natural logarithm of total assets Compustat Global 
PROFIT profitability, =(operating earnings + depreciation) / total assets Compustat Global 
INVESTMENT investment, =capital expenditures / total assets Compustat Global 
SELLEXP sell expenses, =(advertising + selling expenses) / total sales  Compustat Global 
GDPG annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita (%) World Development 
Indicators 
INFLATION annual inflation rate (%) World Development 
Indicators 
Panel D. Other variables 
 
CAPEX_SALES capital expenditure ratio, =capital expenditures / total sales  Compustat Global 
ASSET_G asset growth, =(total assets – total assets at previous year) / total assets at 
previous year 
Compustat Global 
ASSET_VOL1 first measure of asset volatility, computed based on Bharath and Shumway 
(2008) 
Bharath and Shumway 
(2008) 
ASSET_VOL2 second measure of asset volatility, computed based on Hillegeist et al. (2004) Hillegeist et al. (2004) 
SALES_G sales growth, =(SALES – SALES at previous year) / SALES at previous year. 
SALES denotes total sales. 
Compustat Global 
UNEMPLOYG annual percentage growth rate of unemployment rate for each country International Labour 
Organization 
TIME time of enforcing creditor rights, represented by the estimated duration from the 
moment of default to the point at which the secured creditor receives payment 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
COST costs of enforcing creditor rights, represented by the estimated cost of the 
insolvency proceeding, reported as a percentage of the value of the insolvency 
assets. Costs include court/bankruptcy authority costs, attorney fees, bankruptcy 
administrator fees, accountant fees, notification and publication fees, assessor 
or inspector fees, asset storage and preservation costs, auctioneer fees, 
government levies and other associated insolvency costs. 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
EFFICIENCY efficiency of enforcing creditor rights, represented by the present value of the 
terminal value of the firm after bankruptcy costs, or (100*GC+70*(1-GC)-
100*c) / (1+r)^t. GC is equal to 1 if the firm continues as a going concern and 
0 otherwise, c denotes COST discussed above, t is TIME discussed above, and r 
is the nominal lending rate. 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
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RENEGOTIATION 
FAILURE 
renegotiation failure index, the average of the following binary variables: 1) 
secured creditors may seize and sell their collateral without court approval, 2) 
secured creditors may enforce their security in or out of court, 3) the entire 
firm’s assets can be treated as collateral, 4) an insolvency or liquidation order 
cannot be appealed, 5) an insolvency case is suspended until the appeal is 
resolved, 6) the firm is allowed to enter liquidation without attempting 
reorganization, 7) secured creditors may enforce their security upon 
commencement of the insolvency proceedings, 8) a defaulting firm must cease 
operation upon commencement of insolvency proceedings, 9) management does 
not remain control during insolvency proceedings, 10) secured creditors have 
the right to approve the appointment of the insolvency administrator, 11) 
secured creditors may dismiss the insolvency administrator, 12) secured 
creditors have direct vote on the reorganization plan. 
Constructed by Favara et 
al. (2012) based on 
Djankov et al. (2008) 
EMPL_G employee growth, =(EMP-EMP at previous year) / EMP at previous year, EMP 
is the number of employees 
Compustat Global 
AP_G annual percentage growth rate of accounts payable (AP), =(AP - AP at previous 
year )/AP at previous year, representing suppliers’ incentives to extend trade 
credit 
Compustat Global 
DEBTISSUE debt issuance, =(change of total assets – change of common / ordinary equity – 
change of deferred taxes) / total assets at previous year 
Compustat Global 
EQUITYISSUE equity issuance, =(sale of common and preferred stock – purchase of common 
and preferred stock) / total assets at previous year 
Compustat Global 
STOCKRETURN cumulative annual risk-adjusted stock return, = 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 −
𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 𝛽𝑚𝑘𝑡𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚 −𝛽𝑠𝑚𝑏𝑆𝑀𝐵−𝛽ℎ𝑚𝑙𝐻𝑀𝐿 
Compustat Global and 
Fama and French (1993) 
 
 
